Patricia Shipley, Heidi Mason (Eds.)

Ethics and Socratic Dialogue in Civil Society

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Dieter Krohn, Barbara Neißer, Nora Walter †

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

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This volume is dedicated to all those groups and individuals working across cultures, countries, faiths and languages, to build the bonds of friendship.

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Acknowledgments

This publication was sponsored by the Society for the Furtherance of the Critical Philosophy, in collaboration with the Philosophisch-Politische Akademie (Philosophical-Political Academy). Both these organizations are registered charities in the civil sector. They are both strongly interested in everyday ethics, and are committed to the promotion of critical philosophy applied to social and political life and to training in the skills of dialogue, modern Socratic Dialogue (or SD) in particular.

The Society for the Furtherance of the Critical Philosophy (SFCP), London, was founded in Britain in 1940 on the ideas of the German philosopher, Leonard Nelson (1882–1927). Nelson took up one line of Kantian philosophy which had been developed earlier, during the nineteenth century, by Jakob Friedrich Fries (1773–1843). This Fries-Nelsonian tradition emphasises empirical and psychological aspects of rational philosophy and is deeply concerned with issues of ethics arising in everyday life and practice. The SFCP is an educational charity and seeks to realize its aims through a variety of paths, including through the practice of Socratic Dialogue, through conferences, and through the support and promotion of scholarship in the Critical Philosophy. It also publishes the *Occasional Working Papers in Ethics and the Critical Philosophy.*

The Philosophisch-Politische Akademie (PPA) is a thriving sister charity in Germany, where there is also a subsidiary Gesellschaft für Sokratisches Philosophieren (Society of Socratic Facilitators, the GSP). Some members of the original PPA had to flee fascist Germany in the 1930s because of their political stance, and some eventually made their way to Britain. The PPA publishes the *Schriftenreihe*, which is a series of papers on Socratic philosophy, of which this publication is a part. The Schriftenreihe series is edited by Dieter Krohn and Barbara Neisser.

The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the SFCP, the PPA, or the GSP.

Introduction

> It is a truism that civil society is what we, as active citizens, make it, but it is also true that 'social energy', or 'willed action', is the spark that ignites civil society as a force for positive social change. The determination to do something because it is the right thing to do, not because we are told to do it by governments or enticed to do it by the market, is what makes associational life a force for good, provides fuel for change in the practices of states and business, and motivates people to raise their voices in the public sphere.
>
> Michael Edwards[1]

Few would disagree that Nelson Mandela, the black South African lawyer, Nobel Peace Prize winner, human rights activist, and former President of the democratic republic of South Africa, is among the modern world's great leaders. During his struggle against apartheid as a member of the African National Congress he eventually came to favour militant tactics against a recalcitrant government as opposed to an earlier policy of non-violence. Later, during his long imprisonment, he moderated his militant views, reverting from a revolutionary to a more co-operative and moderate political stance in pursuit of his goals of freedom and equality for black people.

For his biographer, Anthony Sampson, prison life enabled Mandela to become detached, to reflect, and to empathise with and persuade others to his view, including some of his warders.[2] In what came to be known as 'the university of Robben Island' (an informal culture of learning for the prisoners, which included interested warders) he became the dignified and respected model for others. He is described by Sampson as having been "Socratic" and "fiercely candid", cross-examining himself and others, exposing vagueness and clarifying ideas, and getting fellow prisoners to see both sides of an argument.[3] Many years later we are told, "Mandela sometimes sounded like a philosopher-king", and continued to refer to "first principles ... [of] reconciliation, human dignity and love."[4] "His prison ordeal had transformed him into

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1 Michael Edwards, *Civil Society,* Cambridge, Polity Press, 2004, p.111.

2 Sampson, A., *Mandela: The Authorised Biography*, London, Harper Collins, 2000, p.203. See also Mandela's autobiography, *Long Walk to Freedom*, London, Abacus, 1994.

3 Sampson, *op. cit.*, p.237.

4 Sampson, *op. cit.*, p.505.

a much more reflective and influential kind of leader ... [who] showed far more intellectual depth and originality than his early anti-colonialist clichés; and ...[who was] persistent in getting to the truth, however uncomfortable."[5]

Now, your editors are not suggesting that we all need a spell in jail in order to become clear and principled thinkers. We may benefit from learning the art of disciplined dialogue, however. For simplicity, we can distinguish between structured formal and facilitated dialogue such as modern Socratic Dialogue (SD) – or, as it is sometimes known, Neo-Socratic Dialogue (NSD) – and unstructured informal dialogue which is ordinarily what we understand by talk, chat, or conversation.

What is this modern practice of SD? The modern version of the method does not revolve around a central figure like the Socrates of old, or a modern Mandela for that matter. It is a multilateral form of group dialogue rather than the bilateral (one-to-one) traditional form. The revival of SD began in pre-Nazi Germany at the University of Göttingen where it was used primarily as a pedagogical tool by the philosopher Leonard Nelson. Later, in their struggle against fascism, trained German Socratic facilitators found SD helpful to the resistance workers in their small circle in the clarification of the motives behind their resistance. Since then, although it remains a little-known activity, its use has spread to other countries in Europe and is increasingly in use in other parts of the world. Although education remains its main field of application it is also now used in many other settings, including the world of business and commerce, and in public sector organizations.

Its underlying values and principles are Socratic. In essence, Socrates asked questions rather than provided answers. He maintained that all true knowledge was a form of self-insight, that comes from within and is waiting to be discovered, and also that a slave has the same rational potential as a person of rank (see the Platonic Dialogue 'Meno'). The idea was revolutionary: that Man is capable of knowing himself through the exercise of rational thought.

We were specifically interested in this volume in considering the potential role of dialogue, especially modern SD, to help to answer some of the ethical questions and issues arising in civil society. In this we hope to contribute to the debate about the role of dialogue in general in promoting the ethical effectiveness of civil society.

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5 Sampson, *op. cit.*, p.581.

Democracy and Citizenship

It is often said that disciplined public dialogue was the hallmark of classical democracy, that participation in political debate was expected of the whole citizenry, the polity, and that issues were settled in and through public debate. There was the ever-present danger, however, of the misuse of dialogue and rhetoric by the unscrupulous and ignorant, but the logical process of dialectic could serve as an antidote to such abuse. In Plato's Dialogue 'Gorgias' Socrates maintained that debate or oratory was to be used only in the service of "the right" – by which he meant in the service of the just, or in the service of ethics. Gorgias was himself a professor of oratory and he was engaged in debate with Socrates over the nature of his art. The real substance of the dialogue is actually ethics. For Socrates the whole purpose of life was ethical, by which he meant the avoidance of injustice. As modern Socratics, it follows that it is the ethics of civil society which should also engage us.

It is common belief that the birth of democracy, as a simple form of direct democracy, flourished under the unique conditions and the political order of Pericles in the self-governing city-state of ancient Athens. At the time, Athens prospered more than any other Greek state, where for once the warrior ethic gave way to 'civic'[6] virtues where the rule of law, philosophy and the arts of free public debate and dialogue flourished in the polis.

To another great classical philosopher, Aristotle, politics and ethics went hand-in-hand and the polis was an association of virtuous citizens. As a member of the polis, the Greek citizen was assumed to be a political being by nature and equal under the law. Citizenship has ancient roots, therefore. It must also be said that in ancient Athens democracy was a double moral standard which excluded women and slaves and it was not therefore a genuine democracy. Woman's place was quite categorically in the home.[7]

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6 'Civis' is Latin for citizen and 'civic' is proper to citizens. Civic society is a community of citizens. In ancient Rome the citizen was a legal member of the 'res publica' and dialogue and political debate took place in the public civic space of the forum. 'Civicus' was to enjoy freedom as a citizen of one's town; he who was not a citizen was a barbarian by definition.

7 See helpful texts for a detailed illumination of this ideology and its continuing legacy to the present day by: Squires, J., *Gender in Political Theory*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1999; Steans, J., *Gender and International Relations*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1998; and Nash, K., *Contemporary Political Sociology: Globalization, Politics and Power*, Oxford, Blackwell, 2000.

Citizenship these days is a central political concept in the West. It has a long and complex history and has been defined in different ways. Interest in it was revived in the 1980s as the need to deal with social divisions and tensions at home was becoming increasingly recognised. It excludes as much as it includes – excluding exiles, immigrants, refugees, the chronically homeless and so on. It is a legal status defined, conferred and protected by the modern state with the citizen bearing rights (such as property rights, and the possession of a passport) and obligations. Since 'civic' is a legal idea which pertains to the citizen and the city it should not be conflated with 'civil' which implies something broader, less specific, and is a non-legal term as such.

The modern world is a far cry from that of the ancient city-state of Athens. Many centuries later the modern state has grown vastly in size and power. The growing states of the great powers of the developed world became nation-states. Democracy developed into complex systems of representation. But there is a pressing modern crisis. Inflamed by dogma, terrorism has become an ever-present menace. With the end of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union, and the collapse of the latter after the fall of the 'iron curtain' in 1989, space has opened up for the resurgence of extremist nationalist sentiment which has taken a fundamentalist form in some disturbed and insecure areas of the world.

Civil Society and the 'Third Sector'

A main interest of this volume is that of the nebulous and complex idea of 'civil society'. What do we mean by civil society? Civil society is not an homogeneous entity.[8] To use modern jargon, it is a 'fuzzy' concept with fuzzy boundaries. Because of this ambiguity, civil society may be defined by default, by what it is not, that which is not state – or market. In Western political theory civil society has been clearly distinguished from the state. To add to our confusion, civil society is taken as private when opposed to the state, and public when opposed to the personal. Civil

[8] For Kate Nash, civil society is "an ideal of liberal democracy", and represents that sphere which is outside the scope of the state but includes individuals and private associations and institutions protected by the state. See her *Contemporary Political Sociology: Globalization, Politics and Power*, Oxford, Blackwell, 2000, especially the glossary on p.273.

society is often now also called the 'third sector', whereas previously the 'voluntary sector' or 'charity sector' was a more popular term.

On their own, individuals cannot achieve much to improve their life chances and need local grassroots initiatives and networks of ordinary people joined together in a common cause or project. A crude distinction can be made between the political and non-political associations of civil society. Associations may be quite clearly political organizations (such as anti-war protest movements), but they are often not at all political (such as Women's Institutes, church and religious groups, games and sports or social clubs of one kind or another). Allow us to return briefly to a little English history to illuminate this point.

Under the harsh conditions of work with the advent of the market economy during the first great wave of industrialisation in Britain, in the 18th and 19th centuries, the English working classes created 'Friendly Societies' to provide their members with mutual financial and community support, and opportunities for leisure and companionship. These early 'unions' were not explicitly political organizations and were a first experience for many workers of organized self-government. They gave individuals a sense of dignity, belonging and purpose. They afforded opportunities for ordinary people to hold office – although office in a voluntary capacity in a voluntary organization.

More precisely, in 1792 in radical 18th century London, a small group of tradesmen founded the London Corresponding Society.[9] Its purpose was the education of its members and ordinary people in history and politics. It also acted as a pressure group on the government for reform. Importantly, it acted as a co-ordinator of many similar popular reform groups. Barrell sees it as the first national political movement in Britain and with an influence far exceeding its size. There was at that time no government control over the conditions of labour and no organized trade unions. Clubs and groups in civil society which grew up in 18th century England convened in shared social and public spaces such as coffee houses and town centre meeting houses as well as in private homes.

There are many civil groups and associations today with clear-cut political objectives such as nationally-based NGOs (Non-Governmental Organisations) like the UK's Liberty (set up to protect human rights and civil liberties from encroachment and violation by the state), and, increasingly, international NGOs (INGOs) like Amnesty International, Greenpeace, and Jubilee 2000. Some are reputable pressure groups, and

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9 See Barrell, J., 'Divided We Grow', in *London Review of Books*, June 3, 2003, pp.8–11.

some less scrupulous. To complicate matters there are hybrid groups which are ostensibly non-political, such as a local conservation society or a medical charity, but which may use political lobbying, typically lobbying government authorities, to better achieve their objectives. Others are clearly non-political in their aims and practices.

Many civil society associations are informal and loosely-structured, but many others have taken a formal legal route becoming registered with 'articles of association' or 'articles of incorporation' – perhaps as a registered charity, or as a limited company with non-profit-making status. In the UK these voluntary groups are primarily self-regulating, but because they have a legal base are also under the control of the state. Charities are arguably the core, the heart of civil society. They are defined in the UK as bodies which are owned and governed by unpaid volunteer trustees approved by the appropriate official state agency – the Charity Commission – the state agency which regulates them at arms length.[10]

In the UK today it is estimated that there are 22 million adults (about 40% of the total population) engaged in some form of voluntary work; a form of labour which has been historically omitted from official labour statistics. Such unpaid labour is now considered to more than double the income of the 'third sector'.[11] There are about 170,000 registered UK charities which are bodies meant to benefit the public interest and which share a public service ethos. The UK charity sector's budget is about £20billion and a large part of this (about 40%) comes from government sources.

As an institution, the voluntary association in Britain goes back to the craft guilds of the late Middle Ages; the medieval fraternities which marked the beginnings of a structured and formal civil society. The

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10 For more information see: www.charity-commission.gov.uk

11 A similar point has long been made by feminist theorists, who have sought to draw attention to the economic value of women's unpaid labour in the home. Out of sight and out of the equation. Recently, Shirley Burggraf has argued that the Western family is an economic unit taken for granted by 'privatization' of the domestic sphere, and so overlooked by economic science. She suggests that the (unmarried) economist Adam Smith was naïve, and she highlights women's vast but unpaid labour as rearers and caretakers of children who are the future workforce, polis and citizenry. Burggraf sees the family unit as the primary source of human capital: see her book *The Feminine Economy and Economic Man: Reviving Family in the Post-Industrial Age*, Reading, Mass., Perseus Publishing, 1999. At the time of writing we do not know whether official statistics on the value of voluntary work include domestic labour and there is room for a productive debate on how one defines and distinguishes 'voluntary' work.

guilds appear to have furnished an escape from domestic ties and feudal hierarchy.[12] They were also an early form of quasi-professional body for the protection of market privileges; trade 'closed shops' which eventually came to form a wealthy middle class in the UK.

Modern Politics and Globalization: The Analogy of the Three-legged Stool

For democracy to have a good chance of working in practice, ideally certain conditions and criteria have to be met. In a modern Western liberal democracy these criteria are conventionally taken to be: universal suffrage and a representative government; an effective opposition to the ruling administration in power (the system is not one-party); an independent and effective judiciary and the rule of law and equality before the law; a free press and mass media; and an active vibrant civil society which enjoys freedom of speech, freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and freedom of association.

These different conditions are meant as countervailing forces to central authority; to act as barriers to a potentially overweening state – a check on the state's tendency towards excessive power which could be exercised through the coercive apparatus of the police and the military. A fashionable analogy to convey the notion of this balancing process is that of the three-legged stool. The three main arenas of democratic power are likened to a stool, with the three legs of the stool – the central state, the market (the economy), and civil society – all kept in dynamic and harmonious balance.

The three-legged stool of state/market/third sector is thought by many commentators today to be seriously unbalanced in an era of state cutbacks and privatization. They see an imbalance in the direction of the growth of the power of corporate capitalism and the markets which encroaches on the political and threatens the sovereignty of individual states. Many are alarmed by the global expansion ('globalization') of the big corporations and multinationals which are able to exploit an international division of labour and undermine the sovereignty of nation-

[12] See Bossy, J., *Christianity in the West: 1400–1700*, Oxford, Oxford Paperbacks, 1985. These associations were for Bossy a form of "social glue" or "social miracle", in which market rivalries were set aside for the social exchanges of "greeting, meeting and eating". (The term 'social capital' is more frequently used these days).

states by taking their business elsewhere to developing countries whose governments tax and regulate them less than do the home governments of the developed world, and where labour costs are considerably lower.

One response by governments is to roll back the frontiers of the state and to persuade other sectors, the private market, or the third sector with its reserve army of unpaid voluntary labour to take over some of the tasks which have been historically the function of the state. The hunt is on for the volunteer. One paradox is that the less space there is available for public meeting (places like public libraries and civic community centres) because of cutbacks in state funding and the increasing take-over of these spaces by commerce and business, the less opportunity there is for a thriving civil society to function.

Reasons for this Volume

This volume originated in an international conference, held at Newman College, Birmingham (UK), in the summer of 2002.[13] The conference experience exceeded our expectations and the warmth of the dialogue and exchanges will inspire us for many years to come.

Our theme was inspired by two broad and interrelated sets of issues, local and international. Firstly, looking inwards, there are *domestic* questions which threaten to undermine democracy. There is the question of whether and how to build unity and a common civic identity, a flourishing civil society and peaceful internal relations in today's fragmented societies. There is also the so-called 'democratic deficit' of how to guarantee the survival of democracy in an era of media and TV politics, low voter turn-out, growing disillusionment with representative forms of government and diminishing participation in formal political systems. What, in short, is the role of civil society in a modern democracy?

Secondly, the work was motivated by concerns about the supposed threats from a number of contemporary *international* developments, such as the laissez-faire globalization of deregulated capitalism over the past

[13] This was the 4th in a series of international conferences sponsored jointly by the SFCP and PPA.

20 years.[14] Then there are the ethical issues of the new biotechnology (of genetic testing, GM crops and the transplanting of animal parts into human patients). Also, at a time of European Union enlargement to 25 member states there is a particular interest in the effects of the recent collapse of the Soviet Union on the former Communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe, and on the Union itself.

Finally, together with most contributors to this volume, we have wide experience as volunteers serving in civil society at home and abroad and were struck by ethical problems and potential conflicts of interest encountered in that sector, by how such problems might sometimes hold back its efficacy, and (granted that much more than this is needed to improve matters) by how training in skilled dialogue might help alleviate some of these problems.

This volume is a result of a wider and longer term international collaborative project sponsored jointly by the SFCP and the PPA, and we hope it will be a modest contribution to a growing international and cosmopolitan civil society. There are at least 13 countries represented among our authors, and four papers have joint authors each based in different countries. The 17 papers in the volume are of roughly two main kinds. In Part One there are four lead papers, by authors from Germany, the UK, Bosnia, and Mexico, who were invited to offer a more general and theoretical slant to our topic. These set the scene for the 13 papers that follow in Part Two, which are more specific and, in some cases, more practice-oriented. In some of the latter the use of modern Socratic Dialogue (SD) in practice is described.

For the vast majority of our contributors, English is not their first language. However, all of these non-English speaking writers have contributed papers in English. We hope that the distinct national and cultural backgrounds of our contributors still comes across through their own use of what is an increasingly international medium.

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[14] Like civil society 'globalization' is a fuzzy concept to define with several dimensions to it, although most commentators focus on the economic dimension. In *What is Globalization?*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2000, p.20, Ulrich Beck likens it to nailing a blancmange to a wall. According to the editor of *The Ecologist*, Zac Goldsmith, today just 500 corporations control 70% of world trade and, with their financial power, it's impossible to exagerate their political influence – a state of affairs which he thinks is neither necessary or desirable. See Goldsmith's article 'Progress to Nowhere' in *Resurgence*, 219, 2003, p.22–23. For Ann Pettifor, Director of Jubilee Research at the New Economics Foundation, globalization is "the marketisation of society" (*Resurgence*, 219, 2003, p.26). See www.jubileeresearch.org.

Part One: Reflections on Civil Society

Primum non nocere (Above all, do no harm)

(The ethical principle of non-maleficence and the Hippocratic Oath for physicians)

The German political philosopher, Thomas Meyer presents the opening paper of Part 1. Meyer starts by expressing alarm at what he sees to be the negative side of globalization, which has become far too dominant in the modern world. He dwells in particular on the modern phenomenon of runaway market forces and the ability of big business in the modern world to disembed itself from the local 'lifeworld'[15] – to operate outside national frontiers and out of reach of national trade laws and regulations. Yet, by and large, our political capacity is still restricted to our role as citizens within the nation-state.[16] Traditional social values are increasingly displaced by materialist and consumerist priorities, and the technical *means* have over-run the social *ends* of modernization; technological change, economic growth and the profits from markets have become ends in themselves. This global market domination is seen by Meyer to be increasingly disconnected from the guiding influence of those basic human values that are normally upheld in national democratic cultures.

Thomas Meyer's remedy for this state of affairs is a form of *positive* globalization and the renewal of democracy. He advocates two approaches for this to happen, from the wider macro-institutional level

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15 'Lifeworld' is a term from existential phenomenological philosophy and is often used by the contemporary German social theorist and philosopher Jürgen Habermas. For Habermas the lifeworld has two spheres: the family and civil society on the one hand which lie outside the state, and the state and market on the other. The family and civil society, he argues, must resist the power and encroachment of the state and the market, which have a tendency to "colonise" and over-run the lifeworld, through state administrative bureaucracy and market commodification. His optimistic model of "deliberative democracy" through reasoned dialogue between citizens as equals, which he proposes as a solution to the modern malaise, is a cautious view. There is, he maintains, a potential for greater democratic participation in the informal non-state structures of civil society where its members have become organized, are co-operative and politically aware. See Habermas, J., *The Theory of Communicative Action*, trans. T. McCarthy, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1987.

16 The EU is a special case; citizens of member countries can take action at the level of European courts but their scope for political action and democratic involvement in the EU is much more restricted than at the national level.

to the microphysics of human interaction: from the building of "global governance" through new international institutions, to the local revitalization of civil societies. States and coalitions of states are needed to tame markets. Civil society is where consensus can be reached about goals, ethics and values to shape our lifeworlds, through a process of promoting solidarity in face-to-face public dialogues between citizens. The two levels are linked by appeal to a growing international civil movement to which the recent anti-globalization protests are a testimony.

In contrast to central politics and media-dominated communication, Socratic Dialogue (SD) conducted in public spaces is singled out by him as a role model for direct dialogue, because it is a voluntary activity in civil society where reasonable communication takes place, in principle, between equals. Its practitioners are urged to adopt a more political stance than is currently fashionable in Socratic circles. Meyer's premise is that a healthy civic order and civil society are a precondition for effective democracy, and that we have a basic democratic political and social right to this. In contrast, civil society is poorly developed in authoritarian states.

In his reply to Thomas Meyer's paper, Hugh Busher from the UK challenges what he refers to as the big 'modernist' solutions to the problems of globalization. Busher sees these as yet more central bureaucracies (like the EU and UN) which are prone to abuse their power, preferring instead 'postmodernist' solutions of smaller regional groupings in continuous dialogue with each other; solutions which accommodate difference, promote dialogue (including between religious faiths) and greater equality. He points to the unequal distribution of power in societies and the myths of presumed equality within democracies and the so-called 'freedom' of the markets.

Our next paper is by the British moral philosopher Peter Rickman and is reminiscent of a classic liberal position (the liberal ideal of minimal government intervention in the affairs of society), and warns against the dangers of authoritarian states. The state's main function should be confined largely to the role of protecting the freedom of its individual citizens. But this does not mean the total absence of control because there cannot be complete independence from central control. There is a need for states to be involved in regulating the economy, for example; all states have to strike internal balances between central control and local autonomy. For Rickman, civil society is, like the market, part of the private sector, and the state is the public sector. Over the question of

what makes a society free, Rickman proposes that a crucial dimension is that of being free as individuals to participate in a web of small voluntary groups and other associations which cater for our many and varied interests in a richly multi-faceted civil society. The legal framework provided by the state is essential for the flourishing of civil society and for protecting and safeguarding the legitimate freedom of individuals and groups.

Peter Rickman goes on to consider the notion of *academic* freedom and the position of the state-funded university in the UK today.[17] He believes that the university should be free to select what disciplines it teaches, and how to teach them. Necessary waste is distinguished from unproductive and unnecessary waste. University teachers should be trusted to be free to use their own discretion creatively (giving time to research, for example), and this includes the freedom to produce unavoidable waste sometimes. Such waste is tolerable as an inevitable price of freedom.

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[17] UK universities with independent royal charters are state-funded and occupy an ambiguous place in the third sector, therefore. How far they are instruments of the state or enjoy a kind of independent charitable status concerned to serve the wider public interest and the common good has become a salient debate since the general move to the political right in Europe with the rise of neo-liberalism and a growing expectation that funds be moved generally from the public to the private sector. Some critics argue that the universities are at risk of losing their radical critical cutting edge if not kept free from state funding and state interference, free from funds from business for that matter, and kept free from meeting the vested interests of third parties, in order, as its servant, to pursue the ideals of a civilized society.

In contrast, the modern American university has been entrepreneurial since before World War II, where the American idea of university contributions to public service is to help the economy. Onetime president of Harvard University, Derek Bok in 'Universities and the Marketplace', reviewed by Shapin in the *London Review of Books*, Vol. 25, September 2003, regards this commercialisation of American universities to be a distraction from their main purpose, which conflicts with academic freedom. Shapin takes a more sympathetic view of the need for such bodies which are not state-funded to get their funds from somewhere, and the inevitability of compromise, reminding us that throughout their history Western universities (in Britain too) have tended to serve the interests of authorities of one kind or another, – religion, state or market. But Shapin also warns that their central objectives of independent enquiry and responsible teaching could be confused with the peripheral; and that (if publicly-funded) universities have a commitment and duty to the public, and are uniquely placed to do certain things well that markets don't do well, such as turning out well-educated graduates and doing basic research as public goods.

If for the author of the last paper, *freedom to associate* with others and minimal interference from the state are hallmarks of the free society in a liberal democracy like that of Britain (at least in theory), *intellectual freedom* is a vital consideration in our next contribution, which is by Ugo Vlaisavljevic from the University of Sarajevo in Bosnia-Herzegovina, a state which was reconstituted from the recent break-up of former Communist Yugoslavia. The theme of the freedom of the university as an institution is taken up again in this paper, but universities in a post-Communist country like Bosnia have a very different history and culture from those in the UK. Under Communism the Bosnian university was required to legitimate the dominant ideology. This resulted in a deadness, the petrified and sluggish culture described here by Ugo Vlaisavljevic; a ritualised discourse keeping to the official party line – all these a hangover from one-party dictatorship. Communist universities were "free" only to perpetuate and legitimate a given political and totalitarian ideology – Marxism – which was promoted as a "true" and completed body of "scientific knowledge", closed and finite – finished off.

Vlaisavljevic writes about the problems of university renewal and "re-socialization" and the difficulty in transforming to democracy under such conditions. The mentality and social attitudes and practices that underpinned the old system prevail, despite the collapse of Communism; it is more that of a school than a university. There is still no genuine forum, no open circle or community of scholars, no truly autonomous, open and democratic culture in which "public debate, critical thinking and innovative research would be nurtured." Instead, ethno-nationalism has occupied the space vacated by the old regime. Visiting scholars to South East Europe who are keen to assist their hosts in their democratic goals fail to appreciate the reality.[18] What little research is done is pursued in isolation, and anything unorthodox is dismissed as esoteric and not treated as a serious challenge to the status quo. There is "silence around the Holy Truth" instead.

In her reply to these two papers Beate Littig from Austria questions the value of university scientists always being free to do whatever research appeals to them, such as unlimited research into genetics. She raises questions about the social roles of the university and science. The

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[18] The need to rebuild an active civil society in Bosnia is advocated in an article by Zarko Papic on 'Policies of international support to the SEE countries' printed in *Bosnia Report*, 23–25, June–Oct 2001, pp.31–35. See also Chandler, D., *Bosnia: Faking Democracy after Dayton*, London, Pluto Press, 1999, particularly chapter six on 'Building Civil Society'. Bosnia Report is published by the London based UK charity The Bosnian Institute, see www.bosnia.org.uk.

interconnections between civil society and the university and scientific worlds are in need of clarification, she feels. Civil society, moreover, has a long tradition but unclear meaning and definition. Does participation in civil society need to be institutionalized, and what constitutes civil society in a post-Communist country like Bosnia? She poses many other interesting and significant questions.

Like markets and states civil society has its own particular strengths and weaknesses; its own advantages and disadvantages; successes and failures. In our remaining paper in Part One, Fernando Leal, who writes from Mexico, dwells on the negative side of the third sector. We are reminded that 'to err is human' as he highlights the "sins" of civil society. His argument is reminiscent of a consequentialist ethical position in that it stresses the importance of the consequences of our ethical actions (rather than our original intentions), particularly the unintended consequences. Good intentions are often simply not enough. There are, in particular these days, unanticipated big and negative consequences for the growing financial dependency on government funds by the third sector.

Economic science might save us, however. As an intellectual, analytical and mathematical tool, it is advocated by Leal as a useful resource if we want to be more ethical as actors in civil society. Thinking through the eyes and tools of the economist might help us pre-empt some of the failures of the third sector. This resource is not only useful to markets and states. In fact, it is a valuable ethical tool for all who want to do the right thing. Economics is about choices, public or private choices, and their consequences, rather than about money as such, which is the main means of the facilitation of choice. [19]

For Leal, civil society has no sacrosanct claim to benevolence, and self-interest is as relevant an issue in this sector as it is in markets. There are particular incentives to getting involved in civil society, whether as volunteers or as paid workers, and these can be ethical traps. Failures, mistakes and unintended harmful consequences occur in civil society as much as in markets and governments, and economics can sometimes

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[19] Of course, economics is not a static science and is itself subject to these very tools. Feminist economists have pointed out the masculine bias in classical/neo-classical economic models: for example, of the private/public division and the invisibility of women's labour (see Burggraf, op. cit.). Perhaps this criticism in turn serves to make economics itself more reflective, more ethically aware. See Ferber, M.A. and Nelson, J.A. (eds.), *Beyond Economic Man: Feminist Theory and Economics*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1993. See also the journal *Feminist Economics* (edited by Diana Strassman) published by Routledge.

help us to see where our good intentions and ideals are leading us. It saves us from being blinded by "lofty ideals, good intentions and ethical earnestness".

Conscious of the problem posed for the modern world by the sociologist Max Weber, of the disconnection between acts and their consequences, Leal is also inspired by Weber's notion of the "ideal type" of organization. He wonders what happens when an organization in civil society departs significantly from voluntary work, which many might suppose to be the essence of charity activity in the third sector. The third sector is taken implicitly and uncritically as the *ethical* sector but, if it is intrinsically and in principle ethical with benign intentions, it may often be unethical in practice. For Leal, to use economics as an analytical tool is one way to become a more ethically aware citizen, volunteer, employee or aid worker.

Leal's paper offers more than an appeal to the strengths of economics.[20] It appeals to Socratic virtues, for Patricia Shipley, in a reply to his paper. Here, Leal is likened to a modern Socrates, a gadfly attempting to provoke a big and lazy third sector horse into self-criticism. He is seen, on the one hand, to be urging an eternal vigilance against outside influences that can deflect and distract civil society organizations from their 'true' and proper path. On the other, a kind of internal restraint is urged against over-enthusiasm and jumping into humanitarian 'solutions' which could lead to unintended and ugly consequences. For Socrates, ethics was the avoidance of injustice; it was the care of souls, especially his own soul.[21]

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20 Academic disciplines and tools have their particular strengths. They have their limits as well. Following Max Weber, one could say that although econometrics, the quantifying side of economics such as costs-benefits analysis, has brought gains to the modern world, it remains an instrumental rationalist modernist approach, rather than a postmodernist approach which is more qualitative than quantitative. Technical progress and technique/techne (Weber's 'instrumental rationality') – from arms race to genetic engineering– is the road to hell whatever form it takes when used without a sense of moral and ethical responsibility.

21 In a seemingly Pauline (Damascene) moral conversion, a senior Bosnian Serb politician, a woman in her 70s who would not have reached adulthood at the end of WW2, Biljana Plavsic made legal history by recently giving herself up to the war crimes tribunal in the Hague. A former Bosnian Serb Vice President and committed Orthodox Christian, her astonishing public courtroom confession was without precedent. She openly acknowledged and accepted full and unconditional responsibility for her part in one of the most heinous war crimes of the late 20th century, in which thousands of innocent civilians suffered terrible atrocities. She went further by offering reconciliation to the victims of her crimes. She was not alone in ordering these crimes but insisted that she bore an individual and personal

Part Two: Dialogue in Practice

Three papers from the 13 contributions in Part Two are from authors in former Communist countries (Lithuania, Belarus, and Bulgaria). A 'big bang' enlargement of the EU to 25 member states is to occur. But, in the transformation to democratic market societies, a kind of culture shock is

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guilt. This is in remarkable contrast to that of Adolf Eichmann at Nuremburg who claimed that he was doing his Kantian duty by only following orders – what the political philosopher Hannah Arendt referred to as the "banality of evil".

Plavsic's address to the court in Dec 2002 was also remarkable: "I have now come to the belief and accept the fact that many thousands of innocent people were the victims of an organized, systematic effort to remove Muslims and Croats from the territory claimed by the Serbs. At the time I easily convinced myself that this was a matter of survival and self-defence. ... Explanations of self-defence and survival offer no justification ... in this war we had lost our nobility of character. ... The obvious questions become, if this truth is now self-evident, why did I not see it earlier? And how could our leaders and those who followed have committed such acts? The answer to both questions is, I believe, fear, a blinding fear that led to an obsession, especially for those of us for whom the Second World War was a living memory, that Serbs would never again allow themselves to become victims. In this, we in the leadership violated the most basic duty of every human being, the duty to restrain oneself and to respect the human dignity of others... This responsibility is mine and mine alone ... yet, this leadership, without shame, continues to seek the loyalty and support of our people. It is done to provoke fear and speaking half truths in order to convince our people that the world is against us. ... I believe that we must put our own house in order. Others will have to examine themselves and their own conduct. We must live in the world and not in a cave."

She was presumably aware of South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission. She was probably aware of Plato's metaphor of the cave, and Socrates' puzzling argument that we do not willingly and knowingly commit injustice – that injustice, sin and vice is the product of ignorance. Notorious during the civil wars as one of Bosnia's hawkish Serbs, this university teacher of biology argued on local TV that Muslims were genetically inferior to Serbs. We may dismiss her confession as a cynical ploy to reduce the gravity of her sentence knowing that the game was up, in a plea-bargaining deal with the prosecution, (her 11 year sentence appears lenient), but who are we to judge? We may be on surer grounds about her remorse and wish for redemption and atonement for her sins, when we know of her deep Christian faith – allied with her age. If so, then we may be willing to accept that she now admits that she was mistaken in rushing into action that led to so much injustice to others, and which she now deeply regrets, and that she has taken the necessary steps to salvage her own soul before she takes her heavy conscience to the grave.

Her full address to the court can be found in *Bosnia Report*, 32–34, Dec 2002 – July 2003. See also 'Plea-bargaining at Hague sends confusing messages about war crimes accountability' in *Bosnia Report*, 35, Aug–Sept 2003, p.13.

taking place in some post-Communist countries preparing to join the EU.

In her paper on the problem of her country's integration into Europe, Grazina Miniotaite from Lithuania observes a reluctance in her country to "internalize democratic norms" including the legal norms and values of social order imposed from outside. She identifies a problem of "international socialization" where attitudes and living standards lag behind the rapid external push to integration. Viewing EU enlargement in normative terms she notes the political instability and corruption rife in her country. Miniotaite distinguishes two general methods of political and social change in dealing with value conflicts and incompatibility – the top-down EU model as distinct from a more Nordic grassroots approach. Miniotaite attributes transition problems in Lithuania partly to a top-down values imposition on the EU model. She also refers to a cross-cultural empirical study of values – the 'European Values Study' – which found that citizens of Central Eastern European countries share the "syndrome of institutional distrust" – a marked distrust of the state and its institutions (which applies especially to Lithuania), and under-confidence in their own capacity for control over their own lives. Lithuania has no independent civil society to speak of. Authoritarian attitudes are common, as is the desire for a strong leader. Grazina Miniotaite believes there is a need to stimulate new methods of dialogue in Lithuanian society and briefly mentions a British Council initiative in Lithuania to support an experiment with Socratic Dialogue there.

There is an economic crisis in Belarus as in all these former Communist states which have lost the old protectionist Soviet umbrella. Belarus, a near neighbour of Lithuania and onetime part of the latter, was until recently a part of the former Communist Bloc, and a "shop window of Soviet national policy" as described in our next paper jointly authored by Dimitri Kletschko from Belarus and Ute Siebert from Germany.

Like Lithuania, Belarus is not making an easy transition to democracy, nor has it a developed civil society. Dimitri Kletschko begins by telling us something of the history and culture of his country, which continues to maintain attitudes of the previous regime in a tendency on the part of his countrymen to believe what they are told. As a member of the German network of Socratic facilitators, Ute Siebert was a pioneer in the introduction of SD in Belarus, believing that this country needs outside support in the transition period and that SD can offer some (limited)

benefit. She hopes there will be a snowball effect – that the method will catch on widely there.

Like Fernando Leal, she is at pains to warn Westerners like herself to be wary in their interventions when their good intentions can lead to undesirable consequences. There should be no illusions. Cultural sensitivity is needed; an understanding of the current political situation is called for, and Western values should not be imposed from above or outside. She feels confident, however, that SD will be of benefit if introduced sympathetically because she sees it as a model of democracy in operation, which can teach democratic skills. She notes from her practical experience of SD facilitation in Belarus that the question of freedom preoccupied the minds of many local dialogue participants.

In democracies, children are the voters of the future. In fact, they are already junior citizens playing a part in local community life with the potential for independent critical thinking in civil society itself. They also have rights. Aneta Karageorgieva from Bulgaria tells us in the next paper about a successful attempt to introduce the Philosophy for Children (P4C) project in her own country, by the Association for the Advancement of Philosophy with Children whose aims are primarily education in the values of democracy and civil society and the promotion of critical thinking.

In her paper on the use of SD in UK schools as part of the Philosophy for Children project, the SD facilitator Karin Murris explores the connection between thinking skills and citizenship, citizenship education in schools being a contemporary political interest in multicultural Britain. Murris tackles the question of obstacles in the UK school environment to the effective teaching of thinking skills and the problems associated with the introduction of SD into UK schools.

The next paper is by the Japanese teacher of philosophy Toshiro Terada. Although Terada noticed an element of 'culture shock' with the Socratic method among Japanese participants, he has had some success in his introduction of SD into his university philosophy course. Terada acknowledges a certain rather stereotyped view of Japan as a feudal society that lacks genuine public dialogue and prefers its traditional virtues of conformity, harmony and consensus to acknowledging difference and dealing with conflict. In this picture, it is suggested that the minority voice is silently suppressed in Japanese culture and there is a lack of the necessary public skills for an active civil society in that country. Whilst he grants that there is some truth in this, Terada's

contribution suggests that there is potential for developing dialogue skills in Japan and enthusiasm for this amongst his students.

Given the centrality of an idea of consensus to Japanese culture, it comes as no surprise that Terada wishes to address the contentious place of consensus within SD and its relationship to the idea of truth that participants may hold. Perhaps it is Terada's experience of the negative aspects of consensus in Japanese society that leads him to question the untested view that consensus of opinion is a main feature of modern SD. Instead, he places a greater emphasis on what he sees as a "meta-consensus", that is, agreement about our search for truth, of which factual consensus is never a guarantee.

We detect a growing interest in SD facilitator circles to try to evaluate and do research into SD, to seek to understand the SD process better, both philosophically and psychologically. Like Terada, the following paper in this volume tackles SD process questions. One general view in education is that critical thinking depends on posing the right questions in the first place; that it is thinking about the questions that takes priority. The multi-authored paper by the international SD facilitator team Kopfwerk ('headwork') focuses on the question-posing/question-analysis phases in SD; it is an analytic attempt at the questioning of questions in SD. The team distinguishes between three different levels or orders of questions – of decreasing abstraction/increasing concreteness. The authors also emphasise the importance for the Dialogue of participants being as concrete as they can in all their contributions. (In the SD the Dialogue does indeed routinely begin with the very detailed presentation by one participant of a particular personal experience chosen as an illustration of the general theme of the SD).

The 18th century Scottish Enlightenment philosopher David Hume argued that feelings (Hume's "passion") are crucial for ethics, and that we have to care about something to be ethical about it. In their jointly-authored paper, Horst Gronke from Germany and Lily Sparnaay from the Netherlands consider the potentially constructive role that participants' feelings might play in SD, especially when the Dialogue is about ethical issues. In fact, they go as far as to claim that feelings are essential for Socratic reasoning, contrary to the Western philosophic tradition, which has opposed reason with feeling and valued the former above the latter. They suggest that the phrase "rationalized feelings" should enter the SD vocabulary.

In their jointly authored contribution to the volume, Robert Hamilton and Keith Hammond from Scotland outline the extra mural

work of the 'town and gown' tradition in British universities of service to the community. Such work has long been valued by Glasgow University teachers in the Scottish Enlightenment tradition (the tradition of David Hume and other distinguished Scottish thinkers) who have tried to help in the development of an active citizenry in the local community and to promote liberal adult education (which, as a matter of fact, has always included the specific needs of women) since before Victorian times. This is followed by a description in the paper of a particular ongoing project, the Pre-Access, at Glasgow University's Centre for Continuing Education, which is intended to help the underprivileged and marginalized members of the local community to gain access to higher education, and as a contribution to civil society. In fact, many Pre-Access Glaswegians go on to become university students. Dialogue and a "conversational philosophy" teaching style are a central part of this tradition, a teaching approach which recognises the value of the experiential elements of learning and the social dimension (feelings as well as the rationality), the friendship which grows in it.

Taking a cue from Fernando Leal, the paper by Dorothy Moir addresses the question of paid work in charities, within the framework of third sector organizations in a changing UK environment. It addresses in particular the blurring of boundaries between the public service provision by governments and that delivered by charities, as part of a central government policy to relieve pressure on resources, and its unintended effects on the integrity and nature of the charity sector – especially the potentially adverse effects on volunteers and their commitment and goodwill. She tentatively proposes a "fourth sector" to cater for the disillusioned volunteers who might leave the third sector in consequence, and advocates the use of formal dialogues like SD within the third sector to assist in clarifying the issues in this growing debate.

The question of payment for SD facilitation is a growing concern among German SD facilitators. In her own paper, Gisela Raupach-Strey of the PPA gives a brief introduction to the history of the modern SD with particular reference to its German philosopher founder Leonard Nelson and his successor, Gustav Heckmann, who developed the method after Nelson's early death. She also refers to the political resistance work of the anti-fascist Nelsonians in the 1930s, in particular citing the use of SD by Nelson's pupil and research assistant, Grete Henry-Hermann, to help support the resistance workers in that movement. It is Raupach-Strey's view that SD can contribute to the

promotion of democratic aims in civil society. Some of our readers may wish to read this paper first because of this historical background to SD.

The ethics of unequal expert–lay power relationships and the wish to empower their 'clients' is a topic that in recent years has worried many professional practitioners of one kind and another and is relevant for facilitators in SD. The use of SD as an equalising tool in doctor–patient relations in the context of medical ethics is the theme of the paper by Paulo Dordoni from Italy and Stan van Hooft from Australia who describe in detail a particular SD application in the clinical setting of optometry and the expert oculist. These authors consider the moral character, (the Aristotelian virtues), of the expert of great interest and relevance to the success of the consultation.

There seems to be no end to the march of technology and the social problems that can follow in its wake. The new field of the ethics of biotechnology has taken off since the success of the Genome gene-mapping project and the implications it has for personal privacy about health risks. In the next paper, Beate Littig from Austria describes a multi-site project, involving three different countries and funded by the European Commission, which aims to increase public participation in official and expert policy-making in the field of the bioethics of xenotransplantation (transplanting animal body parts into humans). SD is being used in this project to help enhance public involvement and debate and is once again promoted as a valuable tool.

In our final paper, Gale Prawda and Peter Rickman discuss another form of structured dialogue – the popular Café Philosophy method, which started in France a few years ago. They conclude that structured forms of dialogue are important tools to aid understanding; however, they make the point that such dialogues cannot replace the need for sustained private reflection by the individual. What are the relative merits of the various forms of structured dialogue, and what are the distinctive benefits of communal dialogue and solitary reflection? It might be useful and valuable to have comparative studies of the merits and limitations of the different forms of dialogue and philosophical investigation. We look forward to the dialogues that these and other explorations will create.

Part One: Reflections on Civil Society

Thomas Meyer

Renewing Democracy in an Era of Globalization

The Role of Civil Society, Ethics and Citizens' Dialogue

Abstract

Thus far, the world has passed through a prolonged period of largely *negative* globalization which has torn down frontiers and bypassed established mechanisms of responsibility and regulation. Whereas markets, environmental destruction, migration, organized crime, and electronic mass communication increasingly transgress all national boundaries, democracy and our political capacity to act are still restricted to the nation-state. Thus, democracy itself tends to become more and more powerless and consequently questionable.

What is urgently needed in order to bring the unleashed forces of modernization and globalization under the control of democracy, political deliberation and basic humane values is a process of *positive* globalization that proceeds by constructing new forms of responsibility, regulation and value orientation. To be successful, positive globalization needs a two-pronged approach: first, the erecting of worldwide structures for democratic decision-making and regulation in an era of globalization. Second, arriving at a consensus about the values, norms and goals that should give global democracy its meaning and direction. To create such a consensus we need public spaces and structures for citizens' dialogues within each society, and between all societies in the world of today.

A Diagnosis of the Present Situation

The present-day stage of the twin processes of modernization and globalization is marked by some alarming characteristics.[1] The most outstanding ones under discussion are the following:

- Whereas markets, environmental destruction, migration, organized crime, and electronic mass communication increasingly transgress all national boundaries, democracy and our political capacity to act are in the final analysis still restricted to the nation-state. Thus, democracy itself tends to become more and more powerless and, consequently, questionable.
- The cultural, social and ecological embedding of economic markets that has been successful in many Western democracies in the course of the 20th century has made capitalism more or less acceptable to those democracies. Today global markets are lacking appropriate embedding and national welfare states are challenged by the present form of globalization.
- Both economically-dominated globalization and market-led modernization of present-day societies display a strong tendency to become more and more disconnected from basic humane values and the preconditions for a good life for all the world's citizens. The shaping forces of this development lack guidance and orientation that could potentially meet with the consent of the large majority of those human beings whose lives are strongly affected by it.[2]

Using the terms of Jan Tinbergen, we can say that in the course of the last two or so decades the world has passed through a prolonged period of largely *negative* globalization, which has torn down frontiers and bypassed established mechanisms of responsibility and regulation.[3] What is urgently needed in order to bring the unleashed forces of modernization and globalization under the control of democracy, political deliberation and basic humane values is a process of *positive*

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1 Giddens, A., *Consequences of Modernity*, Oxford, Polity Press, 1991.

2 Held, D. and McGrew, A. (eds.), *The Global Transformations Reader: An Introduction to the Globalization Debate*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2000.

3 Tinbergen, J., *International Economic Integration* (Second Edition), Amsterdam, Elsevier, 1965.

globalization that proceeds by constructing new forms of responsibility, regulation and value orientation.

To be successful, positive globalization needs a two-pronged approach: first, the erecting of worldwide structures for democratic decision-making and regulation.[4] This can be achieved by building global governance as a new form of democracy in an era of globalization.[5] Second, arriving at a tentatively global consensus about the values, norms and goals that should give global democracy and regulation meaning and direction. To create such a consensus we need public spaces and new opportunities for citizens' dialogues within each society, and between all societies in the world of today.

A Crisis of Legitimacy

In both the academic and political discussions of recent years it has become obvious that the present world-order, or rather, in many respects, disorder, suffers a most severe lack of legitimacy. One expression of this being the growing protest movement, particularly of younger people, against the present mode of globalization and its consequences for large parts of the world's population both in the South and North of the globe. Regarding the issue of legitimacy, it is a consensus today that modern age standards of political legitimacy require two basic norms to be obeyed when it comes to political action:

- that all issues political in nature should be dealt with in politically legitimate procedures;
- that all such legitimate political procedures need to be based on human rights and democratic norms.

19th and 20th century concepts of democracy were based on the premise of co-extension between the twin arenas of political problem causation and political sovereignty of decision-making.[6] This was the rationale of

4 The Commission on Global Governance, *Our Global Neighborhood*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995.

5 Held, D., *Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1995.

6 Streeck, W., 'Einleitung' in *Internationale Wirtschaft und Nationale Demokratie. Herausforderungen für die Demokratietheorie*, Frankfurt am Main/New York, Campus, 1998.

the idea of the democratic nation-state. The nation-state was expected to harmonize the three dimensions of problem causation, addressees and authors of political solutions for all those problems political in nature. In order to define what is political in nature, and what belongs to the realm of privacy, two basic criteria emerged in the course of the 20th century.[7]

- All social actions that lead to rules and regulations that are binding for all members of a given society, so that no space is left for them to opt out, must be considered to be political in nature. There are basically two forms of such binding social facts: laws, rules and public policy projects on the one hand and external effects of societal activities that entail some kind of coerced consumption that nobody can avoid.
- Wherever basic human rights of groups of individuals are affected by the action of other groups there is a case for legitimate political intervention. Thomas H. Marshall has demonstrated that the very idea of basic human rights cannot be restricted, without severe contradictions, to liberal rights (as freedom from illegitimate state intervention) and political rights (to participate in the process of political decision-making), but needs to be extended to the sphere of preconditions for free action (social rights).[8] Thus the concept of basic human rights today combines the three dimensions of freedom from the state (liberal rights), freedom in the state (political rights) and freedom through the state (social rights). Wherever human rights in this broad sense are systematically violated political action is called for.

Hence, legitimate political action in the world of today – action to which all citizens wherever they live have a basic right – is required in all cases in which the two defined conditions are met for matters political in nature. Societal, economic or political actions that either cause unavoidable social facts for large groups or affect their basic rights need to be tackled through legitimate political procedures. Those chains of political effect-causation that transgress national boundaries need transnational arenas for deliberation for all those affected, and transnational procedures for decision-making and enforcement.[9] The co-

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7 Meyer, T., *Was ist Politik?*, Stuttgart, Opladen, 2002.

8 Marshall, T.H., *Bürgerrechte und soziale Klasse: Zur Soziologie des Wohlfahrtsstaates*, Frankfurt/New York, Campus, 1992.

9 Höffe, O., *Demokratie im Zeitalter der Demokratisierung*, München, C H Beck, 1999.

extension of the twin arenas of political effect-causation and competence in responsible decision-making that has been lost through the process of negative globalization needs to be re-established to a sufficient degree. Otherwise the present world-order cannot claim to be legitimate in any reasonable sense of the word.

This situation calls for a comprehensive strategy of positive globalization as gradual construction of worldwide institutions, organizations and regimes of political deliberation and decision-making. This vision of positive globalization has been given different names. For reasons of realism and according to the democratic principle of subsidiarity it can hardly be conceived of as taking the form of a world state, but some elements of statehood appear to be necessary if the defined conditions are to be met. The Commission on Global Governance in 1995 has coined the name "global governance".[10] The British political scientist David Held calls it "cosmopolitan democracy",[11] the German philosopher, Otfried Höffe, calls it a "social and subsidiary world republic".[12]

Toward a New Utopian Realism

Contrary to the position of the so-called realists in the field of foreign policy research, it must be stressed that such a prospect is by no means empty utopianism. But, as Anthony Giddens has put it, *utopian realism* is necessary to provide guidelines for a present-day political action that is constrained by the needs of the day and the obvious legitimacy deficits of the given situation.[13] Moreover, the blueprint of such a politically-integrated world society is already visible in an embryonic way in present-day structures of transnational political co-operation which, in their turn, still suffer severe deficits, unacceptable degrees of exclusionism and unfair biases. This blueprint for global governance consists of four branches of co-operation and their mutual interaction:

- transnational and supranational political institutions and organizations, especially the UN and its sub-organizations;

10 The Commission on Global Governance, *op. cit.*
11 Held, *op. cit.*
12 Höffe, *op. cit.*
13 Giddens, *op. cit.*

- regional systems of political co-operation such as the EU (European Union), ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations), SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation), Mercosur, NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) and the like;
- transnational regimes of sector-wise political regulation such as the Kyoto-Protocol, the International Labor Organization (ILO) or the World Trade Organization (WTO);
- transnational civil society with its more than 25,000 initiatives covering all relevant fields of politics and human rights from environmental protection to gender equality and human rights monitoring.

Such are the first building blocks for democratic global governance. Two conclusions present themselves from this list. First, obviously some of the elements in this list can serve as a demonstration of the weaknesses and shortcomings of the present stage of transnational political development. For instance, much more inclusiveness, democratization, power of implementation and fairness is needed to make such organizations as the WTO, NAFTA or even the institutions of the UN serve properly the ends of a democratic world society. They are, however, the germs of a development in the direction of a politically responsible world-order that is capable of action. Second, though transnational civil society will have to play an increasingly crucial role in the emerging cosmopolitan democracy, it is not as such identical with global democracy.

Benjamin Barber has argued that due to the irreparable alienation of political institutions from people's aspirations, values and customs the main thrust for the necessary renewal of democracy in era of globalization can only come from within civil society and be realized in its forms of organization and action.[14] This would, however, overstretch the capabilities of civil society and under-estimate the role of binding decisions, power and sanctions in a democratic political world-order. The economic and societal powers that have to be tamed in order to re-embed world economy in accordance with social, cultural and ecological standards require powerful state-like instruments of political implementation. In a realistic concept of democracy civil society cannot replace institutionalized statehood as such.

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[14] Barber, B., *Jihad vs. McWorld*, New York, Random House, 1995.

In the *institutional* dimension, the role of civil society is indispensable but also clearly limited. It will have to play its crucial role in contributing to two particularly relevant functions of global democracy: first, *defining the objectives* and standards of global regulation and framework setting (re-embedding), and second, contributing to the monitoring and control of norm implementation in its capacity as part of what James Rosenau has called "spheres of authority", i.e. clusters of experts, media, citizens' initiatives, institutions that emerge around particular policy issues like child labour, environmental destruction or the drugs trade.[15] In setting the goals of transnational regulation in a binding manner and in making their implementation work, more institutionalized forms of authority such as transnational organizations and the national state will have to play the decisive part in any realistic concept of global democracy. What is needed for erecting such a legitimate world-order today is consensus building through dialogue to engender a common vision and political pressures to bring it about step by step.

Civil Society and Value Building

Even if we succeed in creating a perfect set of transnational political institutions, we would have at best half of what is needed to make global governance work. Underlying its adequate functioning must be a sufficiently strong and unified layer of common values and ethical standards common among global citizens, which is far from being in existence today. Of course, the creation of global political institutions is in itself an expression of the common ethical standards of those who support them but these standards are still too thin to provide for goal-oriented action in order to re-embed the world economy and shape life worlds in which people wish to live. A thicker consensus on ethical norms and values for political action is required to provide orientation for action by transnational institutions.

It needs to be added that the same holds true for decisions concerning the future of national societies as well. Globalization is a new step and a mechanism of acceleration in the process of modernization, but modernization itself in the course of recent decades has proven to be a rather purposeless dynamism, delivering as much destruction of values

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15 Zürn, M., *Regieren jenseits des Nationalstaats: Globalisierung und Denationalisierung*, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1998.

and valued forms of life in some respects, as progress in other respects. The original expectation, from the age of Enlightenment, that economic and technological modernization would automatically foster the perfectibility of human beings and their life forms has been replaced, in recent decades, by an increasing fear that men will finally lose control over the automatism of modernization. The relation between means and ends has become reversed. Economic and technological modernization, originally meant as means to the end of enabling more and more humane life forms, seems to have become an end in itself. The markets in particular have occupied the role of a supreme value.

Particularly, the markets and their functional requirements have in recent decades served to justify social and economic deregulation, increasing speeds of social change and insecurity, growing flexibilization of human beings in their capacity as market participants, environmental destruction, and the enforced dissolution of people's lifeworlds in cities – let alone poverty, misery and exploitation in the less effective parts of today's world economy. All this stands as proof to the fact that the very process of modernization currently underway is not directed towards justified ends and purposes that would meet with the consensus of the affected people, were they to be asked.

Whereas modernization is very strong in *dissolving* traditional values, life ethics and lifeworlds, it is remarkably weak in *creating* new ones. The key questions: 'how do we want to live?'; 'how do we want to live together?' and 'what kind of world do we want to live in?' are still open, or rather more open, than ever before. It seems, however, that fewer and fewer people accept that the answers to these questions must be left to markets. Both modernization and globalization, the twin interrelated processes that shape our time, need to be given meaning and direction. This is, as far as I can see, the driving force behind those young people who resist the present mode of globalization. It underlies large parts of the activities of civil society worldwide and also citizens' movements in large parts of the developing world.

If we speak about 'reflexive modernization' as a new stage in the historical process of modernization,[16] we are well advised to use the term as a call both for norms and for tools in order to give modernization meaning and direction, not just to designate a new level of complexity within the structures and processes of modernization themselves. The key question in this respect is where will the ethical norms and values

[16] See Beck, U., *Was ist Globalisierung?*, Frankfurt, Suhrkamp, 1997; and Giddens, A., *The Third Way and its Critics*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2000.

come from that will allow us to make meaningful use of the tools for controlling and shaping modernization?

It is exactly at this junction that civil society has to be entered into our considerations, for it can play a key role in both approaches to positive globalization: *governance* and *value building*. It is simultaneously one of the tools of democratic regulation and the *only available social space* in which that kind of free and open citizens' dialogue can take place and generate ethical norms and political values. At the same time, those direct dialogue iniatives that are conducted in civil society have the potential to create not only consensus about norms and ethical values for shared forms of life, but also the energies of solidarity and social capital that are necessary for their implementation in everyday life and in the field of political action.[17]

Action-oriented face-to-face dialogues in civil society, contrary to talk mediated by mass media or strategic communication in the political arena, have a high potential for engendering strong bonds of solidarity and obligation, together with the norms and values that emerge from them.[18] Thus, both the *orientation* for shaping modernization in the globalization age, and the energies for its successful pursuit can best be generated in the public space of civil society. All responsibly-minded forces in the world of today that can help bring about the timely renewal of democracy, including the national democratic state itself, can contribute to the building of appropriate structures of opportunity for social dialogues in national civil societies and their transnational interconnection.[19]

Socratic Dialogue and Political Action

Among the many forms of face-to-face dialogues and forms of deliberation that need to play the crucial role in this process, Socratic Dialogue is prominent because it is paradigmatic for free and reasonable communication between equals. Socratic Dialogue, together with many other forms of face-to-face dialogue, must 'go public' and take on a

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17 Putnam, R., *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community*, New York, Simon and Schuster, 2001.

18 Habermas, J., *Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns*, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1982.

19 Barber, B., *A Place for Us: How to Make Society Civil and Democracy Strong*, New York, Random House, 1998.

political responsibility. It should again, as in the days of one of its modern founding fathers, Leonard Nelson, become connected with the overarching project of the struggle for a humane and just society. What makes a form of life humane is exactly the role of good reason in its shaping. Dialogue, as a way of co-operative striving for ethical truth through the exchange of good reason, is under threat in the media societies and media democracies of today.[20] Media discourses that are based on pictures, theatricality and entertainment values are increasingly crowding out dialogue-like discourses from the realms of public life and even social interaction.

In this situation Socratic Dialogue needs to adopt two public obligations. First, as a paradigmatic form of humane procedures of mutual understanding it needs to enter the curricula of our educational systems as one of the counter-forces to the dominance of media and computer communication. For a society based on these two dominant modes of communication will be a society with an abundance of information but a lack of values and solidarity. Second, the design of Socratic Dialogue should be directed more and more towards contributing to the ethical and political challenge of giving humane meaning and direction to the process of modernization. The proper place where this can be done is civil society.

Civil society is not just the public space between state, market and family, it is also marked by an ethical qualification. For only those activities in the public space of voluntary action can be called civil society actions which are – in addition to all the other purposes they may serve – directed towards common well-being. Thus, civil society cannot meaningfully be defined without some reference to ethical norms and motives.[21]

There are many other forms of citizens' dialogue which are much more directly linked to political action in civil society such as: the open space method, the search conference, mediation, negotiated rule-making, deliberative opinion polls, community advisory panels, citizens' juries, national issue forums and the like.[22] A civil society that is marked by such forms of citizens' dialogue can increasingly serve as both the place where values and solidarity are generated, and as one of the channels

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20 Meyer, T., *Media Democracy: How the Media Colonize Politics*, Oxford, Polity Press, 2002.

21 Meyer, T. and Weil, R., *Die Bürgergesellschaft: Perspektiven für Bürgerbeteiligung und Bürgerkommunikation*, Dietz, Bonn, 2002, 9ff.

22 Feindt, P.H., 'Neue Formen der politischen Beteiligung', in Meyer, T. and Weil, R., *Die Bürgergesellschaft: Perspektiven für Bürgerbeteiligung und Bürgerkommunikation*, Bonn, Dietz, 2002.

through which their democratic implementation in the national and global political arenas is effected.

Conclusion

Though the role of civil society in implementing democratic control over the processes of modernization and globalization is limited, its contribution to building the values and creating the solidarity necessary for making the values powerful is crucial. The social form in which domination of the free public space of civil society can be made use of to meet these ends is direct dialogue between citizens. As Socratic Dialogue is a paradigmatic form of the co-operative searching for truth, it needs both to play a prominent role in civil society and to adopt its ethical-political obligation vis-à-vis the challenges of our time.

Hugh Busher

Reply to Thomas Meyer

Thomas Meyer's stimulating paper raises many questions in counterpoint to it. I am not sure how broad-based is the support for reversing globalization, whatever may be the intellectual arguments against it. Protest groups against globalization or in favour of alternative approaches to a global society seem to be at best pressure groups pursuing their particularist agenda. They do not seem to be developing a broad popular basis, however noisy they are at times. The occasional local riots, such as those in Indonesia in recent years, have been more against particular nationalist merchant groups than against international globalization. The broad mass of people living in the West seem in favour of globalization because it raises their standards of living at very little cost. Consequently they seem willing to acquiesce to those voices encouraging globalization as a means of enhancing corporate profits and projecting particular free-market capitalist values, even when support of such values leads, apparently, to Western so-called democracies supporting intolerant autocratic regimes in other states because they have embraced capitalism.

Clearly there are advantages in the world working more closely together to people's mutual benefit, but whether that is through modernist solutions of global bureaucracies or through postmodern solutions that accept and encourage difference while promoting dialogue, is open to question. I am not sure that larger and more embracing supranational bodies, congresses or bureaucracies makes for greater dialogue between people or for a subtle form of neo-colonialism by those groups and people best able to manipulate the processes of such supranational organizations. In any case, such bodies are likely to be highly unresponsive to people in their member states or societies. There are serious doubts about how responsive the 'government' of the European Union is to its members' peoples. How much more so will be a body as inclusive as the United Nations?

The real risk is that as supranational bodies grow bigger and more influential, people's cultural precepts and chosen ways of life in different

parts of the world are likely to be endangered. Colleagues of mine worry about the ways in which some languages are being squeezed into extinction by the spread of English or other languages that are linked to powerful world economies or large populations. With that extinction, they worry, we lose some of our enriching diversity. So a key issue and tension in developing any globally ordered life is how to protect people's cultural heritages and ways of life, and help those people to celebrate, sustain and strengthen their heritages.

Subsidiarity, then, has to be a core principle in any supranational forms of government that are constructed. This notion lends importance to the development of world regional groupings of nations, such as the EU and ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations), while also recognising the importance of those regional groupings sustaining a meaningful dialogue with each other in pursuit of shared aims. In turn, this raises questions about what should be the nature of the dialogue between different people and nations and regional groupings of nations.

These questions can perhaps be pursued under four headings:

- What constitutes "legitimate procedures" to set up and regulate traffic and dialogue between people and nations and regional groups of nations?
- What are the values to be pursued through the regulation of supranational interchange?
- What constitutes acceptable forms of government for different nations?
- What constitutes legitimate uses of power in a civil society?

The remainder of this response looks at each of these briefly in turn. I am fascinated to know what are the "politically legitimate procedures" on which future changes to the current world-order should be based. Genghis Khan had politically legitimate procedures, but his were based on power related to coercive physical force and central government control. Arguably, the current development of globalization is also based on politically legitimate procedures, those of economic power – demand for cheap local goods on the one hand, and on the other for wages that are better than the local rates available without the operations of multinational companies. Neither system is democratic, although in both, one could argue, participants do have choices. Both systems might be and are regarded as repellent by some people, but this immediately raises

questions about what values they are espousing in making such judgements.

What then should be the values to be pursued in regulating national and supranational interchanges? Commercial markets do regulate the supply and demand for goods and the distribution of wealth and services, and encourage participants to try to engage in competing to accumulate wealth in various forms. The problem is there is no such thing as a free market – except as a model in economic textbooks – because governments intervene and distort it, usually in favour of those people and pressure groups within their societies who are most influential already. Nor is there any point in seeking, as those on the political right do, to create markets free from government intervention, since that is not possible. People who have power in societies through their access to material and symbolic resources normally use these to their own benefit, and occasionally altruistically for other people.

The 'free' market does not address questions about what sorts of values one wants to put in place for any society, be it a national or a supranational one. By default there are in the market place implicit values that reward success, whatever its origins, and punish misfortune as though it were the outcome of some sort of moral failure or sin. But concerns about the values projected and the preferred relationships desired between people in a society cannot be left to 'naturally occurring' economic forces, since such concerns are of a different order to those about the exchange and distribution of goods and services.

What concerns me is whether such moral and civil purposes can and should be created only through the secular constructions of some people's understandings of human rights. It also raises an uncomfortable question about how definitions of such rights were arrived at, and to what extent they represent only a distillation of Western values. Surely the construction of such moral and civil purposes must also include a distillation of religious views through dialogue between various faiths and atheists since these views and faiths influence the lives of so many people in the world. That is not to argue that human rights and the United Nations statement of these are unimportant. Indeed, they could form a beacon around which people could build common views about what constitutes acceptable forms and processes of government and society in the world. As such, their key importance would be to form a convenient forum and common language through which people of different religious faiths (which underpin their values) and cultural perspectives are able to sustain a constructive dialogue.

It leads however to an uncomfortable question about what constitutes acceptable forms of government. Democracy, which is so often given pre-eminence in discussions of judgement about the acceptability of different regimes in the world, is based on a myth that claims that all people living in a society can influence social and political decisions equally. This is based on the assumption that there is equality between the people taking part in such social and political processes and that each person's voice is given equal weight and worth. This view is heavily flawed because power is unequally distributed in society. There are those who, for various reasons, are better able to influence the shaping of social structures – the rules that frame the construction of social systems, according to Giddens.[1] Some people have more human and social capital, according to Bourdieu[2] and are better placed than others to exert influence because of accidents of birth and education, as well as of personality and geo-social location, and to access leadership roles or to take advantage of opportunities that emerge in society.

If democracy is so flawed, however, it does not license dictatorship or oligarchy nor encourage forms of government that condone fundamental breaches of human rights, for whatever reasons they are claimed. However it does suggest that the projection of the preferred Western solution for government through current international organizations is not only a form of neo-colonialism, but overlooks other possible forms of government from other parts of the world that may themselves be as consultative in practice as is democracy, and similarly based on a contract of consensus between leaders and led. Some of these forms may allow leadership and authority to be changed in an orderly and peaceful manner, too, without a state necessarily having to embrace multi-party democracy.

This brings me to my final point about how legitimate power is constituted and distributed in civil society. It raises questions about what can be considered legitimate uses of power – for what purposes and in pursuit of what values may power be exercised – and how that process of legitimation is constructed. It raises questions about who exercises power and by what means it is exercised – what the conduits of power are as well as what are the sources of it. It also, I think, then raises questions about how decision-making processes can be extended in

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1 Giddens, A., *The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1984.

2 Bourdieu, P., *The Logic of Practice*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1992.

society so that people can engage with decision-making more equally. In turn that leads to a concern about how human capital can be extended so that people can engage with their societies on a more equitable basis. It requires societies to look carefully and hard at how to better empower those people in them who are marginalized for economic or social reasons, for reasons of gender, or for reasons of ethnicity or language or bodily, mental and emotional function.

The agenda that emerges from this is not towards modernist solutions of bigger bureaucracies with hierarchies of assemblies leading from local sub-governments up to supranational assemblies where, in the Babel of negotiation between the powerful and the influential, the voices of the oppressed will be lost, but in the development of regional groupings of nations each of which works to protect and celebrate its distinctive heritage, while allowing and admiring others for doing the same. Such groupings, however, would need to engage in a continuous dialogue with each other to promote understanding and development so the peoples they represent can share equitably in the distribution of world resources. To build such a dialogue creatively requires the sharing of common values, expressed through a variety of different discourses, perhaps, but understood as having agreed meanings and applications. And that seems the key issue for the immediate future. We can tinker with the mechanisms of national and international government, making minor adjustments to practices that may be claimed to improve the representativeness of institutions, but unless we can agree and project policies through national government and international bodies reflecting values that increase social and economic justice we will be merely postponing the next global conflict instead of reducing the causes of it.

Peter Rickman

Civil Society and Freedom

Problems of Autonomy and Control in a Free Society

Abstract

Civil society, that web of relations not imposed by the state, depends on freedom and in turn makes freedom possible. Freedom is a vital condition of human life. By making choice possible, it protects human dignity and the possibility of us maturing. More specifically, it allows us to live by values and strive for goals of our own choosing. However, as Plato and Aristotle have already stressed, a full human life cannot be achieved by the individual in isolation. We are social beings who depend on a community for physical, emotional and intellectual satisfaction.

The framework of a state is essential to provide security, and enforceable laws to regulate the relations between citizens, and to ensure basic provisions for welfare, health and education. There is, however, a danger of authoritarianism if a paternalistic state presumes to cater for too many of our needs. A government is, then, easily tempted into the belief that it knows better than the rest of us about where our true interests lie. Once taxpayers' money is invested in provisions supposed to serve our interests, our rulers may then frown upon those who have different priorities.

Herein lies the importance of a rich and varied civil society as a safeguard of freedom. While the function of the state should be largely confined to the 'negative' role of protecting freedom, a multitude of associations and organizations are required to provide for it in a 'positive' way. Our requirements are varied. Only independent political parties can protect our political

freedom. We have trade unions to assert the rights of workers, clubs to cater for our leisure interests in sports and games such as chess and bridge, and organizations providing other forms of entertainment. Scientific institutions and universities which are not controlled by the state are needed to assure free and independent scholarship.

All such organizations need to have rules of their own. Clubs may insist on dress codes and establishments may prohibit smoking etc., but the crucial point is that we are free to apply to join them and free to leave them. Some of them, such as consumer organizations or trade unions, are there to protect our freedom, while others help us to use it as we choose.

By a free society I mean one in which each member is assured the maximum freedom compatible with that of others. A web of associations is required to make such freedom possible. Some of these associations need to be comprehensive and centrally provided. The critical problem to be pinpointed and analysed by philosophy, but only solvable in practice, is how to strike balances between central control and local autonomy.

Freedom is a crucial value in human life and all arrangements in the human world are subject to the criterion of serving freedom. Freedom, the opportunity to make your own unforced choices, is an indispensable condition of morality. Without it, principles of actions, praise and blame, reward and punishment, would all be meaningless. In any case, individuals as well as groups normally desire to live by their own choices, to develop their own style of life and select their own goals. The need to make your own choices is also a process of learning, leading to the fulfilment required by pride and assuring dignity.

Plato and Aristotle already stressed some 2,500 years ago that a full human life cannot be achieved by the individual in isolation. One condition is what, for brevity, I shall call the state, and deal with only in passing. There need to be universal provisions for safety and order by such means as armies, police forces, legislation, courts of law, and the means of raising revenues for these services. They are indispensable but their existence and scope are only justified by their role in protecting freedom.

In turning to civil society, I single out first the parts of it which are the extreme opposite of state institutions because they involve no, or

minimal, compulsion. If individuals are to fulfil themselves by pursuing their personal interests, there need to be social clubs, choral societies, amateur theatre groups, chess clubs and the like. No state provision is needed for them, as they can be created, with limited expenditure, through the initiatives of individuals or small groups. Their rules apply only to voluntary members.

I turn to the part of civil society over which controversy and political conflict continue to rage. The outstanding examples are economic life, health provision, and education. Though I shall deal with all three, my main examples will come from the third area with which I am most familiar.

The economic life of a country inevitably consists of very numerous units – for example shops, factories, workshops, restaurants and farms – but there is an obvious case for central intervention in many areas. So, for example, there are powerful reasons for a country to protect its agriculture from extinction precipitated by natural disasters, foreign competition or other market forces, or indeed to encourage the production of what is most needed. Similarly, employers may need restraining from allowing inhuman working conditions, or from encouraging the creation of monopolies, which rob consumers of freedom of choice. A free market must not be confused with the absence of all control.

A similar situation prevails in the area of health care. There is obviously a multitude of doctors, group practices, clinics, nursing homes and hospitals. But if all the financial resources required were to be raised from the users of these facilities, the poor would lose the freedom of doing the best for their health. General funds, taxpayers' money, need to be channelled into these provisions and, as a consequence, the state acquires the responsibility to ensure that money is not unduly squandered and that it is fairly distributed in line with reasonable priorities.

In education the situation is similar. To provide and maintain buildings and equipment, to pay competent staff, is expensive. But unless education remains a privilege of the rich, public money has to be poured into schools and universities. Only thus can all members of a community, who are able and willing, be free to be educated. If the education of children is compulsory and not a matter of free individual choice, it is understood that this serves the greater freedom of the individual to choose his career and leisure activity later.

The need for state involvement in economic life, in the provision of health services and education, as well as in other areas it would be tiresome to list, for example communication systems, creates the problem I want to address. Complete state control over these various areas of civil society constitutes tyranny, not freedom. Bureaucracy grows and freedom is stifled. A further issue arises about which I shall have to say more presently. As regards efficiency, full state control turns out to be counter-productive. The history of the last few decades suggests that central economic planning, such as government-backed five or ten-year plans, leads to waste and inefficiency. The case for free markets, if intelligently interpreted, has proved convincing. The same is true of health provision. The manager of a hospital, indeed the general practitioner or head of a group practice, is likely to be able to judge better how to spend money and assign priorities than 'the man in Whitehall'.[1] To protect the autonomy of small units is also a matter of freedom, and it is dangerous to undermine the sense of responsibility of doctors in this sphere.

I turn to education, and particularly higher education where I can provide more detailed examples. Various forms of freedom, apart from the freedom of access already mentioned, are involved. There needs to be the freedom of universities to select and prioritise the disciplines they teach. Universities have become particularly famous for law, or science, or history. My university was a technological university but gradually opened out into management, economics and some social sciences. Neither history nor literature ever figured as a degree subject, and philosophy is being eliminated after a few years' existence. If government feels the need to encourage the study of, let us say, dentistry, in the national interest, it can offer inducements such as extra grants, but the essential freedom to choose should not be eliminated. Equally important is the freedom of teaching. Some security of tenure is required because lecturers should not be at the mercy of superiors with whose political, scientific or religious views they disagree.

Last, though not least, is the teacher's freedom to use his time at his own discretion. It is well known that academics only spend a fraction of their time on timetabled work, say some ten hours on lectures, tutorials and seminars, and a few more on committees, rather less than half the time factory and office workers have to be at their place of work. Over

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[1] Non-UK readers should note that Whitehall is the name of a street in London and is usually used to designate the government offices situated there, or the British civil service in general.

and above this, the teaching year extends to just over half of the calendar year. Of course, the set hours are only part of the academic's work. There is also setting examinations and essays, marking them, preparing lectures, and, last but not least, research. The conscientious lecturer will work longer hours than those employed in offices, but there is scope for getting away with less. Preparation is a variable quantity, and it is sometimes possible or even necessary to repeat the same course for successive years, thus requiring only minimal preparatory work. On the other hand, the young lecturer, or the adventurous one, will need a great deal of time to prepare new courses. In many subjects too, new material becomes available which needs to be considered as part of the revision of courses. You can also be more or less conscientious in marking, and the burden also varies from subject to subject. Where there are clearly right and wrong answers, marking is evidently less troublesome. In some other disciplines like my own, philosophy, assessment can be particularly difficult, and one may have to weigh clarity against originality, or accuracy against the ambitiousness of a project.

Research, which, of course, means different things in different subjects, is the hardest to evaluate. I believe it to be vital for academics to have ample free time for research because their teaching should be enriched by their struggles on the frontier line of their subject. In many subjects, certainly in mine, it is also important that time for research should be continuous. The odd hour between lectures is useless. There needs to be continuous absorption for many hours or even days. Sometimes research leads into blind alleys and little emerges from long periods of work. This possibility can be used as an excuse for idleness. The claims of ambitious projects and prolonged work can be shrugged off as leading to ultimate failure.

Another area in which there can be little control over the work of academics is that of conferences. International conferences are usually held at attractive places. I myself have been twice to Venice and also to German spas. Your university pays for you to go and spend a week or so enjoying good food and drink and taking part in excursions in the surrounding countryside, you meet old friends and make new acquaintances, and there is even scope sometimes for sexual adventures. Of course, scholarly papers are read, but then who will be able to tell whether you listen to them seriously or even attend the sessions, and whether your conversations centre on an exploration of finer scholastic points or consist of gossip and flirtation?

I have singled out higher education but similar stories of freedom producing waste can be told of the other areas I have listed. Shops and restaurants multiply until some go bankrupt through competition. Doctors' surgeries are crowded with patients presenting trivial complaints. Can such waste be avoided? I maintain that it is merely the price of freedom.

However, I am not just making a negative point about the cost of letting people do what they choose. Returning to my example of university research, conferences, etc., I want to stress that waste is also the price to be paid for creative success. Panels to vet and supervise research would be equally wasteful and much less fruitful. You cannot have researchers clock in and out. I encountered a small example of how the central collection of evidence on research distorts results from the outset. In response to a departmental request, I listed three pieces of research in different fields. I was told that only one per lecturer could be listed and that there was a further limit on research by the department. So some research vanished by the stroke of a pen.

Every schoolchild knows that Archimedes had found the solution of a scientific problem sitting in his bath and that Newton's ideas fell into place as he was sitting under an apple tree. Most researchers can confirm that ideas, though less spectacular than those of Archimedes or Newton, have come to them when they were resting in bed or riding on a train. Nor is it possible in many, if not most cases, to anticipate the probable outcome of a piece of research, let alone to evaluate its importance. If it were possible to do so, that outcome could hardly be called original. You cannot say to researchers – 'please invent this, we need it' – though it is possible of course to encourage research into specific areas. (The development of specific discoveries is a different matter.) No one could have asked researchers to discover lasers, but once lasers were discovered, it became possible to develop their applications.

A similar case can be made for conferences and the potential fruitfulness of bringing scholars together. I can speak most easily from my own experience, unspectacular as it may be. A few years ago, I attended an international conference in Leipzig. Of course, we ate and drank and chatted and looked at the town. We had lively discussions on the papers presented. But for me personally, there were three sets of consequences I considered fruitful.

First, I made friends with the head of the philosophy department of Salamanca and was subsequently invited to read a paper at that ancient university. The professor in turn came with a colleague to London to

speak at a seminar of my university. For some years, we operated an exchange scheme with Spanish students. The second development was that I was approached by an English colleague who was editing a philosophic dictionary and, as a result, contributed five articles. The third development was making friends with a German professor who first invited me to give a talk in Switzerland where he was working at the time, and who later arranged for me to lecture in Berlin after he was transferred there. He, in turn, gave a paper at my university. I cannot claim that these were world-shattering events, but I like to believe that they make a small contribution towards keeping the wheels of international scholarship moving.

Conclusions

(1) A flourishing and multi-facetted civil society is a crucial condition of freedom. Only a multiplicity of fully or at least partly independent providers can deliver the maximum opportunity for people to choose freely what they need or want.

(2) There cannot be complete independence from central control on all the facilities provided by civil society, because society as a whole, represented by its government, needs to guarantee universal and fair access to all provisions catering for the needs and aspirations of its citizens.

(3) The critical issue is to assess, case by case, the degree to which social issues need to be subjected to universal central control on the one hand, and the scope for autonomous initiatives by individuals and individual organizations on the other.

(4) Having insisted on freedom as a crucial goal of all social arrangements, we need to conclude that its attainment and preservation represent a criterion for the acceptability of both legislation and civil society arrangements.

(5) The first criterion is this: any government limitation of freedom can only be justified if it serves to protect more important freedoms. This criterion applies to government legislation and action, whether strictly applied in its own sphere or extending to civil society, which is also subject to law.

(6) Emphasis on freedom tends to be in conflict with the single-minded pursuit of efficiency and normally entails waste.

Though it is misguided and often counter-productive to make efficiency one's first goal, a distinction needs to be made between unproductive waste, and necessary waste contributing to potentially fruitful outcomes.

I have tried to show, as an example, that freedom of research is both necessary and potentially fruitful, while attempts at elaborate vetting and supervision of research are unprofitably wasteful.

It will be noted that I have not mentioned, or mentioned only in passing, the goals human beings pursue and treasure which civil society exists to provide: peace, good health, intellectual stimulation, amusement, social involvement, etc. However universal these aspirations may be, they are a matter of individual choice, and therein lies freedom.

I am aware of course that some philosophies, cultures and religions place other values above freedom and, though I have set out some reasons for valuing freedom so highly, I recognise that this is ultimately a matter of faith.

Ugo Vlaisavljevic

The End of Scientific Ideologies and the Re-socialization of Universities

Abstract

The social sciences and humanities have still to acquire their proper social form in post-Communist societies. Communities of researchers have not yet been constituted, public forums of dialogue established, or independent research institutions opened. The true democratization of post-Communist regimes requires the profound transformation of both the school-like practice of universities and the pseudo-scientific practice of political forums. Only a re-socialisation of all of the institutions inhabited by the social sciences and humanities will bring to an end 'scientific ideologies.'

Philosophers on my side of the argument think that we can explain what we mean when we say that academic research should be disinterested and objective only by pointing to the ways in which free universities actually function. We can defend such universities only by pointing to the good these universities do, to their role in keeping democratic and liberal institutions alive and functioning.

Richard Rorty[1]

1 Rorty, R., 'Truth and Progress', *Philosophical Papers*, Vol.3, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998, p.69.

Introduction

Upon observing how important the function of forums of enquirers is for the production of scientific truth in the eyes of the contemporary philosophy of science, one could be tempted to assert that the human sciences have never been adequately introduced in this part of the world.[2] In fact, the humanities and social sciences have been institutionalized, and they strongly influence local public opinion; their influence on current politics probably stronger than anywhere. In their almost exclusive institutional form, that of the university, they have acquired an important ideological role in society. The sole base for the social sciences and humanities in post-Communist countries remains the university, but this institution has not been democratized or adequately socialized. It has never been an educational institution where professors and students do participate effectively in the same communicative community.

The burden of the recent past, of the political regime which introduced the 'scientific knowledge' of Man in the majority of East European countries, remains overpowering. It is the pretension to represent scientific institutions operating in the field of the knowledge of Man that has brought the first Communist universities into the mainstream of political life and transformed them into influential political institutions. When the educational establishment impersonates a scientific institution or when a pure theoretical, 'impractical', 'sterile' school practice is publicly misrepresented as an exemplary social practice of open debate and questioning, then the path is established for a pseudo-scientific ideology. This kind of ideology becomes dominant from the moment that an 'internal socialization' within communities of scholars is mistaken for an 'external socialization' in political forums. It is true that even today the first and basic socialization of university teachers, claiming to be scholars/scientists, takes place in political institutions. Their belief in the practical character of their knowledge, confirmed by their fascinating experience of communicative practices in these institutions, gives them an illusion of participating in a genuine scientific community. The curious fact that scholars themselves have brought the dominant political ideology into the field of their knowledge and expertise is to be explained by this lack of independent communicative practice. The once-and-for-all accomplished science of

[2] The author writes from Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Marxism, this modern variant of Platonic essentialism, has made any institutional practice of Socratic Dialogue needless and even perilous.

In this epistemological politics the 'knowledge' is essentially already acquired (in the form of established 'sciences' archived in educational institutions). The only 'external' social practices – teaching and political commitment – have not only disabled these institutions in their main role (the critique of ideology), but have transformed them into a symbolic body of the official ideology itself (yesterday's Communism, today's ethno-nationalism).

The University as an Important Ideological Institution

The assumption that the university may help in the transition, in social, political and economic processes taking place outside its doors, presents this institution, if not as unchanging, then surely as a firm support of important changes. This does not mean that the university itself should not undergo the movement of transition.[3] The authorities of Sarajevo University, like their counterparts elsewhere in SE Europe, are fully aware of the need for the reform of higher education and they work enthusiastically towards it. However, it seems that they are using a particular model of the university that limits in advance the range of their reforms and prevents a fundamental transformation of the university, which would enable it to become an important institution of a democratic society.

We need to look back at the recent past in order to realize how unacceptable this model is. It is a product of the ideology of the previous regime, or to be more precise, of its *epistemological politics*. That was an ideological interpretation of what knowledge and science are about, based on a division of human reality into two spheres called theory and practice, where the latter was awarded primacy over the first. Derived from this division was a topology that placed the university at the margins of social life, classified as an institution of essentially theoretical activities. At the heart of social life was politics, meaning party politics as a privileged form of social practice. The common concept of science

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3 About the concept of transition, which was until recently frequently used by political analysts but today has lost its explanatory power and should be discarded, see Caruthers, T., 'The End of the Transition Paradigm,' *Journal of Democracy*, Vol.13, No.1, January 2002, pp.5–21.

implied both theory and practice, i.e. the practical implementation of a theory. Natural sciences were constituted only in *technology*, whereas the social sciences were finally constituted in *political practice*. As an institution of knowledge, even the highest form of scientific knowledge, the university was not a *scientific institution*, although it was so considered. Lacking any practical dimension, either technological or political, the university was but another kind of school. Contrary to cherished ideological beliefs, there was no crucial difference between it and lower forms of education. The university model we are speaking of is a model of the school institution.[4]

As a school institution the university stayed out of politics. It is in that sense that speaking of the Socialist era one may speak of the political autonomy of the university, even of its excessive autonomy such as that of a prison or hospital. On the other hand, the university as a 'scientific' institution, as a home institution of the social sciences and humanities, was committed to politics. In order to verify and legitimate their scientific pretensions these sciences needed politics. To become sciences they had to enter the political arena. De-politicized from within, the university was re-politicized from outside.

Party politics also needed the social sciences. Marxism was a political ideology that presented itself as something far more important than a mere ideology, i.e. as a true science.[5] The university was important to the dominant ideology as an institution giving it *scientific* legitimation. The Central Committee as the highest political institution, and the university as the highest institution of knowledge, functioned as two

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4 Of course, my readers should know some notorious facts about the history of higher education in South East (SE) Europe, a quite short history marked by the strong impact, both historico-political (Austro-Hungarian empire) and ideological (Marxist and Hegelian), of a German cultural tradition and Humboldtian model of education on the local cultural and political environment. Let us note here that in the period of German Idealism the university form of education was opposed to school education on the basis of the difference between science and professional practice. This tradition – in which, according to Habermas, "the classical understanding of the relationship between theory and practice" was introduced "for the last time" – remains vivid and ideologically active in Yugoslav Marxism, in spite of the transition from the pre-industrial world of labour to the industrial one, and the assault of techno-sciences which tend to reduce the university form of study to the school one. For a short account of Schleiermacher's, Fichte's and Humboldt's views on the university, as well as of the disturbance and imposed redefinition of the relationship between theory and practice, see Habermas, J., 'Vom sozialen Wandel akademischer Bildung' in *Theorie und Praxis*, Frankfurt, Suhrkamp, 1974, pp.359–375.

5 Recall Friedrich Engels's famous treatise on *Socialism: Utopian and Scientific*, SW2, 1880.

complementary institutional supports of the Communist regime. The smooth functioning of these institutions implied a continuous exchange of politicians and professors, or rather their metamorphosis from one public figure to another at the moment of their passage from one institution to another. In the Central Committee, an important role was played by professors coming from the university (their participation was often announced solemnly: 'and now we are going to hear our eminent scholar'), whereas at the University such a role was played by politicians ('and now we are going to hear our comrade from the CC'). The whole system was based on the circulation of a certain discourse – which we now call Communist ideology – that may be described as a *political discourse of social scientists* or as a *scientific discourse of politicians.* Marxism-Leninism was a social pseudo-science, while the university was an important political institution having for its aim the scientific legitimation of the dominant ideology.

After the collapse of Communism and the rejection of Marxist doctrine that pretended to be a science of sciences, has the political role of the university really changed? Many people think it has, since they project a reform of higher education within an allegedly de-politicized context. They overlook the present-day political role of the social sciences and humanities, probably because they see in Communism, and this is a common opinion, only a *political* regime, not an *epistemological* regime able to survive the collapse of the first. From the epistemological point of view, Marxism is at the present time often seen as a particular *form* of knowledge, as a pseudo-science in the first place, and not as a particular *discursive and institutional regime of knowledge*, a regime of knowledge production, distribution, exchange, etc.

The Lack of a Community of Scholars

The Communist epistemological regime requires its analysts to direct their attention to an institutional interaction between 'Knowledge' and 'Society', and not simply to *a* form of knowledge or to *a* certain scientific structure established in an institution we recognize as a university. As is well known, it is with the modern age and its characteristic spirit of enlightenment that clear boundaries between knowledge and its social forms have disappeared.

The socio-historical reality of both former Yugoslavias was marked by traits of what might be called a 'belated modernity'[6] among which, in this context, one should emphasize the naïve and massive enlightenment campaign and quite aggressive secularization which accompanied the introduction of mass education and the mass media. Unfortunately, we cannot deal here, even briefly, with the historical context of the development of higher education in South East Europe in order to substantiate a claim we would now like to introduce: that the former regime was based on a rigid version of the Enlightenment project, prescribing that every social form should be underpinned by knowledge. But knowledge itself, in its highest *academic* form, has never acquired an adequate *social* form. In other words, the epistemological regime of Socialism was built on the social circulation of knowledge and scientifically-based socialization, while the institution of knowledge and science, namely the university, remained unsocialized or poorly socialized.

To put it more precisely, the university has remained a school institution due to the fact that it was established as the highest scientific institution, a home institution of both the natural and social sciences, whereas communities of scientists and scholars or, to use a precise epistemological term, "communicative communities of researchers at work"[7] were never established. At least, this is true for the social sciences, although there have been a number of professional associations and institutes included in or associated with the university. In a word, the university as an institution and the social sciences as a form of knowledge and research have been deprived of *their proper social form.*

Science could become ideology and ideology could become science due to this lack of a community of scholars. The Communist regime did

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6 "During the nineteenth century, then, the South Slav peoples found themselves located at the margins of two collapsing empires, both of which (for different reasons) were ill-suited to manage the demands of modernity." Allcock, J.B., *Explaining Yugoslavia*, London, Hurst and Company, 2000, p.325.

7 On this concept, which plays an important role in the contemporary philosophy of science and was forged against a naïve methodological solipsism, see a short historical account by Karl-Otto Apel, accompanied by his systematic, transcendental-philosophical elaboration of the need for establishing an "ideal, unlimited community" following the *telos* and implicit assumptions of a "real community of experimenting and interpretation": 'Szientismus oder transzendentale Hermeneutik?' *Transformation der Philosophie, Band 2, Das Apriori der Kommunikationsgemeinschaft*, Frankfurt, Suhrkamp, 1973, pp.178–220.

not exclude science and rational procedure and treatment[8] – on the contrary, the totalitarian order had such a background – but it excluded the social form of scientific procedures, which in modern times gives decision-making a democratic pattern or makes democracy modern.[9] The *scientific socialization of the masses*, that radical mode of mass enlightenment glorified by the proletarian avant-garde, did not lead to *the socialization of the sciences themselves.*

Given some major assumptions built into the edifice of modern democracy, we have the right to conclude that public political forums could not become democratic until public scientific forums of various disciplines had become their important, supporting and mobilizing segments. It is the Communist ideology, personified at the university as a true science, which prevented the establishment of an open community in which public debate, critical thinking and innovative research would be nurtured.

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8 "To my knowledge", writes Derrida, "there has been no university project founded against *Raison*". On the foundation of the modern university according to the principles of reason, from Kant to Heidegger, and its present-day groundlessness revealed by techo-science, see Derrida, J., 'Le principe de raison et l'idée de l'Université' in *Du droit à la philosophie*, Paris, Galilée, 1990, pp.461–498.

9 "It is true" acknowledges Rorty in his response to the critical observations of Thelma Z. Lavine on his work, "as I have remarked in various papers, that communities of researchers in the natural sciences have often been paradigms of democratic consensus-building, and good examples of the virtues Lavine lists." In her comment on Dewey's major work *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry*, the critic in fact borrows a list of virtues from another author. Here is that passage: "The same pattern of inquiry, seeking a testable resolution of a Hegelian, contextual problematic situation, which is operative in scientific method, is operative also in democratic process. Here the pattern of inquiry avoids ideological disputation and adjudicates difficulties by giving each viewpoint a voice in the quasi trail and error debate until a resolution in the form of consensus is achieved. Both procedures, scientific and democratic, are experimental, tied to action and to change. James Grouinlock has pointed out that both science and democratic process share (for Dewey) not only the same pattern of inquiry, the 'method of intelligence', but also the same moral virtue: a willingness to question, to search for clarity and evidence, to hear and respect the views of others, to consider alternatives impartially, to change one's view as a consequence of inquiry and communication." (Lavine, T. Z., 'America and the Contestations of Modernity: Bentley, Dewey, Rorty' in: Saatkamp, H.J (ed.), *Rorty and Pragmatism: The Philosopher Responds to His Critics*, Nashville and London, Vanderbilt University Press, 1995, pp.45 and 51.)

A true post-Communist reform of the university should bring about a *re-socialization* of this modern political institution.[10] This would be one of the most important preconditions for the democratization of the whole society.[11] A re-socialization that entails introducing a *community of researchers at work* is inseparable from the democratization of the university and is something totally different from the undemocratic hyper-socialization of this institution which characterized the former regime, and characterizes its successors to an even greater extent. Namely, the proliferation of universities and massive increase of the student population – that also occurred at secondary schools – tells us that the primary socialization of this so-called scientific institution was never accomplished.

There is a good deal of truth in the claim put forward by Communist epistemology that theory must leave the university in order to gain its scientific status. Indeed, archived knowledge was in need of some sort of social practice. However, the practice that was offered to university professors, primarily to those who dealt with the social sciences and humanities, was just the practice of a political community, a community of ruling party politicians, in which competence and even scientific attitude itself were set aside in the name of communicative objectives

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10 However, the most necessary precondition for a correct and reform-minded policy of the university authorities, particularly of its social sciences wing, is the readiness of a true subject/self of the university, to reflect on itself and the basic premises of its pedagogical and scientific production. The disciplines of philosophy, social sciences and the humanities should re-examine the institutional frameworks of their own existence. The institutional and practical conditions deeply affect the scientific soundness of these theoretical practices. cf. Pierre Bourdieu, 'Les sciences sociales et la philosophie', *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales*, 47/48, June 1983, p.52.

11 The question is still open as to whether ex-Marxists are able to carry out a re-socialization of the university. One can rightly set an even more radical precondition for a true university reform, as, for example, Paul Ricoeur did when he was arguing for the need to re-institutionalize post-Communist universities: "This spring 1990, we have just witnessed a lyric phase of these liberation movements, while the real problems are only beginning. Especially problems related to what I would call 're-institutionalization' – of the economy, of course, but also, for instance, of the university; the issues involved here are those I have recently considered with my French and foreign colleagues. When most teaching posts are occupied by incompetent people, appointed with the blessing of the Communist Party, what then should be done? Dismiss them? Pension them off? Conduct a witch-hunt? These are questions that emerge in the phase of re-institutionalisation, which will last, presumably, ten years at least." (Aeschlimann, J-C, Halperin, J. et al., *Ethique et responsabilité: Paul Ricoeur*, Neuchâtel, Editions de la Baconnière, 1994, p.13.)

specific to this sort of community. What was actually brought into these political forums was their legitimation endorsed by social science representatives. The price of this external, political legitimation was to be found in the exchange of competences: eminent professors acquired political competence at the very moment they lost their scientific expertise. The clearest ideological moment of the whole epistemological politics was precisely this moment of *displaced socialization*: it is at that moment that social theory was supposed to become practical and prove itself to be a *science*.

In its recent development, from logical empiricism and Karl Popper up to the present time, the philosophy of science has been increasingly aware of the social and historical reality of the scientific acquisition of knowledge.[12] Each form of scientific knowledge depends on the type, dynamics, context and circumstances of its socialization. According to Richard Rorty, the truth we have gained in a particular discipline at a particular moment relies on a forum of scientists through which this truth undergoes a process of verification and adoption, based on their previous knowledge and competence, their skills and capabilities, their aspirations and ambitions, their pressing motives, their will to reach a compromise or to accept important changes, etc.[13]

Towards a New Epistemological Politics

It seems that we now have good reasons to claim that the rejection of Marxism as a pseudo-science was not sufficient for an epistemological

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12 See for example, Audi, R.., *Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge*, London and New York, Routledge, 1998, pp.256–159.

13 Rorty, R., 'Truth and Progress', *Philosophical Papers: Vol.3*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998, p.22: "My underlying idea ... was that the entire force of the cautionary use of 'true' is to point out that justification is relative to an audience and that we can never exclude the possibility that some better audience might exist, or come to exist, to whom a belief that is justifiable to us would not be justifiable. But, as Putnam's 'naturalistic fallacy' argument shows, there can be no such thing as an 'ideal audience' before which justification would be sufficient to ensure truth, any more than there can be a largest integer. For any audience, one can imagine a better-informed audience and also a more imaginative one – an audience that has thought up hitherto-undreamt-of alternatives to the proposed belief. The limits of justification would be the limits of language, but language (like imagination) has no limits."

recovery of the social sciences and humanities. Each science and each form of knowledge will continue to function as a pseudo-science until the re-socialization of the university is achieved, not external and supplementary, but genuine. This precondition may be expressed as the demand for the full autonomy of the university, meaning the separation of the social sciences from any party politics: no politics should dictate the communicative and research practice of scholars. Given the vague boundaries of the political in general, this demand may be more clearly stated: the primary socialization of the social sciences and humanities should take place only among the scholars themselves, within their circle which should never be closed.

It is precisely the wholly de-politicized university, viewed as a school, that conceals the political abuse of scientific knowledge, expertise in the social sciences above all.[14] Any institutional nurturing of these sciences and disciplines, without a prior foundation of active communities of researchers, will completely neutralize their true *political capacities*, i.e. their potential for criticism and the imaginative creation of another reality, which we used to call the 'critique of ideology'.

The current reform of higher education ought not to remain a school reform. It is discouraging to learn that probably all initiatives in SE Europe devoted to university reform are dictated by the inherited school model of the university institution and do not question it. These initiatives overlook the necessity of re-socializing the local universities, i.e. of transforming them into politically proactive institutions devoted to independent and innovative research, and to the critical re-examination of the existing social reality. This is particularly pressing if this institution of a hidden political function has taken the place of all other research institutions.

Foreigners who are keen to help democratic reforms of the small and underdeveloped countries of SE Europe usually overlook the fact that the university is almost the only institution aspiring to be scientific and that the knowledge produced by the social sciences and humanities is shared and disseminated only through school patterns and modes of transmission. However, if the social sciences remain confined to school, then the whole educational system becomes politicized, entirely subordinated to the dominant ideology.

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[14] cf. Habermas, J., 'Demokratisierung der Hochschule – Politisierung der Wissenschaft?' in Habermas, J., *Theorie und Praxis*, Frankfurt, Suhrkamp, 1974, pp.376–385.

It seems that *ethno-nationalism*,[15] the reign of which has marked the social and political reality of post-Communist countries, requires the conservation of the model and function of the university in the age of Communism; and to such an extent that it may be asserted that ethno-nationalism is a kind of regime (symbolic, discursive, institutional, political, etc.) that fosters the principal Marxist patterns of Society and Science after the collapse of Communism. To perceive this, one needs to measure the current state of knowledge of Man and the roles the university plays in society by the standards of the previous epistemological politics. This is perhaps the easiest way to grasp the scope and effects of recent political developments. There is a certain politics of knowledge at the very political base of ethno-nationalism, and this politics, I believe, is not essentially different from that of the past regime. What makes us believe in the continuity of the two regimes is a comparative analysis of their epistemological politics.

Communication restrained by Knowledge

The exclusive institutionalization of the social sciences and humanities within the university, justified by the ideological claim that the knowledge of Man has been *essentially acquired*,[16] has deprived this knowledge of its inherent social and communicative practice.[17] However,

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15 See, for example, Walker Connor's already classic work on *Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding*, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1994.

16 Scientific knowledge was conceived as an *adequate knowledge* of the historical process, especially of its current revolutionary phase in which the self-transformation of capitalism into socialism takes place. On this see Lukes, S., *Marxism and Morality*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1985, p.41.

17 This deprivation is a direct consequence of the ideological preference for 'an accurate representation of natural reality' over practical involvement in social reality. This preference, which is but a preference for *truth*, is typical of undemocratic regimes. In such regimes, according to Rorty, the main goal of education is to teach people about Truth. In comparison to them, democratic regimes should have the reverse preference: "What takes the place of the urge to represent reality accurately is the urge to come to free agreement with our fellow human beings – to be full participating members of a free community of inquiry." (Rorty, R., *Philosophy and Social Hope*, Chapter 7: 'Education as Socialization and as Individualization,' London, Penguin Books, 1999, p.119.) We here take seriously the thesis that "knowledge inhabits the same world as its putative objects." In doing so we are following Steve Fuller who thinks that the social sciences have a privileged status in this respect: "Because the social sciences continue to be perceived as only partially autonomous

this practice is still needed, at least in a rudimentary form, for the school-based reproduction and transmission of scientific knowledge. Moreover, for the dominant Communist ideology it was important to produce a semblance of flourishing social sciences in order to conceal its nature. Those in power were well aware that only a true scientific practice of research and public debate could dispel doubts that a kind of revealed ideology had acquired enormous power, or could convince people of the scientific character of the adopted politics.

It is a supplementary and external socialization in political institutions, with its intensive communicative and quasi-critical practice before the public eye, that has produced the general impression that the human sciences are not petrified into school subjects and confined to pedagogic practice. The lack of truly scientific institutions in this specific epistemological field constitutive of the Communist ideology (or every modern ideology in general) has been compensated for and thus hidden by the intervention of political institutions in educational institutions. However, this constant intervention does not eliminate the gap between knowledge and its social form, but rather institutionalizes it.

This institutional division has turned out to be a way for ideology to take the place of the 'critique of ideology', not only to occupy it but to adopt it as its main place of residence. Science and ideology intermingle after political institutions have taken the 'pure theory', installed at the university, into their institutional practice.

Of course, not every ideology is capable of this fusion with the social sciences: only a humanistic ideology can politically, or rather pseudo-politically, re-socialize these sciences. Due to its humanistic content, to "the best that the history of mankind has produced" (Hannah Arendt), such an ideology is able to find its support in, and to draw its strength and inspiration from scientific knowledge. Its 'scientific' elaboration post-dates its narrative content; at its core stands a fascinating meta-narration about the great endeavour of the emancipation of humankind from all inhuman forces and actors, whereby the humanity of Man is particularly stressed. The social sciences have recognized this narration as their own: as a politically reworked – which in the first place means

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from the societies that support them, their histories provide a special opportunity ... to examine the processes by which knowledge tries to be about the world without drawing undue attention to its existence in the world." (Fuller, S., 'Disciplinary Boundaries and the Rhetoric of the Social Sciences' in: *Knowledges: Historical and Critical Studies in Disciplinarity*, edited by Messe-Davidow, E., Shumway, D.R. and Sylvan, D.J., Virginia and London, University Press of Virginia, 1993, p.146.)

popularized and operational – form of scientific interpretation and explanation.

Ideology thus appears in the place of philosophy – as a kind of popular philosophy shared both by politicians and the people – predating or post-dating its differentiation into distinctive scientific and humanistic disciplines. A politician, an adherent of humanistic ideology, speaks like a university professor who wants to make the achievements of his discipline intelligible to laymen. In the given context, the politician appears as a scholar in the company of laymen: in this company they are hardly distinguishable. The political forums with their lay-public allow this metamorphosis of scholar-professor into politician and vice versa. Since scholars, as a rule, are but teachers, (they spend their career teaching and frequenting political forums, but not pursuing their own research, or sometimes even doing some solitary research, alone, far from any community of co-researchers or public forums that may provide a critical verification of their – temporary or final – achievements), communication with the general public does not pose a problem for them. Their competence is in the first place pedagogic – they are usually familiar public faces popularized by the mass media and frequently cited textbook writers – and so it provides them, when they appear as politicians, with privileged resources of eloquence and social influence.

Can the problem of the communicability of the scientific knowledge of Man still appear in Socialism, given that the only communicative community is a lay or semi-lay one? Is this problem characteristic of a pseudo-scientific regime, i.e. of a regime where knowledge is essentially acquired prior to any form of communication that would involve and challenge it? Is a genuine scientific knowledge constantly threatened by the risk of its being incommunicable?

Let us recall that so-called 'scientific Socialism' is a politico-epistemological regime where all relevant socially-constitutive communication is based on scientific knowledge. There is in principle no gap between knowledge and communication. The Communist rule was praised by its leaders, ideologues and proponents as a glorious accomplishment of the Enlightenment project: they used to teach their people that after the Communist revolution, for the first time in human history, human science was constitutive of society. To play such a prominent role science had to be essentially accomplished, that is, the truth about human beings and justice had to have been revealed, although the tasks of science were not completed in that many marginal

questions and tasks needed to be finished. Only in this way can science appear as a set of tools that helps members of society cope in their day-to-day communicative practice.

Only an accomplished science has no need of a proper scientific community. No wonder that the social sciences and humanities were almost exclusively institutionalized in the universities as school disciplines and that their pedagogical function was far more important than research. What were considered professional communities were in fact teachers' associations oriented towards solving specific professional problems. These associations, or at least, their most distinguished members, were able to play the role of expert bodies when required: even the most challenging research would not undermine their authority, no matter how petrified and sluggish these school bodies might be. They would always have enough knowledge to give a valid assessment of new findings, due to the fundamental ideological belief that the most important things are already known and that the room left for new research is fairly limited and marginal.

It is not surprising that research undertaken in the social sciences was either too abstract, conceptual, and non-empirical, or, too concrete, too meticulous, and missing any guiding conceptual scheme. In any event, it was impossible to imagine research results that could threaten the very basis of scientific assessments and verifications. Within the system it was not possible to challenge the code of all communication and the politically relevant assessment – Marxist Science. It is from the perspective of a scholar who has done genuine research that Marxism appears most clearly as the code of all communication in the public sphere. The findings of such a scholar would not only be condemned by experts as unscientific, but would be incommunicable to the general public. Genuine research either questions the code of political communication or is not coded by it – this is what makes truly new findings incommunicable.

Therefore, an achievement declared by undoubtedly competent authorities as unscientific or pseudo-scientific appears to the public eye as a potentially dangerous business that may disturb the whole political order. However, what often saves unorthodox scholars from being immediately branded as political dissidents is their unpopular, esoteric thought. The unacceptable interpretations are, as a rule, regarded as obscure and, only exceptionally, as subversive of the existing political order. To become dangerous, obscure ideas need to be socialized: an unorthodox scholar should be discovered, say, by the secret police, as

the member of a whole group of conspirators.[18] There was a great deal of truth in regarding non- or insufficiently Marxist writings as obscure writings, rather than as harmful anti-Marxist propaganda, although it may be noticed that in these dark pockets of Communist textual production a genuine social science germinated. It turned out that the lack of a true professional community was far more ruinous than the lack of knowledge. Unsocialized knowledge remained obscure and pseudo-scientific. That is why today, in the post-Communist era, we do not discover unknown or ignored scientific works of great value, but rather more or less opaque philosophical essays with a certain literary charm.

Like political prisoners, non-Marxist researchers suffered from a devastating and self-imposed isolation. In contrast to them, orthodox Marxist scholars never worked in isolation, although there was no professional community in the proper sense of the term. It would be an exaggeration to speak of their 'methodological solipsism', although everybody was working on his own, because the adventure of research was generally replaced by book-learning, by the study of the classics of Marxism. The field of human knowledge was essentially pedagogized: in the last analysis, everybody was learning what was already known and what should be known. Even the most renowned and prolific university professors were in fact students, admittedly, the best students – that is why they were teachers in the first place. The politico-epistemological regime of the definitively-established social sciences was a regime of *political popularization* of scientific knowledge.

It is clear that in a hyper-socialized field of knowledge, where complete solitude was unimaginable, there was no genuine communication. (We are speaking of school knowledge, of an achieved and systematized knowledge: that is why students do not suffer from isolation in their studies.) In the university classrooms in which the social sciences and humanities were taught, there was not much doubt about

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18 "In fact, the regime appears to have differentiated between individual liberty, on the one hand (at which level considerable freedom of expression was permitted), and the representation of collective and organized opposition (which was met with repression). This distinction is illustrated well by the experience of a celebrated Praxis group of philosophers. Academics were permitted to develop and disseminate quite radical critical views regarding the regime and to meet openly with foreign colleagues at such institutions as the Korcula Summer School and the Dubrovnik Inter-University Centre. As soon as they were suspected of mobilising into organized opposition as an incipient political party, however, the group was disciplined." (Allcock, J.B., *Explaining Yugoslavia*, *op.cit.*, p.274.)

what to say and how to speak. Communication was supposed to be completely founded on knowledge, in such a way that the former never seriously exceeds the latter. Each communicative act had to be a way of substantiating a piece of knowledge.

An Excessive Communicative Practice of Politics

In politics, by contrast, communication is often marked by ignorance or by insufficient and fragile knowledge. Scientific Socialism could not have scientific politics *stricto sensu.* Communist politics was still politics, a collective coping with the unknown. The full overlapping of knowledge and communicative practice in the 'scientific field' was dearly paid for. The semblance of this overlapping was produced in the field of politics by a certain strategy of discourse ritualization. On almost any politically important occasion, an accepted manner of speaking had to be respected, a particular vocabulary with characteristic figures used, particular narratives related.

In spite of its firm rhetorical framework, public discourse was not simply a ritual practice, an endless ceremonial full of clichés and stereotypes. Even if public speakers were often obliged to say what was expected of them, the ongoing political practice was never impeccably pre-calculated. In spite of all the immense efforts in social and economic planning, especially at the beginning of the post-revolutionary period when the enthusiasm of people was great, the social sciences proved themselves unable to engineer the new reality but only to legitimate the achievements of the current political practice – namely, to link, only subsequently, *public communication* and *scientific knowledge.*

So-called 'political schools' (a name for the quasi-institution of political courses given on a regular basis outside or rather in-between the established educational and political institutions, where eminent university professors taught politicians and public actors, usually in the evening) throw perhaps the most important light on the relationship between the social sciences and politics. From their meagre curricula, it is plainly evident that the social sciences, considered as the main resource of true knowledge about the prevailing politics, were able to provide professional politicians with only a basic knowledge concerning the 'bright future' that had begun: some general concepts, canonical interpretations, a draft plan of History, etc., plus lessons learned from

the revolutionary practice of their great predecessors, including leaders in power at the time. Devoid of this fascinating weave of epic narration about revolutionary deeds, scientific knowledge might appear to sceptical listeners, and it frequently did, as dry academicism at its worst.

After having finished these courses, new generations of politicians and public actors learned *how to speak* in public, but still not *what to say*. A basic knowledge of Marxist doctrines would suffice for a successful political career, only if supplemented with practical skills. These skills were needed for gaining an even more important sort of knowledge: a *practical political knowledge*. This is a knowledge of what to say and how to act in concrete situations. In a one-party dictatorship, where the field of politics is firmly cemented through governmental and party institutions and arranged in a rigid hierarchy, where politicians are essentially bureaucrats, except those of highest rank, there is not much room for the display of one's creative abilities.[19] Given numerous restraints, ideological and institutional (which could be summed up under two headings: *official party line* and *bureaucratic apparatus*), the most important skill for a politician was that of proving his loyalty: to know how to decide what he was expected to decide (i.e. to know how to follow directives, especially unstated ones).

Practical political knowledge made the communicative political practice inauthentic and often false. The latter was modelled on the 'scientific' communicative practice of the universities: there, in the field of accomplished knowledge, any communicative event was allegedly predicted and coded. Consequently, there were no *events* any more.[20] Practical political knowledge, that active Marxist doctrine, pretended to be scientific knowledge transposed into the political arena. However, the practical uncertainty of public actors, their fragile knowledge and ignorance, allows only a subsequent and indefinitely prolonged overlapping of the acquired practical knowledge with archived theoretical knowledge.

This is a way of describing the meaning of the 'scientific legitimization of politics' in the past Communist regime. Officially adopted political interpretations of decisive events, declared reasons for

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19 See Lefort, C., *The Political Forms of Modern Society: Bureaucracy, Democracy, Totalitarianism*, ed. J.B. Thompson, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1986, pp. 98–122.

20 Lyotard writes about responsibility towards the event, cherished by the deliberative democratic institutions: "Republic is constitutionally attentive to the event. What is called freedom is but this keeping one's ears open to what may occur, and which should be judged beyond any rule." Lyotard, J-F., *Le postmoderne expliqué aux enfants*, Editions Galilée, 1988, p.79.

taking important decisions, noticeable changes in party documents, etc., had to be legitimated. Communist politics was thus committed to the well-established social sciences and humanities. Continuous efforts at official re-description and re-interpretations of the past political practice were a price to be paid in order to have convincing pseudo-communication around emancipatory politics and not simply silence around the Holy Truth.[21]

Consequently, to legitimate the current politics meant to prove that a newly acquired practical political knowledge was simply applied scientific knowledge. It was important for that politics to show that there had been no arbitrary, unpredicted and unwarranted political action, that even the most vigorous, dramatic and fruitful public discussions were in the last analysis part of a directed and predicted communicative practice. Assuming that politics is an exemplary communicative practice, we are inclined to think that Communism was a politics of the depoliticization of the political. The smouldering ashes of true public discussion, the visible signs of sporadic strains and conflicts among the highest political authorities, political practice in need of legitimation, etc. indicated that politics had not become fully 'scientific'. The communicative deadness of the Communist universities, of these exemplary non-political institutions, has never been matched.

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[21] This is, of course, the official truth of the state characteristic of totalitarian regimes. cf. Aron, R., *Democracy and Totalitarianism: A Theory of Political* Systems, University of Michigan Press, 1990, pp.192–204.

Beate Littig

Reply to Peter Rickman and Ugo Vlaisavljevic

These two papers addressed the role of universities in society, one from a Western perspective, the other one from a post-Communist experience. Peter Rickman presented a case for the freedom of science with regard to the content, output and working conditions of the researchers. To start with the latter: I appreciate very much the idea of free and flexible working conditions for scientists. Being a scientist myself, I have experienced the fruitful impacts of beautiful conference locations and I value highly the possibility of network-building during conferences. But with regard to one of Peter Rickman's conclusions which stresses strongly the necessity of the freedom of research, I am more sceptical. This might hold true for the humanities and the social sciences. But how does this relate to the medical sciences, natural sciences and technologies? Do we really want unlimited 'technological and scientific progress', for example, regarding the new biotechnologies? Do we want to support unlimited genetic engineering?

This brings me to my second point which addresses both papers: this is the question of the role universities or science can play in civil society. To explain this I have to start with some remarks on the difference between civil and civic society. The discourse on *civic* society deals mainly with the legal frame of citizenship, the rights and obligations of citizens. This discourse has been fostered by feminists and critics of the dominant immigration policies asking for equal rights. The discourse on *civil* society has a long tradition which traces back to John Locke who wanted to empower civil society against feudalism. It took another shape when the Italian Communist Gramsci conceptualised civil society as a powerful force against Italian fascism. In the last 10–15 years, civil society has been resurrected as a driving force of protest and societal change in the political arenas (new social movements for peace, ecology, feminism, etc.) But the meaning of the term 'civil society' is still heterogeneous. Civil society includes charity organizations as well as self-help groups, politically driven NGOs, chess and sports clubs. And the term is

positively rated by left-wing groups as well as by conservatives. The conservatives ask for the strengthening of civil society to legitimise the budget cuts of the welfare state. Those who are more oriented towards the political left see civil society as a driving force of democracy, participation and political protest. The ambiguity of the term raises many problems: if civil society is the third sector beside the state and the economy it comprises all sorts of private and semi-public organizations, including right-wing or even neo-Nazi groups. Obviously, we have to be very clear with our definition of civil society.

These considerations lead me to another question: what do the authors mean by civil society? With regard to universities: what are the interconnections of university/science and civil society? What can research contribute to the development of civil society and democratic structures? And on the other hand: is the participation of civil society or representatives in the decision-making on research policies a fruitful and democratic idea? What does 'participation' mean? Does it need to be institutionalized? With regard to Ugo Vlaisavljevic's paper: what is the civil society in his and other post-Communist countries now? Are there any interconnections? Can civil society help to democratize post-Communist universities? And what role can Socratic Dialogue play in this context?

Fernando Leal

Ethics, Economics, and the Third Sector

Abstract

There are three economic sectors in society (market, government, and 'the third sector' or 'civil society'), each one of which has its proper role and function and each one of which is vulnerable to its own particular kind of failure. Up to now it has been the merit of economics to discover and articulate the theories of 'market failure' (on the basis of which the welfare state has been built) and 'government failure' (through which we understand the limits of democracies and constitutions). The time may have arrived to start thinking about 'third sector failure', especially as, like those of governments or markets, the failures of the third sector have an ethical dimension. Economics can help us to improve the quality of our ethical thinking in relation to civil society and the third sector by showing us that often good intentions are not enough. Economic theory can provide us with the tools to analyse the long-term effects of our ethical choices, and not only in relation to this or that particular group of intended beneficiaries, but in relation to all groups in society.

Introduction: Ethics and Economics

Ethics and economics might seem to be strange bedfellows. Economists look notoriously uncomfortable when talking about ethics and people who are prone to ethical talk tend to think that economics is irrelevant to ethical thinking, if not incompatible with it. This is a very unfortunate and unsatisfactory state of affairs. In my own considered opinion,

economics cannot dispense with ethics and neither can ethics dispense with economics. Yet thinking about that sector of the economy which would seem closest to the ethical viewpoint, the so-called 'third sector' (also referred to variously as the charitable sector, the voluntary sector, the nonprofit sector or the civil society sector), seems quite a good platform from which to launch a first attempt at persuasion.

The starting-point for this paper is a very simple idea:

No matter how lofty the ideals of civil society, no matter how well-intentioned a citizens' initiative or association, no matter how ethically earnest or committed the individuals in a third sector organization might be, we should be prepared to witness abuses and mistakes, we should be always on the lookout for unintended consequences and unforeseen harms and we should arm ourselves intellectually to be able to detect and analyse the failures of civil society and the third sector.

This is a thoroughly ethical assertion. It asks us to do certain things but doesn't say *how* we can do them. This is where economics enters the picture, for its theory and methods prepare us to witness abuses and mistakes, to be on the lookout for unintended consequences and unforeseen harms, to detect and analyse the failures of different forms of organizations and institutions. Economic science is very far from being perfect, but it is certainly the best intellectual tool yet devised to avoid being blinded by lofty ideals, good intentions and ethical earnestness. Economics is thus not only compatible with ethics, but it is the single most important ally of people who want to do the right thing. For what is the point of having ideals and good intentions if you don't see where those ideals and intentions are leading you?

Another way of explaining the connection between ethics and economics is by considering Kant's 'moral law', as presented by the 20th century German philosopher Leonard Nelson: *always act in such a way that you would agree to your action if the interests of all people affected by it would be your own.*[1]

According to Nelson (and many other celebrated post-Kantians, such as Thomas Nagel, as well as pre-Kantians, such as Adam Smith), human beings, when choosing a particular course of action, are capable of detaching themselves from their narrow personal perspective and attaining an impersonal perspective, a "view from nowhere" (Nagel's

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1 Nelson, L., *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft,* Vol.4 of the *Gesammelte Schriften,* 9 Vols., Hamburg, Felix Meiner, 1970–1972. See also: Kant, I., *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals,* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998 (first German edition 1785).

phrase), in which all interests affected by the action contemplated would be considered "impartially" (according to Smith) or as "numerically equal" (according to Nelson).[2] The decision would then be uninfluenced by the very human drive to follow our inclinations and privilege our own interests. Just *how* this "quantum leap", as the late Paul Branton[3] described it, is psychologically possible is a very deep question that has exercised many great minds.[4] Most of us just assume that it *is* possible and, if we consider that such an impartial attitude is the mark of the 'ethical', then the economic way of thinking is not only compatible with, but in fact indispensable to, ethics. For economics is the social science that has made most progress in modelling the way any decision or action will impact upon the interests of *all* groups. In fact, Hazlitt rightly defined economics in such a way:

> The art of economics consists in looking not merely at the immediate but at the longer effects of any act or policy; it consists in tracing the consequences of that policy not merely for one group but for all groups.[5]

Therefore ethics and economics are not at all inimical, but, on the contrary, might be able to work in tandem, vastly enhancing each other's strengths.

The Subject Matter of Economics

People usually think economics is all about money. This is wrong and misleading. Economics is not about money, it is about the *choices* people make and the *consequences* of those choices. For example, you have chosen to read this paper (at least so far). There are other things you might be doing instead, but, by using your time to read this, you rejected those options. You compared and you chose and that choice has consequences

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2 Nagel, T., *The View From Nowhere*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1986, and *The Possibility of Altruism,* Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1970; Smith, A., *The Theory of Moral Sentiments,* New York, Prometheus Books, 2000 (first edition 1759); Nelson, L., *op. cit.*

3 Branton, P., *A Psychology of Reasonable Autonomy*, (unpublished monograph), 1981. Abstract in: Oborne, D.J. et al., *Person-Centred Ergonomics: A Brantonian View of Human Factors,* London, Taylor and Francis, 1993, p. 229.

4 This still unsolved problem was given a fascinating treatment by Grete Henry-Hermann in 'Die Überwindung des Zufalls', reprinted with lots of additional posthumous material by Felix Meiner, Hamburg, 1985. Translated as 'Conquering Chance', *Philosophical Investigations,* 1953, Vol.14, No.1, pp. 1–80.

5 Hazlitt, H., *Economics in One Lesson,* San Francisco, Laissez Faire Books, 1996.

(e.g. you're not reading that novel you've been longing to read). That's what economics is all about. Money is not of the essence. It enters the picture only because, when a society becomes sufficiently complicated, an instrument to facilitate transactions among people is invented. That facilitating instrument, money, is then taken by economists as a very handy tool to make measurements to help understand and explain people's choices and their consequences. But it is the choices and consequences as such that are the subject matter of economics, not money.[6]

Choices can be *private* or *public*. Economists call your choice 'private' when you choose for yourself and your own; they call it 'public' when you choose for everyone else as well. Thus when you buy yourself or your children nice clothes or a flight ticket, your choice is private; but when you vote for a political party during elections, your choice is public. If you are a business person and have made a lot of profit and decide to use one third of those profits to reinvest in your company, one third to buy yourself a new house, and one third to donate to the Red Crescent in Afghanistan, then all these choices are private. But if you are a member of parliament and vote for a new tax, a new budget or a new industry regulation, or if you are a bureaucrat and make all sorts of little administrative decisions that will affect thousands of people, then your choices are public.

The most widely known and publicized part of economic science deals with *private* choices and their consequences. It is the study of trade, industry, finance, markets, and consumption patterns, in short, the study of the business or private sector. Lots of choices are made here: choices about prices, savings, purchases, household budgets, investments, technology, and so on. Those choices in turn have lots of consequences, which together constitute what we call the market system, a kind of spontaneous order of the myriad actions of myriad individuals. The scientific reputation of economics derives mainly from the fabulously complicated theories and models that economists have developed to explain this system.

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6 Good introductions to economics include: Friedman, D., *Hidden Order: The Economics of Everyday Life*, New York, Harper Business, 1996; Sowell, T., *Basic Economics: A Citizen's Guide to the Economy*, New York, Basic Books, 2000. No introduction can replace the careful considerations of wide-ranging examples and statistical data, so I suggest reading the books above together with: Tanzi, V. and Schuknecht, L., *Public Spending in the 20th Century*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000; Miller, R.L., Benjamin, D.K. and North, D.C., *The Economics of Public Issues*, Boston, Addison Wesley, 2001.

But there is another branch of economic science that is concerned with public choices. It is the study of the behaviour of voters, politicians, and bureaucrats; it deals with taxation, budgets, elections, and regulations. It is, in short, the study of the government or 'public' sector. Lots of choices are made here: choices about candidates, campaigns and campaign promises, rallies, meetings, deals and negotiations, national and local budgets, administrative procedures, penal codes, and so on. Those public choices have, in their turn, lots of consequences for everyone and they all make up our political system. Economists (sometimes in collaboration with political scientists, sometimes against them) have made enormous progress in drawing a picture of how that political system works, and sometimes fails to work, properly.[7]

Economics is thus the study of the market and market failures as well as the study of government and government failures. Now the concept of 'failure' may sound ethically charged, and so it often is. Thus the concept of 'market failures' was born when, in 1912, an economist proposed to distinguish between *wealth* and *welfare*.[8] Wealth is so to speak ethically neutral; it just describes the accumulation of goods in a society. Welfare in contrast seems to say something more; it suggests a judgement either on the quality of the goods accumulated or on the question of who gets what. Words like 'consumerism' and 'inequity' are not very far off once we start talking about welfare instead of wealth.

Up to 1912 wealth was the agreed subject of economic science. Economics was "an inquiry into the wealth of nations", as Adam Smith famously put it.[9] Not even Marx disputed that. The German philosopher just believed that the system of creating wealth through markets and private choices was going to collapse of its own accord, so that in time it would be superseded by a better system for creating wealth, viz. the Socialist system, in which all choices would be public. What the new 'welfare economists' around and after 1917 had in mind was related but different. The market system was fine for creating wealth all around, but sometimes it did fail and produced unwanted effects: it failed to create welfare.

As I suggested, economists are specialists in unwanted effects and unforeseen consequences, and so were immediately seduced by this new

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7 Two useful and nontechnical introductions to the field are: Mitchell, W.C. and Simmons, R.T., *Beyond Politics: Markets, Welfare, and the Failure of Bureaucracy,* Boulder CO, The Westview Press, 1994; Tullock, G., Seldon, A. and Brady, G.L., *Government: Whose Obedient Servant?,* London, The Institute of Economic Affairs, 2000.

8 Pigou, A.C., *Wealth and Welfare,* London, Macmillan, 1912.

9 Smith, A., *The Theory of Moral Sentiments,* New York, Prometheus Books, 2000.

concept. Welfare economics and the welfare state were born as a result. Because the market system was bound to fail from time to time it needed adjustments and corrections, that is, it needed guidance and intervention from government. This brought about huge changes in government spending, on which Tanzi and Schuknecht have compiled a mine of data. Around 1870, government expenditures in all countries for which we have reliable figures ranked between 6% (in Sweden) and 10% (in Germany) of gross domestic product. From then on spending grew gradually and, following steep rises in European spending between 1960 and 1980, by 1996 they were in the order of 32% in the USA, 43% in the UK, 49% in Germany, rising to 64% in Sweden.[10]

The growth of government has been enormous, even monstrous, and it shows no signs of abating. Why did government grow so much and so quickly? Perhaps it has something to do with the terrible wars that were fought in the 20th century? Surely government expenditure soars during wars, and after wars it is very difficult to bring spending down again. The 'war theory', even though attractive, is wrong. The expenses of war are always huge, but, as a matter of historical record, the state budgets of the fighting countries always went down fast after the end of hostilities.[11] No, the explanation is the welfare state.

What is by far the biggest part of the state budget nowadays in most countries, certainly in all developed countries? The pension system, which, as readers may have heard already, will probably collapse on our heads more or less soon. But was the pension system not an ethically worthy goal? Yes it was; there is no question about it. The only question is whether it was or *is* economically sound. The question is whether these *ethical* public choices (made at the time when the pension system was set up) will turn out to have very *unethical* consequences.

The great lesson of public choice economics has been that it is not enough to look at the intentions behind the choices we make: we also have to look at the *consequences* of those choices. It is hard work, it is painful work; but if we don't do it we are being very irresponsible indeed. Now what we have learned from public choice economics and the study of government failures can be conveniently divided into two parts:

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10 Tanzi, V. and Schuknecht, L., *op. cit.*

11 Peltzman, S. 'The Growth of Government', *The Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 23, Oct. 1980, pp. 209–287.

A. Even the best of intentions can have undesirable and unforeseen consequences.
B. People always make their choices within a system of incentives that sometimes also produce undesirable and unforeseen effects.

I have said something about Part A already. As for Part B, analytically, it is just an aspect of Part A, but it deserves some special emphasis because we so often forget it. When the welfare state was first set up people somehow thought that, because officials were not acting on the profit motive as business persons do in the private sector, they were then to be considered, generally and without exception, *benevolent.* They would just make their choices according to the 'common interest'. However, politicians and bureaucrats are only human. Why should it be a surprise to discover that bureaucrats often sabotage their alleged bosses, the elected politicians? Or that politicians are unduly influenced by special interest groups? Or that they make promises during elections that they know they won't fulfil? Public choice economists were able to confirm and explain these and other phenomena, some of which were known to insiders, but by no means all. And yet their work is not as widely known as it should be nor is it sufficiently used to understand the workings of government. So maybe we are still shocked by the realization that, at the end of the day, government officials are just like everyone else.

Enter the Third Sector

Let us now return to our main subject. The expression 'third sector' is intended to convey that civil society is additional, and perhaps complementary, to the market and the government sector. The third sector is neither one nor the other; it is supposed to do things done by neither business nor government.[12] For many people, these things have an enormous value, and that value is widely deemed to be *ethical* in character. In a very poignant sense, the third sector is the 'ethical sector'

[12] The distinction between 'private', 'public' and 'third' sectors is not universal among economists and is probably more common among other social scientists, politicians and political activists. According to many economists, the first (or primary) sector is thought of as the realm of natural products and resources, such as agriculture, fisheries and mining; the second (or secondary) sector is the realm of man-made products, the domain of industry and manufacture; the third (or tertiary) sector is the realm of services, as opposed to products.

in society, at least it is often considered to be so. For example, a business firm decides to pour a considerable amount of its profits into a foundation that is going to serve the community in some way, say by giving scholarships to allow poor people to go to college, or by creating free-access public libraries, or by sponsoring a development project to enhance the quality of life in a deteriorated neighbourhood. A group of lawyers decide to constitute an association to defend the rights of underprivileged people without charging any fees. A student of medicine in her second term decides to volunteer part-time in an organization that caters to the needs of disabled or elderly people. That foundation, that lawyers' association, and that health care organization belong to the third sector. They are neither business nor government and clearly they are doing a lot of good.

This may be so from the standpoint of pure ethics. But if we enlist the help of economic science, then we want to know the consequences of those ethical choices. I could rephrase my initial idea as follows:

It is possible to construct an analogue to public choice economics that will undertake the study of the undesired and unforeseen consequences of the choices made in the third sector. If we go ahead with such a theory, we will discover hosts of phenomena that may surprise some of us, but that can be explained by economic reasoning. Insofar as third sector organizations are ethical in character, there is thus a task for the economics of ethical choice.

Let us start with what we may call, following Max Weber, the 'ideal type' of a third sector organization:

- land and capital are furnished by philanthropists and ordinary people through donations, contributions, and legacies;
- labour is given by volunteers for free;
- the purpose, goal, or mission of the organization is *ethical:* the production of public goods for social benefit.

How far do existing organizations differ from this ideal type? A few organizations do realize the ideal type almost to perfection. Some, perhaps most, do not, or even cannot, realize it. But they depart from it to a smaller or larger degree. A few are very far from it indeed. We can then use a very simple rule of thumb: *the further a given 'third sector' organization is from the ideal type, the more difficult it is to distinguish it from either business or government.*

To begin with, the contribution of philanthropists and more generally of free donations towards land and capital can be greatly exaggerated. In many countries (most of them in Europe) government provides the lion's share, as can be seen by figures for 1995 provided in Salamon et al. In Germany, state subsidies to the third sector constitute 64% of income, in stark contrast to the 4% obtained through donations. Similarly, the Netherlands obtains 59% by subsidy; 3% by donation. By contrast, in the USA, third sector organizations obtain only 30% through subsidy, compared to a substantial 13% by donation. The UK falls somewhere in between European and American patterns of spending, obtaining 47% through subsidy and 9% by donations.[13]

These figures demonstrate how small the distance between the third sector and the two other sectors really is, at least from the financial point of view. In fact, fees and charges, that were until relatively recently the main commercial (or quasi-commercial) feature of the third sector, have been supplemented by more clearly 'capitalist' sources of revenue, such as sales, investments, joint ventures and generally 'a little business on the side'. This 'commercial turn' has been most thoroughly documented by Weisbrod[14] and some intriguing legal cases are assembled and discussed by Fishman and Schwarz.[15] Data in Fishman and Schwarz shows that in 1996, American civil society drew 37% of its revenue from dues, fees and charges and 11% from sales profits, amounting to nearly half its total income.

We can see here how small the 'civil' or 'civic' part really is. And we should at least wonder to what extent we are still justified in talking of *civil* society if the state is largely paying for it. Of course, the state has no income of its own; it all comes from the taxpayer. But that is not the point here; the point is that we tend to think of civil society as effectively *different* from the state, as citizens spontaneously organizing themselves for some worthy goal (and paying for it, too). But that is not all. Both classical economic analysis of taxation and regulation, and the more recent study of public choice, have taught us either to mistrust public spending or at least to avoid considering it naïvely as benign. All sorts of unintended consequences and perverse effects of government intervention and the welfare state have been mercilessly analysed and

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13 Salamon, L.M. *et al.*, *Global Civil Society: Dimensions of the Nonprofit Sector,* Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Center for Civil Society Studies, 1999.

14 Weisbrod, B.A. (ed.), *To Profit or not to Profit: The Commercial Transformation of the Nonprofit Sector,* New York, Cambridge University Press, 1998.

15 Fishman, J.J. and Schwarz, S., *Nonprofit Organizations: Cases and Materials,* New York, Foundation Press, 2000

dissected, so that we cannot believe that government is bound to satisfy our claims for a more just society. For very often its activities have exactly the opposite effects. So, there is no *a priori* reason to think that the fact that the state's starting to 'devolve' its recently acquired responsibilities for certain services back to civil society will not be tainted by such a legacy. We don't know whether the fact that third sector organizations are financially dependent on government subsidies will create an incentive structure contrary to the needs of the people those organizations are supposed to serve. In a world where the real 'customers' are politicians and bureaucrats, it is very difficult for a citizen working in the third sector to resist following their orders and privileging their wishes over those of students, patients, and so on.[16]

Four Questions

Can we say that philanthropists and smaller sponsors are at least the second financial source of the third sector? No, we cannot. In countries in which government contributions are less dominant, payments by those who directly benefit from third sector activities account for most of the income. Some of these payments are fees and subscriptions, some others are even more commercial – the product of the recent trend towards a kind of parallel market, featuring profits from sales of products and services as well as investments in stocks and bonds. Here 'civil' society increasingly looks like a kind of new business sector, only with the privilege of subsidies and tax exemptions. In no country do pecuniary donations account for more than a quarter of third sector income and in many it is less than 10%. These figures improve a lot if

[16] The literature on the third sector is growing and the economic aspects of it are receiving increasing attention: Powell, W.W.(ed.), *The Nonprofit Sector: A Research Handbook*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1987; Weisbrod, B.A., *The Nonprofit Economy*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1988; Hammack, D.C. and Young, D.R. (eds.) *Nonprofit Organizations in a Market Economy: Understanding New Roles, Issues, and Trends,* San Francisco, Jossey-Bass, 1993; Weisbrod, B.A. (ed.) *To Profit or not to Profit: The Commercial Transformation of the Nonprofit Sector,* New York, Cambridge University Press, 1998; Ott, S.J. (ed.), *The Nature of the Nonprofit Sector,* Boulder CO, Westview Press, 2001; Beito, D.T., Gordon, P. and Tabarrok, A. (eds.), *The Voluntary City: Choice, Community, and Civil Society,* Ann Arbor, The University of Michigan Press, 2002; Glaeser, E.L. (ed.), *The Governance of Not-for-Profit Organizations,* Chicago IL, The University of Chicago Press, 2003; Dollery, B.E. and Wallis, J.L., *The Political Economy of the Voluntary Sector,* Northampton MA, Edward Elgar, 2004.

one adds the input of labour, for voluntary work more than doubles the income of the third sector. Thus it is voluntary work that gives the expression 'civil society' its true meaning. Nevertheless, we should not exaggerate its input, for it is less important in relative terms than we imagine. A recent study suggests that we need to pay two hours of work for each freely donated hour.[17] I think that it is not necessarily bad that civil society pays its employees or that it charges fees to the public, in fact, I think it can sometimes be much better. But many people will disagree, so I would like to suggest a first question for consideration:

Question 1: How important do you think voluntary work is for the ethical nature of civil society to be preserved and enhanced? Conversely, how damaging could paid work be for the true spirit of the 'ethical sector'?

What are the purposes, goals, and missions of third sector organizations? Here different countries vary a great deal among each other.[18] In order to understand this variation correctly, I need to introduce another distinction. Economists usefully distinguish between two main kinds of 'good', private goods and public goods. Private goods can be divided and consumed on an individual basis; they are also called 'excludable' goods, because someone's consumption of a given portion of the goods precludes anyone else's consumption of that portion. Food is a clear example: much as I love my friend, I cannot eat my cake and give it to her. I have to choose. Public goods, on the contrary, cannot be enjoyed on an individual basis; they cannot be divided; they cannot exclude anyone. For instance, when attending a lecture everyone is enjoying the facilities of the lecture hall: people share the air we breathe in the room, the microclimate that surrounds them, the sound of the loudspeakers, the view of the overheads, and so on. Now the public nature of any given good is relative; all the things I have just mentioned are shared by all people in the lecture hall, but not by the people who are right now out of that hall, in fact the majority of humankind. Hence the term 'club

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17 Salamon, L.M. et al., *op. cit.*

18 There are at least three relevant international associations promoting research and publication on civil society and the third sector: The International Society for Third-Sector Research (ISTR), online at www.jhu.edu/~istr/about/, publishes *Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations* and the *Inside ISTR* newsletter. The Association for Research on Nonprofit Organizations and Voluntary Action (ARNOVA), online at www.arnova.org, publishes *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly*. The Union of International Associations (UIA), online at www.uia.org, publishes *Transnational Associations*.

goods', introduced by economists to signal that the access to shareable goods is limited to members.

Why is this important? Because one thing that distinguishes third sector organizations from an ethically relevant point of view is the degree of publicness of the goods they deliver. Some organizations deliver public goods in a very wide and admirable sense of the word. What we call welfare services, education, healthcare and social services generally, are one of the important aims of civil society, and the main claim it has to be called the 'ethical sector'. In Western Europe they account for over three-quarters of third sector supply, whereas in Central Europe it is less than 40%. Some organizations are involved with the protection of the environment, the promotion of culture and projects of social and economic development. These aims also look quite 'ethical', for it can be argued that these are public goods which benefit everyone in society. Finally, we have special advocacy groups, professional associations, trade unions, consumer co-operatives, political lobbies, religious establishments, and recreational set-ups. Here there is much more doubt whether we are still dealing with 'public' goods in any clear sense of the word; exclusion of quite large chunks of society seem to be a part of what these organizations stand for. Even more extreme is the case of what one commentator calls "uncivil society", viz. gangs, paramilitary groups, criminal syndicates, secret societies, intelligence networks, drug rings, arms cartels, and, of course, subversive, revolutionary and terrorist groups, as well as their 'front' organizations.[19] These are very hard nuts to crack, but I wanted to mention them without entering into the nuts and bolts of the issue. It's enough if readers see that all sorts of ethical problems lurk here. For example, are the motivations and ideals behind those groups 'ethical'? Facing them will keep us honest, I think. So let me propose a second question for consideration:

Question 2: What could be the criteria for considering a third sector organization or even a third sector activity as more or less ethical than another one?

Although we have come a long way from the 'ideal type' with which we started, these are not the only questions to be asked. Let us for a moment restrict ourselves to 'ethical causes and issues', assuming we can

[19] Judge, A., 'Interacting Fruitfully with Un-civil Society', online, www.uia.org/uiadocs/bank.htm, 1997. Another interesting paper by the same author is: 'NGOs and Civil Society: Some Realities and Distortions', online, www.uia.org/uiadocs/ngocivil.htm, 1995.

define them to everybody's satisfaction, and, moreover, let us restrict ourselves to the donations of philanthropists and the labour of volunteers. I claim that even here their benevolent and benign character cannot just be taken for granted. I want to suggest that philanthropists and volunteers are only human, just as are politicians and bureaucrats. Public choice economics has taught us that people in office always make their choices within a system of incentives that can produce 'public bads' instead of the 'public goods' we expect from them. Something similar can, and does, happen in civil society. To get a grip on the possibilities we have to keep in mind that at least six groups of agents are involved in the work of any third sector organization, namely:

- *management* (the people who make the big decisions, dictate the policies of the organization, and plan its activities);
- *labour* (both paid workers and volunteers serving the organization);
- *customers* (subscribers and other beneficiaries of the organization's activities and products);
- *suppliers* (firms from which the organization buys the goods and services it needs for its work);
- *government* (which exerts a lot of influence through tax exemptions, subsidies, laws and regulations);
- *business partners* (firms which collaborate with the organization).

As readers can see, this is a complex social and economic universe. The most common temptations and sins I have observed in third sector organizations can then be summarized as follows:

(1) *management* will be tempted to exploit labour, particularly volunteers;
(2) both *management* and *labour* (all employees, especially but not exclusively volunteers) will be tempted to work less than they should or to earn more than they deserve;
(3) both *management* and *labour* will be tempted to expand for the sake of expansion (the infamous Parkinson's Law);
(4) *customers* will be tempted to outsmart the organization, for instance, by playing the role of victims;
(5) *organizations* will be tempted to deceive customers as to the quality of the goods supplied;
(6) *suppliers* will be tempted to deceive the organization as to the quality of the goods supplied;

(7) *organizations* and *suppliers* will be tempted to collude in order to outsmart government;
(8) the *organization* will be tempted to misrepresent itself for taxation and subsidies purposes;
(9) *government* will be tempted to be relaxed about acceptance of applications, supervision of organizations, and punishment of misdemeanours;
(10) *organization* and *business partners* will be tempted to collude in order to outsmart government.

I call these the Ten Sins of Civil Society, corresponding to a code of Ten Commandments that one could imagine somebody would want to preach in an appropriate moral tone. Although some of these sins are also present in the private or business sector proper, some are either peculiar to the third sector or at least have features peculiar to it: they are tinged with the half-subconscious idea that, after all, they are being 'charitable', so it's OK if they go off limits. This relaxation of moral standards is one that I have had occasion to observe in myself and others, so it's not just a matter of speculation. But it is not just my personal, limited experience we're talking about here. It has been shown on several occasions that, for instance, environmental groups have been quite economical with the truth when reporting on alleged villains or disseminating doubtful data. In fact, it has been recently suggested that international NGOs should at least formulate and abide by the strict ethical codes they want to impose on business corporations.[20]

This is not in any way to suggest that the Ten Commandments of Civil Society are violated constantly and by everyone. The temptation is there, though, and so are the incentives. I certainly don't think people are bad; in fact, I think that most people are quite decent, at least most of the time. However, temptations can sometimes be hard to resist. If economic theory could come up with public choice theory to better understand the not-so-ethical actions of politicians and bureaucrats, then surely it could come up with something like a 'civil choice theory' to help detect, locate and explain the smaller or greater deviations of third sector actors from the straight and narrow path. I think this is a great theoretical contribution just waiting to happen. For the time being, I am

[20] Adair, A., 'Code of Conduct for NGOs: A Necessary Reform', online, www.iea.org.uk/, 1999.

content to suggest a third question for consideration, which stems directly from the above argument:

Question 3: Is there really a special kind of temptation to do less than one's best, or to violate certain moral standards, under the pretext that one is, after all, serving the community when working for a third sector organization?

Even when the benevolence of philanthropists and volunteers is intact and in place, even if everyone involved in civil society work is immune to ordinary human temptation and really does his or her best to achieve worthy aims, even if our work is carried out efficiently and in goodwill, it may yet fail to serve us, it may yet cause all sorts of unintended consequences, it may yet wreak ethical havoc, it may yet produce untold harm and pain. The road to hell is paved with good intentions, as the good doctor Samuel Johnson said a long time ago. Instead of an abstract economic argument I want to give a terrible example of how this sort of thing can happen.

In 1989 the slave trade in Sudan that had been suppressed by the British colonial government re-emerged as a consequence of post-colonial political developments. When this became known to the West a few years later several humanitarian groups (the perfect example of civil society in action) got involved in slave redemption. As a consequence of this gruesome 'business' slave prices went up to $100 each. Per capita income in Sudan being about $500 per year, the market for slave raiders just soared. Instead of ending the trade in slaves, the intervention of Western civil society has actually increased it. Prices have gone higher and higher and, since 1995, when slave redemption began in earnest, the number of slave raids has grown each year. The size of a typical raiding party has also grown sixfold. Never had the laws of supply and demand worked more cruelly. The slaves' situation has become worse than ever, for in the old days some slaves, chiefly older women and children, were allowed to go home, for the costs of feeding, clothing, and housing exceeded the benefits from their work. Not any more, thanks to the good heart and bad economics of Western civil society.[21]

Terrible though this chain of unintended consequences is, it is far from being an exception. In fact, there is a growing literature suggesting that both government agencies and philanthropic foundations and

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21 Abridged from Miller, R.L., Benjamin, D.K. and North, D.C., *op. cit.*, Ch.7.

groups may have done a lot of harm with the best of intentions.[22] Without going into the gory details, I suggest my fourth and last question for consideration:

Question 4: Can the reader envisage, a causal chain that has led, or could lead, to a perverse effect of well-intentioned acts or policies by your favourite third sector organization? What do you think could be done to prevent such things happening?

Closing Remarks

I have argued first that the ideal type of civil society organization is sometimes quite far from the reality, in that its income does not usually come from philanthropists and other donors, and its labour does not come mostly from volunteers. I also argued that civil society organizations are, to a considerable extent, concerned with issues that are not clearly connected with benevolence and similar ethical motivations, or with the delivery of public good for social benefit. Then I argued that even philanthropists and volunteers are subject to restraints on their ethical performance, in a similar way that politicians and bureaucrats are. Finally, I argued that even when people in civil society organizations act ethically, those actions can fail to produce the consequences that we expected and for which we hoped. These are just indications of the kinds of enquiry we need to institute in order to avoid getting uncritically infatuated with the claims and ideals of civil society. The contribution of this paper is to raise some doubts and to stimulate some deeper thinking as to the commonly-held optimistic belief that civil society will deliver

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[22] There are many books that explore these issues including: Olasky, M., *The Tragedy of American Compassion*, Washington, Regnery Gateway, 1992; Gaul, G. and Borowski, N.A., *Free Ride: The Tax-Exempt Economy*, Kansas City, Andrews and McMeel, 1993; Magnet, M., *The Dream and the Nightmare: The Sixties' Legacy to the Underclass*, New York, Morrow Company, 1993; Murray, C., *Losing Ground: American Social Policy 1950–1980*, New York, Basic Books, 10th Anniversary Edition, 1994; Kaltenbach, P.P., *Associations lucratives sans but*, Paris, Denoël, 1995; Rauch, J., *Government's End: Why Washington Stopped Working*, New York, Public Affairs, 1999; Magnet, M. (ed.), *What Makes Charity Work? A Century of Public and Private Philanthropy*, Chicago, Ivan R. Dee, 2000; Holcombe, R.G., *Writing Off Ideas: Taxation, Philanthropy and America's Non-Profit Foundations*, New Brunswick and London, Transaction Publishers, 2000; MacDonald, H., *The Burden of Bad Ideas: How Modern Intellectuals Misshape our Society*, Chicago, Ivan R. Dee, 2001; Beito, D.T. *et al.*, (eds.), *The Voluntary City: Choice, Community, and Civil Society*, Ann Arbor, The University of Michigan Press, 2002.

the goods that the market or the state cannot. Right now, I don't think anybody knows how wrong that belief is, for the field of 'civil choice' theory or 'civil economics' is not yet born.

Patricia Shipley

Reply to Fernando Leal

> "the worst thing is to rush into action before the consequences have been properly debated."
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> Pericles, *Funeral Oration*[1]

Economics is sometimes called 'the dismal science' and the author of this paper has chosen to dwell on the problems and the unforeseen and undesired consequences of our interventions. Of course, there is a sunny side too; we can't have all failures and no successes. This does not detract from the force of the argument, which I find powerful and challenging and difficult to refute. What I want to do here is to try to reinforce some of the main points.

Fernando Leal is for me a modern Socrates. He is a gadfly stinging and provoking this big lazy and growing third sector into self-criticism. Voluntary organizations could be a particular target of this gadfly, lest we have become too morally complacent – like 'do-gooders' who take it for granted that because we work in the charity sector with supposedly benevolent motives that we have a monopoly on virtue.

His voice is the voice of Socratic *vigilance.* It addresses all those working in the third sector all the way from the big international NGOs, which have sometimes been caught with hands dirty using unethical means to supposedly ethical ends, right down to the thousands, nay millions of volunteers in village communities organizing annual summer fêtes and the like.

It is also the voice of Socratic *restraint.* This Socrates wants us to stop and think before rushing into action, rushing sometimes into places where even the angels fear to tread. Perhaps our problem is that we are men, and women, of action, with a strong love of action, who get a buzz, our 'noradrenaline kicks', our rewards from acting together for a common cause, fired by life shared in the community.

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1 See Dana Villa's *Socratic Citizenship*, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 2001, which was an inspiration in the preparation of this reply.

There are two main kinds of enemies. We have to be continually on our guard against them. There is the *enemy within.* What exactly are we trying to do when working in the voluntary sector? What are our real motives for action, for our being involved? But there is a bigger enemy, a second and more worrying enemy today – the *enemy without;* an enemy outside. This enemy is particularly threatening to the autonomy of voluntary bodies so hungry for cash. Statistics show a *turn to the voluntary* sector. A swelling chorus urges us to be active citizens. In the scramble for funds, for sponsorship, how far are voluntary organizations, how far are NGOs and INGOs, in danger of becoming agents of the state, agents of international quangos, agents of big business? How far are we naïve dupes?

Taking the international level first, and just a single example, I read the other day a claim that Washington funds some 300 NGOs in pro-Russia Belarus alone. Could it be that states will use NGOs politically – to fight their wars? Nearer to my home, in the UK, there is the contemporary problem of state sponsorship. To what are voluntary bodies in the UK subjecting themselves when they take the 'Queen's shilling'? Are they getting too close to the state? To be more specific, in 2001 our Chancellor proclaimed an intention to expand our third sector, and with the lure of a pot of cash – £300 million over three years to be more exact. This move was supposed to mark a new era of enabling government and active citizenship. New Labour's philosophy is that, like the business sector, the voluntary sector will succeed where the state, the public sector has failed, in so-called 'state–voluntary sector partnerships'. Are many voluntary bodies now minor functionaries of the state? Are they nationalised in all but name?

Let me continue to play the numbers game because we are talking 'big bucks' here. The voluntary sector is the goose that lays the golden egg; it makes a huge contribution to the economy. There is a vast unpaid reserve army of productive labour out there. To take only one area of the UK economy, the National Health Service, there are at least 170 thousand volunteers at work in it and they are said to save the NHS some £6 billion.

My question is whether this has anything to do with third way politics and the rolling back of the frontiers of the state, the costly welfare state in particular. Maybe the state is contracting as the third sector expands. Maybe the latter is filling in the vacuum, the spaces created by service areas from which the former has, at least in theory, withdrawn. Whether this is at all a problem perhaps depends on how well the jobs get done

and whether volunteers are fully aware of the conditions in which they work – how far they are under external control. The boundaries of the two sectors are fuzzy and the conditions are ambiguous. Is the state dumping some of its burdens onto naïve, unwitting and benevolent-minded volunteers? In whose interest is all this voluntary activity? I have many questions. The voluntary sector is the weaker partner and the paymaster calls the tune.

Some critics have indeed stated that they do think this matters, including leaders of this country's charity sector. In fact, Ralf Dahrendorf, onetime Director of the London School of Economics, expressed his own concerns about this issue in public in the UK's 2001 Arnold Goodman Lecture, and the problem has grown more acute since then. The worry is that the voluntary sector's independence, (its oxygen, its lifeblood) is being seriously compromised; that the sector is slowly moving away from the ideals of civil society. Traditionally, in the UK, civil society has been the legitimate home of dissensus, of radical critique. It used to be thought that it was in the public interest to nourish an independent and vibrant civil society.

The Socrates of antiquity wanted the citizens of democratic Athens to exercise caution and restraint; to be self-critical and questioning. He went further in wanting them to cultivate intellectual integrity and individual moral conscience above and beyond their civic duties. He wanted them to be restrained and vigilant. Did not the real Socrates warn us that ignorance in itself could be the cause of many vicious actions? Fernando Leal has given us a strong argument and factual knowledge from economics that should help us deal with our ignorance, that should help us to be more vigilant. After all, the price of freedom ever was eternal vigilance.

Part Two: Dialogue in Practice

Grazina Miniotaite

The Integration of Europe and the Dialogue of Values

The International Socialization of Lithuania in the Process of Euro-Atlantic Integration

"Europe has always been a continent of doubt and questioning, seeking a humanism appropriate to its time."

Jacques Delors

Introduction

In September 1991, the three Baltic States – Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania – became members of the United Nations. After 50 years interruption the Baltic dimension returned to European politics. From the very beginning, however, the interpretation of independence in the Baltic States, as well as in Russia and the West, has been marked by divergent and conflicting tendencies. The Baltic States saw independence as a restoration of historical justice, as getting back to a Europe from which they were brutally cut off in 1940. But this was interpreted in two ways: one saw it as the restoration of former states and the other as joining the Europe of liberal democracies.[1]

The Baltic States were unwavering in their choice of integration with the West.[2] The pro-Western orientation was reflected in such radical political decisions as the application for membership in NATO (1994)

1 See Miniotaite, G., 'The Baltic States: In Search of Security and Identity' in Krupnick, C. (ed.), *Almost NATO: Partners and Players in Central and Eastern European Security.* Lanham, Md., Rowman and Littlefield, 2002, pp.261–296.

2 In Lithuania the choice was even sanctioned by a constitutional act 'On the Non-Alignment of the Republic of Lithuania with Post-Soviet Eastern Alliances' (1992).

and the signing of the European Agreement (1995). At the end of 2002 the Baltic States were certain of joining the EU and NATO. They were invited to NATO in November and to the EU in December, and it is expected that they will join the EU and NATO in 2004.

In the West, the return of the Baltic States to the map of Europe was conceived at first as testimony to the power of the West, symbolizing a Western victory in the Cold War. Another view is now prominent, however, where the end of the Cold War, and the accompanying geopolitical changes, testify to the power of ideas and to normative factors in historical development.[3] The Baltic States are seen as part of the growing prevalence of liberal values and the development of a 'security community' in Europe.

Enlargement of international organization will take place when states outside the community share the community values reliably and adhere to its norms.[4] It is scarcely surprising that the process of EU enlargement, with Central Eastern European countries joining the process, has brought into new relief the problem of differences in values. An attempt is made here to identify Lithuania's integration problems; a process of international socialization in entering the Western states' security community. In the process of socialization, the norms and values embedded in international organizations like NATO or the EU help to socialize applicant states, transforming their identities, interests and policy preferences.

Assuming that NATO and EU enlargement is a normative project, with regulated implementation and supervision of the whole process, this paper considers the peculiarities of Lithuania's policy as a result of her attempts to meet NATO and EU membership criteria. The paper mostly concentrates on the process of integration into the EU, revealing the interaction between external demands for membership and national factors.

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3 See Adler, E. and Barnett, M. (eds.), *Security Communities,* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998; Lapid, Y. and Kratochwil, F. (eds.), *The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory,* Boulder, CO, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996; Green Cowles, M., Caporaso, J. and Risse, T. (eds.), *Transforming Europe: Europeanization and Domestic Change,* Ithaca, N.Y, Cornell University Press, 2001.

4 Schimmelfennig, F., 'Liberal identity and Postnationalist Inclusion: The Eastern Enlargement of the European Union' in Cederman, L-E., (ed.), *Constructing Europe's Identity: The External Dimension,* Boulder and London, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001, p.166.

Towards 'Security Community'

The concept of a 'security community' was made prominent by Karl Deutsch nearly forty years ago.[5] He claimed that those states that dwell in a security community had created not simply a stable order but, in fact, a stable peace. Deutsch's observations seem particularly relevant at the present moment because of changes in global politics and the enlargement of the Western security community.

Security communities arise out of a process of regional integration characterized by the development of transaction flows, shared understanding and transnational values. What Deutsch called a "we-feeling" or shared identity also characterizes security community. Lithuania belongs to the North East European region. This region is composed of ten states, with four of them being NATO members, three aspirants for membership, four members of EU, plus Russia with the Kaliningrad enclave. The region is a kind of historical laboratory where new principles of international relations are being formed and put to the test. What kind of security community could be formed in the region?

The history of the region gives us two models for initiating a security community. Hans Mouritzen defines them as a Nordic method ('bottom-up') and the EU method ('top-down'). "Bottom up means that mutual sympathies and transnational ties develop spontaneously over a long time at the popular level".[6] The top-down method starts out with security visions from above, a common project and common institutions: the model of the Euro-Atlantic Security community.

An important precondition for the constitution of a security community is that of a strong civil society. Lithuania, as well as the other Baltic States, is an example of the second model for entering a security community. It is a country with a Socialist past and with the intention 'to return to Europe'. In such circumstances we can talk about a 'top-down method' of forming the security community. However, in contrast to the Western members of the security community, Lithuania started out with no close regional ties with other countries, and with no independent civil society. In addition, long-standing civilizational and cultural ties (historical myths, symbols and images such as the battle of Zalgiris

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5 Deutsch, K.W., et al., *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience,* New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1957; Adler and Barnett (eds.), *op. cit.*

6 Mouritzen, H., 'Security Communities in the Baltic Sea Region' in *Security Dialogue,* Vol.32, No.3, 2001, p.304.

(Grünwald), the crusader as an ancient enemy, the myths surrounding the dukedom of Vytautas) that constitute the historical component of national identity push in the opposite direction. The attitudes towards the West are far from settled.

Thus integration of Lithuania into the EU and NATO is not only a problem of adoption of the EU legal regulations or military inter-operability. It is also a problem of compatibility of norms and values. Or, in other words, it is a problem of international socialization. According to Ikenberry and Kupchan socialization is:

> the process through which national leaders internalize the norms and value operations espoused by the hegemon and, as a consequence, become socialized into the community formed by the hegemon and other nations accepting its leadership position.[7]

The goal of the socialization is to achieve consensus in debate with other members of the community and not to push through one's own worldview and moral values.

EU Enlargement and Value Compatibility

The process of European integration determines the criteria for membership in the EU. From the integration perspective, the issues of exclusion and inclusion are not determined by material costs and benefits, but by the degree of mutual identification between the community members and the aspirants.[8] It presupposes a common space of civic values.

No wonder that as early as 1978 the European Values Study Group (EVSG) was established. Its objective was primarily to determine the main values of the people residing in the EU. Its research began in 1981. The goal was to establish to what extent the cultures of different European states are based on the same set of values. Research was next conducted in 1990 covering most European countries, including Lithuania. The third research project covered European countries and

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7 Ikenberry, J.G. and Kupchan, C.A., 'Socialization and Hegemonic Power' in *International Organizations*, Vol. 44, No. 3, 1990, p.289.

8 Schimmelfennig, *op. cit.*, p.171.

was conducted in 1999–2000.[9] This concentrated on political, social and economic changes typical for post-Communist countries. The research included such issues as quality of life, social identity, social and political values, religiosity, work, family and leisure. Taking into account the research of 1990–1999, an answer will be given to the following questions: do the values and attitudes of an East European (Lithuanian) population approach those of Western Europe, and, is it likely that a unified Europe might come to comprise two or more mutually incoherent regions in terms of the values espoused?

'Values: Europe 1999–2000'

As a result of the research it is possible to divide most European countries into three major groups. The first group includes Austria, Belgium, Denmark, UK, the Netherlands, Finland, Sweden and Germany. The second group includes Belarus, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Poland, Slovakia, Ukraine, Hungary, Portugal, Russia, Romania and Lithuania. The last three of the listed countries, namely Russia, Romania and Lithuania, differ from the first group in all the specified parameters. The third group includes France, Iceland, Ireland (Eire) and Northern Ireland, Czech Republic, Spain, Italy, Croatia and Slovenia. Western Europe was not as homogeneous as it was first thought, while Central Eastern Europe was not so different from the West as one might predict. The greatest differences between Western Europe and Central Eastern Europe are found in the field of social and political values. First of all, the Central Eastern Europe countries are characterized by the "syndrome of institutional distrust"[10] in which the relations between the state and society are not based on a 'vertical trust'.[11]

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9 Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Norway, The Netherlands, Northern Ireland, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Ukraine.

10 Arvydas Valionis 'Socialines ir politines vertybes' in Matulionis, A., (ed.) *Europa ir Mes* (*'Europe and Us'*), Vilnius, Kulturos ir Meno institutas, 2001, p.220.

11 In sociology 'vertical trust' is defined as a trust in social and political institutions, in contrast to 'horizontal trust', which is an interpersonal trust. See Sztompka, P., 'Trust and Emerging Democracy: Lessons from Poland', in *International Sociology*, No. 11, 1996; and Valionis, *op. cit.*

Therefore, the potential instability of the institutional order is much higher here than in Western Europe. Significantly, the Communist system is considered a better regime than the present system of governance in 11 out of 14 CEE countries. Notably, people in the Central Eastern Europe countries are much less confident of their capacity for control over their own lives; and they are much less tolerant of 'the Other'.

Lithuania and 'Values: Europe 1999–2000'

Lithuania is among those countries in which distrust of institutions is at its highest. All state institutions are more distrusted than trusted by the population. Moreover, among European countries, Lithuania has the most popular distrust of parliament, the system of justice and the police. No wonder that, compared with other European countries, the level of popular support for tax evasion in Lithuania is the second highest (after Belarus); and Lithuania leads the list of European countries for dealing in cash (in order to evade tax). Authoritarian attitudes are also widespread in Lithuania: more than half of the population think that a regime with a strong leader, unencumbered by elections and party politics, would be good for Lithuania. The percentage of those sharing this attitude in Lithuania is even higher than that in Russia and Belarus.

These findings can lead one to conclude that in Lithuania "the dominant models of societal adaptation are dysfunctional for the sustaining of democratic institutions."[12] "Lithuanian citizens have still not internalized democratic norms, and the incongruity between prevailing cultural patterns and the established institutional structure can still be observed."[13]

Adjustment to the new social reality and the growth of democratic practices and democratic values is hardly noticeable. Instead, short-term orientation and focusing on immediate gains are widespread throughout the population. When the state is perceived as 'alien' and seen not to correspond to the individual's expectations and needs, little commitment is held towards social order. Legal norms can be violated easily since such violation does not lead to internal moral conflict and legal institutions are not perceived to be powerful enough to punish for

12 Valionis, *op. cit.*, p.222.
13 Valionis, *op. cit.*, p.221.

deviance. These ways of coping with the social trauma of the 'imposed' institutional structure contribute to the blocking of transformation, and reflect signs of the institutionalization of a fragmented and morally flexible (normless) reality. Let us see what the impact of these national factors is on the formulation and implementation of the domestic policy of Lithuania in the process of European integration.

In general, Lithuania's domestic policies are very much influenced by the country's main line of foreign policy, that of seeking membership in NATO and, particularly, the EU. It is influenced also by the post-Socialist transformation, i.e. by the transition from a state-Socialist society to the so-called democratic market society. In 2002, having commemorated the 12th anniversary of the restoration of statehood, Lithuania faces the typical problems of newly emerging democracies. These are primarily the discrepancies between the rapid changes of political institutions and slow developments in economic and social life. Active members of society seek ways of acting beyond the confines of the inefficient political system, and this often results in corruption, social tensions and political instability.[14] The average lifetime of a government in Lithuania is one year, so it is no wonder that Lithuania leads European countries in the popular distrust of state institutions (the political parties are trusted by a mere four per cent of respondents).

Changes of government in Lithuania are usually accompanied by changes in the institutional implementation of decisions already adopted and shifts in the responsibilities of the institutions. This is exemplified in the case of land reform, with the institutions implementing and supervising the reform shifting several times.[15] The question can be raised in this context of whether all EU norms can be properly applied to less developed countries such as Lithuania. In elaborating the latter point, let us consider a case of land reform in Lithuania that has provoked major public reactions.

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14 Taljunaite, M. (ed.), *Streaming towards Social Stability,* Vilnius, Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, 2000.

15 Ramunas Vilpisauskas *Integracija Europoje: Baltijos salys ir Europos sajunga* (*European Integration: The Baltic States and the European Union*), Vilnius, Institute of International Relations and Politics, 2001.

Land Reform in Lithuania and the EU

On 8 December 1995, Lithuania submitted an official application for membership of the EU. On 15 February 2000, Lithuania started the EU accession negotiations with substantial discussions on individual chapters. No other chapter in Lithuania's negotiations with the European Commission has caused such wide-ranging and turbulent reaction in the society as Chapter 7 on agriculture. This can be partly explained by the traditionally prominent role that agriculture has had in Lithuania.

Currently 30% of Lithuania's population lives in rural areas and those in the cities usually have relatives living in the country. Besides, the post-Soviet restitutional land reform, in which land ownership is being restored to former owners or their descendents, has greatly increased the number of landowners. Thus, the results of the negotiations with the EU on matters of agriculture have a direct or indirect bearing on most of Lithuania's population. The process of land reform is directly influenced by the regulations of the European Commission. Therefore, the case of land reform shows whether and to what extent the influence of the EU can be effective in solving specific tasks of domestic policy.

According to land property titles, Lithuania's population can be classified into three groups. The first group are small-holders. Most of them are farming at the level of natural economy, and their main source of income is milk selling. The more demanding criteria for milk quality as imposed by the EU, low buying prices, plummeting living and social security standards, as compared with Soviet times – all these factors have contributed to making this group particularly vulnerable to political manipulation.

The second group comprises owners of medium and large-scale farms employing up-to-date agricultural technologies and able to penetrate the EU markets. This is the group that is usually the recipient of financing opportunities provided by the EU. The third group is constituted by those living in the cities whose land ownership was restored, but who do not intend to go into the farming business; they are interested in the emergence of a land market in Lithuania.

Lithuania's land reform has been in operation for eleven years and the debates about it have lasted just as long. Though the main political groupings were at first unanimous about the general goal of the reform, this being the restoration of Lithuania's citizens' rights to land ownership and the creation of conditions favourable for agricultural development,

they differed in their views on the priorities and conditions of the reform. In restoring property rights, different parties have given priority to different social groups (to former landlords and their heirs or to the tenants). This is why with the change of governments the character of the reform changed, occasionally with interruptions/delays in its implementation (as was the case for nearly six months after the 1996 elections).

The deadline for applications, their priority criteria, the object of the reform (status of land, size), compensation conditions, etc. have all been changed several times. This led to political uncertainty and retarded the implementation of the reform: by the year 2001 the restoration of property rights to land was 79% implemented, yet the conditions for a competitive agriculture were not created. Some 1.2 billion Lithuanian litas (1 Euro = 3.45 litas at the time of writing) are still needed as compensation for property bought out by the state. Though an obligation to pay it by the year 2006 was undertaken under pressure from the European Commission, the term was later extended to 2009.

In the membership negotiations the European Commission has laid an increasingly strong emphasis on the progress of land reform, putting an indirect pressure on the applicant countries by its yearly reports on land reform implementations. However, despite the pressure exerted by EU, the obligation was not carried out, probably because this sphere is not directly covered by EU regulations

At the present stage of Lithuania's negotiations with the EU, powerful groups resist the closed chapter on free movement of capital, its implication of land sale to foreigners specifically. Those opposing the liberalization of land trade insist that foreigners would buy all land, so that Lithuania would lose its major asset. They also point out that the trading is unfair, since foreigners are much richer than local bidders. Those who favour the liberalization stress the point that freedom to sell one's land is a natural extension of one's property rights. Thus restrictions on land-trading violate citizens' property rights. Besides, current restrictions on land trade constitute a major hurdle for the development of private enterprise in rural areas.

This clash of opinions is also reflected in the discussions in the Seimas (Parliament). In order to comply with the EU requirement for free movement of capital, the Seimas has to amend Article 47 of the Constitution which reads: "Land, internal waters, forests and parks may belong only to the citizens and the state of the Republic of Lithuania by the right of ownership." During the first session on the amendment issue

(March 2002) a transitional seven year period was proposed. In the second session (June 24) the proposal to set up a transitional period, during which foreigners would not be allowed to buy farmland, was rejected by majority vote. Disappointed representatives of farmers threatened to blockade roads and even the Seimas itself. However, despite the rejection of the proposal by Seimas, the appropriate clause still might be included in the membership treaty with EU. It is supposed that Seimas will obligate the government to start negotiations concerning the transitional period.

The example shows that despite pressure from the EU the implementation of domestic policies is very much dependent on internal factors, such as interest group pressure, civic values, public distrust of the state institutions which take the form of destabilizing meetings, picketing and road blockades. These internal factors might retard Lithuania's progress to the EU.

Conclusion

Lithuania's participation in the European integration processes, and the harmonization of legal regulations with those of the EU has made a positive impact on the country's social and political development. Put simply, one can say that Lithuania's domestic changes are being shaped directly by EU demands and requirements in a process of accession negotiations. They are also implicitly constrained by the orientation towards the specific EU economic and social model: namely, a low level of unemployment, high cost labour, and high-level social guarantees. Its implementation depends significantly on the level of Lithuania's international socialization – on the compatibility of norms and values, and the development of a shared identity.[16]

[16] The negotiations involve the two parties both of which have their own arguments against and fears about membership. In Lithuania there are fears about the loss of state sovereignty and national identity, and the costs of membership. In the West there are fears about the influx of cheap labour, increase in crime, decrease in EU subsidies (Austria, Germany). The negotiations are in great part not so much about the laws and regulations, as about the exemptions from their application. For example, some Western countries are eager to restrict the application of the 'free movement of persons', while Lithuania is cautious about the 'free movement of capital'.

Living standards and attitudes change in Lithuania have lagged behind the rapid legal and regulatory integration with EU. This explains the hostility to certain political decisions, particularly in those cases when they are justified by appeals to EU requirements. Lithuania's citizens have not yet internalized the democratic norms of the EU countries. This is possibly partly due to the fact that Lithuania's European integration did not start from the grass-roots at the popular level, but as a 'top-down' process, with visions coming from above, and with a common project and common institutions imposed. The 'top-down' integration has its problems. Lithuania's domestic policy often fails to strike a balance between the requirements of the EU and national factors. This leads to populist decisions and creates a gap between policy formulation and policy implementation.

The gap exists both in the applicant countries and in the member states. The rapprochement of values and attitudes of EU countries and those of applicant countries will most probably remain an urgent task for all members of the integrated Europe, even after the acceptance of new EU members. In these circumstances, it is important both for the member states and for Lithuania to stimulate public discussions and research activities that could help answer the following question: under which conditions are the EU community's norms, rules and values internalized in the domestic practices of applicant states and how do they influence political and social change? In search of an answer, it is important to seek new methods that stimulate dialogical thinking in the society. One such method that could contribute significantly is that of Socratic Dialogue. The first step in this process is an interest on the part of the British Council at Vilnius in the development of Socratic Dialogue in Lithuania. The council intends to begin Socratic Dialogues shortly, which will be an excellent opportunity to develop new forms of dialogue and civil society in Lithuania.

Dimitri Kletschko and Ute Siebert

Socratic Dialogue and Democratic Development in the Republic Of Belarus

Part One: Dimitri Kletschko on the History and Politics of the Republic of Belarus

Introduction

In the late 20th century, the phenomenon of political culture became topical in Belarus, a country which has little experience of independent development. Held back by the totalitarian regime of the former Soviet Union, Belarus did not have full state sovereignty, and did not have diplomatic representatives abroad. The main constituents of the power structure were supremacy and submission. The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the formation of the Republic of Belarus led many citizens to believe that everything would go their way as soon as the old values and principles were rejected. The reality turned out to be quite different.

The political structure is of particular importance in the economic sphere. For example, the economic crisis observed in the Republic since the beginning of the last decade of the 20th century, and the break-up of economic relations with former Soviet republics, facilitated by a low-cultured political elite, led Belarusian politicians to apply strict, sometimes severe, measures. Our actual conditions do not allow us to move easily to the democratic principles which exist in many Western countries, and this fact should be clearly understood.

The main dimensions of political culture in Belarus are authority and political process. Authority arises from the social need of society for self-

regulation, integrity and stability in the presence of differences of opinion on the part of different groups and communities. This is, to my mind, the first point to be taken into consideration. The second point is that the character of authority in Belarus is manifest in its continuity; power in this country never disappears. It is passed on like a baton from the preceding regime of the so-called 'democratic' parliament to the authoritarian presidential form of governing. But there is one condition: not to exert one's own authority.

Politicians in Belarus have to take into account not only their formal authority but the level of political culture as well. The latter is manifest in two ways in our Republic. On the one hand, charismatic rule is evident. There is a belief in a president's exceptional qualities. On the other hand, legitimate rule, i.e. the supremacy of law and equal rights for all, has been in the making. Political parties do not advance political culture. They can hardly be called powerful structures, but groups of vain people, who, deprived of power in Soviet times, are looking forward to its restoration.

Moreover, opposition represented by the Belarusian Popular Front is unlikely to succeed insofar as it does not inspire people to build up a civil society, only a national state. The so-called 'third force' is represented by political groups, which reflect the interests of the 'new Belarusian', i.e. those with real estate, as well as people who were enriched by illegal financial manipulations.

The Belarusian political system is in the making. Unlike the other republics of the former Soviet Union, it has managed to avoid devastating political collisions. The main reason for this can be found in the national character of the Belarusian people. The predominant feature of the Belarusian national character is a constant balancing of two types of culture and traditions: Eastern Orthodox and WesternCatholic. This phenomenon results from historic and geo-political factors. There is the geographical position of the country itself and its neighbouring states (in our case Russia, Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Latvia) and relations between them. Then secondly, there are the cultural and spiritual bases of the political culture of a state which are manifest in its custom and tradition, its historic development.

Political culture does not exist in a social desert, but finds its form and shape in a specific historic environment. One powerful factor connecting modern conditions of a nation to its past, consists in those historic elements that shape the national psyche, expressed in particular in literature and language.

The History of Belarus up to the Soviet Period

The history of Belarus goes back to ancient times beginning with the Polotsk Principality in the 10th century. From the 13th through to the 16th centuries, the territory of present-day Belarus was one of the largest, most powerful, and flourishing states in Eastern Europe. The 16th century is considered the golden age of Belarusian history. However, in 1569 a political union was concluded between the Grand Duchy and Poland and The Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth was founded. From this point in history, Belarus was no longer independent. Late in the 18th century, Belarusian lands were incorporated into the Russian Empire and Belarus lost many of his national features, the Belarusian language was prohibited and many people of other nationalities settled in Belarus. The darkest period in the history of the Belarusian nation had begun.

The Russian tsars and emperors began the systematic liquidation of Belarusian institutions through an official policy of unprecedented Russification, including deportation, confiscation of property and appointment of Russian administrators and the higher hierarchy of the Orthodox Church. Thus, from the 19th century, Belarus became a Russian colony right in the middle of Europe known as the North-Western Province.

Modern political life began in 1863. Led by Kastus Kalinouski, a young patriot who was executed at the age of 26, Belarusians rose against their Russian masters. The last third of the 19th century was characterized by positive changes in political culture, which were connected with the emergence of national consciousness. The Belarusian enlighteners directed their efforts to education, and the formation of political structures, parties and movements, as well as working out an ideology for the nation-state. By 1905, Belarusians were allowed some fundamental rights to cultural expression, including the right to publish a newspaper in their own language and to print some books.

Meagre though these concessions were, they breathed new life into the country's national revival. The rapid revival of Belarusian statehood began only after the 1917 Revolution in Russia. The Belarusian People's Republic was proclaimed in March 1918. From 1920 Belarus was divided into two. Western Belarus went under Polish national oppression; Eastern Belarus became part of the USSR. In 1939 both parts were united in one Republic, as a member of the USSR.

The Soviet Period in Belarus

Within the so-called 'Soviet period', in a totalitarian political culture, a specific 'Soviet consciousness' developed. Stalinism created a gap between proclaimed rights and liberties and their non-usage in practice. The totalitarian regime brought in its own notion of the word 'right', whose essence was identified with state laws, acts, enactments, and resolutions of the ruling political party. It was paternal in character and justified repressive action. Within the pre-World War II period (in the 1930s) most of the Belarusian intelligentsia was repressed.

From the middle of the 1960s Belarus had to become a 'shop-window' of Soviet national policy aimed at creating a new social and international community. It was not until 1966 that the international pacts on human rights were signed, and the Universal Declaration on Human Rights of 1948 was brought to light only during Perestroika. Of all the former Soviet republics the Belarusian people were the most Soviet-oriented. This was a political culture of submissiveness; a submission to the existing political system. Such a national personality is sensitive to the authority of the power, and believes everything that is said by the mass media. At the same time, such a personality does not get involved in politics.

Belarus Today

The Belarus of today is experiencing a difficult period in its history and is searching for an adequate form of social development based on its own history. The experiences of foreign countries which resemble Belarus are drawn upon. We observe changes in their social structures.

The new state system in the making has a double character. The former, old state structures adapt themselves to new conditions. In the first half of the 1990s the new authority saw its main support to be in the parliament and government. Powerful and influential political parties did not exist. Communal property was passed on as private property by the new bureaucracy. A percentage of the former BSSR Communist party functionaries became businessmen and bankers.

The presidential elections of 1994 brought to power much of the old state bureaucracy which has become more ambitious without a definite ideology. It is pragmatic; many of the new bureaucrats used to be

Komsomol functionaries who lost their beliefs in Communist ideology. Their way of thinking, formed in the Soviet Period, resulted in watchfulness and caution over further development of their society. Against the background of radical changes, observed in Russia, which has resulted in most of Russian people growing poor during the post-Soviet period, the Belarusian experience of slow development may seem attractive.

In almost all spheres we observe a compromise between old and new. All these processes take place in an economic crisis and without the presence of any civil society structures. There is also the role of religion as an important constituent of the political, social and cultural system, which is affected by contradictory processes of secularization, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, by the extension of religious and pseudo-religious influences.

Christianity became the predominant religion in Belarus at the end of the 10th- and beginning of the 11th century. The Belarusian Orthodox Church, unlike that of Moscow, had a range of specific features, such as control over church life by civic people.

Today these discrepancies do not exist. Orthodoxy has become the predominant religion. Today less than 40% of the population of Belarus is Catholic. Social and economic, as well as spiritual, crises in Belarus have contributed to the growth of different sects of Eastern and Western religions.

The Republic of Belarus is a multicultural state, in which more than 80% are Belarusian, 13% are Russian, and 4% are Polish, the rest Ukrainian, Jewish and other nationalities. Inter-ethnic stability is a great achievement. It does not mean that ethnic and political problems do not exist. There is, for example, a negative attitude towards attributing the status of the only national language to Belarusian.

In recent years the country has become a holding place for emigrants affected by armed conflicts, mostly of Muslim origin (more than 250,000 people). That is why the process of national renaissance has become not only Belarusian, but a problem common to all nationalities.

Today we can talk about a particular type of political culture of Belarusian society, which is in the first stage of its development, when all the habitual cultural stereotypes are being destroyed and new ideas formed. The fragmentary character of this political culture has a negative influence on the stability of the political system, creating a danger of particularism and localism. Nowadays, all types of political sub-culture can be observed in Belarus: traditional, conservative, moderately

progressive, radically progressive, nationalistic, anarchical, and egalitarian.

Part Two: Ute Siebert on coming from Germany to facilitate Socratic Dialogues in Belarus

Presuppositions

When around 1990 the political conditions began to change, the Germans were faced with the question of how to reform educational systems according to democratic demands in the countries in transition. Not only because of geographical circumstances, but even more because they themselves were concerned about the necessity to integrate the GDR and GFR into one state.

As in the course of the reunion of Germany, there arose similar problems in post-Soviet or Eastern European countries (as Edita Treciokienè of Lithuania described in her article on educational concepts).[1] On the one hand, there was and is the desire of the people for a modern, open society with free citizens who create their own living conditions. On the other hand, there were and are the experiences of around 50 years which made the same people feel accustomed to a way of living in which all affairs of everyday life were 'state-affairs'. This contradiction results in crises of identity for the individuals and for their societies. Support is needed to overcome the crises:

> That is why the main task of education is to cope with the crisis of identity. Education has to help the adult develop her/his identity, change

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1 Treciokienè, E., 'Neue Anforderungen der Weiterbildung in Osteuropa' in: *Grundlagen der Weiterbildung: Zeitschrift für Weiterbildung und Bildungspolitik im In- und Ausland*, Neuwied, Luchterhand, 1994, pp.127–129.
Treciokienè uses the term 'East European' and 'post-Communist' as synonyms, though several of these so-called countries belong rather to the centre or to the south of Europe. In connection with pedagogical subjects, however, it became usual to talk of 'East European countries' or 'East European societies' when post-Soviet countries were meant.

> identity, provide the adult with knowledge and qualifications and promote insight which s/he needs to realize her/his identity.[2]

However, if educationalists from Western Europe offer their support another conflict is likely, as was reflected in another statement by Edita Treciokienè:

> Each East European country has preserved the peculiarity of its own culture, regardless of Communist reprisals. Now these states strive to present themselves in a new way, they judge their history in a new way, they find again their identity and want to show the world that each of them exists as a very singular society. The societies that succeeded at this are those which were able to concentrate their intellectual potential...[3]

With regard to this background, Western European advice concerning values in modern democracies might provoke resistance in one or the other case.

The situation in post-Soviet or East European countries is thus characterized by the interaction of a lot of contradictory conditions, and sensitivity is needed for all educational initiatives. There are double-bind instructions like 'Be spontaneous!' which are contradictory in themselves, and criticized by the psychologist Paul Watzlawick.[4] Such assertions are obstructive and hinder fruitful co-operation with our Eastern European colleagues. One should be on the alert and avoid all paradoxical requests, such as 'Be a Western democrat, now!', even if they are meant well.

My own experience in educational work with partners from the former GDR or from Eastern Europe showed me how deeply many of them were hurt by the shocks which accompanied the political changes around 1990. I was very often told the same thing in different ways: 'we feel reproached by the implication that we only did wrong things in our lives.' To fail to consider the injuries which such persons have to bear, and to seek to impart the values of Western democracies only in the form of instructions, would necessarily and understandably be opposed, and often in a very subtle way. This difficulty can be mitigated by use of the Socratic method and, in particular, by Socratic Dialogue.

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2 *ibid.* p.128 (translated from the German by Ute Siebert).

3 *ibid.* p.127 (translated from the German by Ute Siebert).

4 Watzlawick, P. *et al, Menschliche Kommunikation: Formen, Störungen, Paradoxien,* Bern, Verlag Hans Huber, 1969, p.171f.

The Potential of Socratic Method and Socratic Dialogue

The Socratic method does not work by instruction – on the contrary. The teacher or facilitator of an SD is non-directive and only moderates the discussion among the participants in a group, which is regarded as a community of thinkers. The participants start from a concrete example to be clarified. The clarification should bring to the surface values which underlie our decisions and our actions. The discussion aims at insight on a more abstract level but the connection with the example should never be lost. On their way to consensus the participants should always make sure that they understand each other, paying attention to the contents as well as to the structural conditions of the Socratic Dialogue.

These summarized rules were first developed by the founder of the Neo-Socratic Dialogue (NSD), the German philosopher Leonard Nelson (1882–1927). According to these rules, searching for truth is the principal aim in a Socratic Dialogue. It is one of the tasks of the facilitator to prevent hierarchies developing within the group and to help participants to hold to the principle of equal rights instead. In Socratic Dialogue in the tradition of Leonard Nelson and his disciple Gustav Heckmann (1898–1996), fair examination of everybody's contributions is one of the basic requirements for reaching a consensus. A consensus can only be achieved if, without exception, all participants agree to it and are thoroughly convinced. Very often a consensus may only be an agreement on differences or on new questions.

By stimulating critical thinking and avoiding dogmatism, SD is itself an exercise in practising democratic rules. Group members can use the Socratic method to formulate, and to give reasons for, basic values. Instead of forcing pre-determined conceptions of social life upon people of the new East European states, citizens must be trusted to find out in democratic processes the fundamentals of their own private and public lives. Socratic Dialogues today are an excellent instrument for uncovering one's 'true interests'.

'True interest' is one of the key categories of Leonard Nelson's theory. It means more than mere wishes but rather that interest which everybody would recognize without doubt if human beings were able to have knowledge without error. Nelson regarded learning and teaching

according to the Socratic method and practising SD as a kind of furtherance of our critical thinking capacity.[5]

Important presuppositions like 'true-interest' should not be forgotten in the process of a Socratic Dialogue. It is one of the responsibilities of the facilitator to watch that the moral implications which characterize the Socratic theory do not get lost but are reflected on in the practice of Socratic Dialogues.

To be clear: as pointed out above, there is a political dimension in the Socratic Dialogue or Socratic method in Nelson's and Heckmann's tradition. But SD cannot replace political action. Political life depends on compromises. So, in debates about the theory of Socratic method on the one hand and in political debates on the other, the difference between consensus about values in a Socratic discussion and compromises in daily public and political life must be clarified. But, even if political action cannot result directly from Socratic Dialogues, actually practising the Dialogues may strengthen the participants' autonomy and democratic competencies through the development of the capacity for independent critical thinking.

Socratic Work in the Republic of Belarus

From 1998 until 1999, a young German, experienced in Socratic Dialogue, did his social service in Belarus. He paved the way for contacts between Belarusian institutions, and the German institutions – the Philosophisch-Politische Akademie (PPA) and the Gesellschaft für Sokratisches Philosophieren (GSP). The GSP (Society of Socratic Facilitators), in particular, now works with the Belarusian Society for Friendship and Cultural Relations (an NGO), with the Belarus Linguistic University (LU), the Belarusian State University (BSU/BGU) and, we hope, in future also with the European Humanistic University (EHU).

We started our Socratic Educational Initiative (Belarus–Germany) in 1999. There were lectures held in Minsk and we practised Socratic exercises and Socratic Dialogues with students. We discussed different methods of learning and teaching with our Belarusian colleagues and still do so. One important topic is how to overcome the predominance of didactic and directive ways of teaching and the central role of the teacher

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5 Nelson, L., *Gesammelte Schriften in neun Bänden*, Hamburg, Felix Meiner, 1977, Vol. 5, p.312f and p.469f.

in all lessons without abandoning the high standard which Belarusian schools and universities can assert as a fact. Belarusian students were guests of our Socratic courses. Colleagues from Belarus took part in our international conferences at Loccum, Germany, 2000, and in Birmingham, UK, 2002. Maria Soloviova was the first colleague from Belarus who applied for GSP training to become a facilitator of Socratic Dialogues. We have also started to translate basic articles about the Socratic method into Russian.

Report on a Socratic Dialogue in Belarus

To give an impression of the practical Socratic work in Belarus, I will try to summarize the progress of a Socratic Dialogue I facilitated two years ago at one of the Universities in Minsk. I worked with twelve students, and the language was German (many of the students are excellent in speaking foreign languages, German among others).

At first the students proposed the following subjects as themes for a Socratic Dialogue:

(1) What is true freedom?
(2) Can a person live independently of the opinion of others?
(3) Can money make a person feel free or does it chain her/him?
(4) Can we always choose how we want to live?
(5) Can we avoid restricting other people when we choose our way of living?
(6) Do duties contradict freedom?
(7) Is freedom only a right?
(8) Can a person be a stranger in her/his native country?
(9) Why is it so difficult to understand each other even when we speak the same language?
(10) What are the roots of hatred among human beings?
(11) Is the best route to harmony always to tell the truth?
(12) Why are the young people of today so indifferent to our past?
(13) Is it good for people of our native country to join protest marches?
(14) What will happen if morals continue to decline?
(15) Is it worthwhile to undertake adventures and leave one's native country to live in the 'great wide world'?

In my opinion this selection of student questions collected, among others, in only half an hour, shows the high level of their thinking. Furthermore, the questions typically reflect the problems which young people (of around 18 years) want to focus upon. On the other hand, there are questions which reveal the problems arising in Belarus. The question on protest marches, for instance, reflects the actual political situation before the elections of 2001 when, very timidly, opposition groups tested different forms of protest against the Lukashenko regime. To ask about the decline of morals could be a repetition of what was published in connection with the protest marches in the official media, or what might have been said by one or another party-liner among the parents or teachers of the students.

The many questions about freedom (questions like "can we always choose how we want to live?"), or, more concrete and clear ("is it worthwhile to undertake adventures and leave one's native country to live in the 'great wide world'?") direct attention onto the problems with which young Belarusians are very preoccupied. To be allowed to study in Belarus means to agree to certain obligations for the period after having finished studying (for instance, for a young teacher this could involve working in schools in small villages even though everybody would prefer to live and work in the capital Minsk where the provisions are much better than in the countryside). There is a lively debate among students regarding whether the individual is justified in trying to escape from the duties s/he had undertaken at the beginning of her/his studies. Because of the low wages and other difficult conditions of life in Belarus, many young people think about going abroad. They know their country needs them, especially the well-educated young graduates. So a lot of questions mentioned here are of great relevance to the existence of the young Belarusian and their answers are of considerable importance for the future of their country.

Thus, not only the Socratic method but also the subjects dealt with in SDs can be regarded as relevant for democratic development in Belarus (and this is the case for other countries in transition, too). The question that was finally chosen by the student group, and its clarification, confirmed this view. The students chose the question: "Is freedom only a right?" The example at the start of the Dialogue dealt with an experience of taking a course in 'military lessons'. (Many young men will choose this subject because that frees them from military service; they choose to undertake non-military tasks instead in connection with military affairs such as translations, interpreting and so on.)

I will call the young man, who gave the example, Pjotr. He said that one day one of his teachers of military lessons, a military man, asked the students of Pjotr's group to join a certain paramilitary organization. Though he was against this organization Pjotr signed a form and thereby became a member. In the beginning of our Dialogue Pjotr himself saw his experience as proof that the military teacher, a representative of the state, had robbed him of his right, his freedom to choose what he wanted to do, and, furthermore that he himself had not coped in a responsible way with his right. But somehow he was not content with his own judgement. Most of the other students thought that Pjotr had had a clear choice. In their opinion, he had acted as an opportunist wanting to avoid disadvantages which could have arisen from his refusal to join the organization. Pjotr could not agree with this judgement. He was struggling for a reasonable and fair answer. The next day he even brought a friend along who had been together with him in the very situation; Pjotr wanted to be supported in finding the right explanation for what had happened to him. Though it is not according to the rules of SD for someone to join a group later on, Pjotr's friend was allowed to stay with us as a witness, because it was becoming more and more important for Pjotr and the other students to discover which thoughts and values lay behind Pjotr's decision. Everybody, and not least Pjotr himself, was surprised at the result of the profound examination of all the details of Pjotr's example.

For Pjotr, it had been an important factor that the military teacher had used the words: "Now you will all voluntarily join the organization X." The clarification in the Socratic Dialogue led to the interpretation (which had only now come to Pjotr's awareness) that the teacher had given an ironic signal. This circumstance had made it possible for Pjotr to keep a certain distance from his own feelings in a situation that demanded a decision. Pjotr's words sounded convincing when he explained what he had only just realized in the process of the Socratic investigation: he had not come to his decision because he had been afraid of bad consequences – rather the ironic signal of his teacher had shown him that the case was not important enough to waste energy on opposing it. Pjotr had chosen military lessons because in Belarus that is the only way to escape military service; he assured us that he would have resisted if he had been asked to do things which contradicted his pacifist principles. The decision in question, however, according to Pjotr, had not touched his 'inner' principles.

Further discussion resulted in realizing that Pjotr had made different choices – the first one when he decided to attend military lessons. By this step he had won latitude, and within its scope he could claim to have made decisions according to his free will. At the end of our Dialogue Pjotr understood himself better than he had done before and was now able to stick to his decision, backed by reasons and values of which he had not before been aware.

Some of the students in Pjotr's group were really impressed by the difference between Pjotr's early opinion (see above) and his later judgement. Finally, the young people had a lively discussion about their insight that complicated questions often lead to answers other than just 'Yes' or 'No' or 'Black' or 'White'.

Political Outlook

Our Socratic project aims at a snowball effect. People are educated to spread the Socratic method. For example, economics students, law-students, or student teachers are expected to work as 'multipliers' in their future professions. Our target-group is thus identical with the young people who are the 'backbone' of future Belarusian society. They are the people who, because of their knowledge, understand better than others the enormous problems of their country and who therefore think about leaving it and looking elsewhere – in Western Europe or in the USA – for better chances to earn their living. As mentioned above these young people discuss whether they have the right to do this; so they are not so sure about their 'true interest' here.

Only spreading the Socratic method here and there means that only a few individuals have the opportunity to broaden their perspectives. Is it realistic to hope that spreading the method systematically will generally enhance critical thinking? Critical thinking includes overcoming 'either/or' thinking and striving to find many alternatives. Can we hope that enhancement of critical thinking will help the people to recognize their 'true interest' in the Nelsonian sense?

The Socratic method which aims at this critical thinking is welcome in Belarus. That was my own experience there. Our Belarusian colleagues share the following interests with representatives of other East European countries:

- a new form and new understanding of learning and teaching can be developed;
- new ways can be looked for to help enhance political and democratic thinking, especially among young people;
- representatives of the Socratic method are people from Western Europe and they are welcome as guests, supporters, friends in our countries;
- participants from Eastern European countries should not be expected to pay for educational Socratic work because of their economic circumstances (our Socratic education has a tradition of voluntary and honorary work in any case).

There is another important question. If we want our Belarusian neighbours and friends to continue with critical Socratic thinking we, for our part, should consider the actual living conditions of people and their chances of realizing critical thinking in practice and its consequences in countries like the Republic of Belarus. This does not mean finding out what *their* 'true interest' is, but a realistic view of the political situation of Belarus is required. If someone goes there as an educationalist, her/his work should not be based on ignorance or illusions.

Before the elections in 2001 a visitor to Belarus had the impression that the Belarusian, especially the intellectual elite, were on the point of giving up. They felt stressed by the demand of Western representatives that they drive away Lukashenko, their president, who after his democratic election in 1994, started to misuse his role and continued to govern Belarus in an egoistic and partly dictatorial way. Being forced to take two or even more jobs to earn their living meant that, for many people, there was no time left for political engagement. Furthermore, critical Belarusian people regarded the so-called 'opposition' as hardly inspiring trust and so they did not really see an alternative to Lukashenko. The Belarusian people felt punished by the attitude of the EU at that time because their problems were not taken seriously, and more than once I heard from colleagues there that this would drive them into the arms of Lukashenko.

Although Lukashenko was not deposed in 2001, the EU relinquished its indifferent position towards Belarus. One reason was that politicians recognized that it would be useful to win Belarus as a partner. Belarus will soon become a neighbour of the EU, as Poland, situated between Germany and Belarus, will be one of the EU's new members in an enlarged EU in 2004. The changing relations between Belarus and Russia

were also just as important for an ingenious new policy.[6] Before the elections of 2001, Putin supported Lukashenko as a guarantor who – because of his anti-Western course – would prevent Belarus's withdrawal from Russia. The Russians appeared compromised by their being on too intimate terms with the Belarusian president and his irrational politics. The more the Putin administration promoted Russian integration into the worldwide economy, looking for more and more contacts with Euro-Atlantic institutions, the more their distance to Lukashenko increased.

According to Heinz Timmerman, the EU responds to these facts with its new policy called "Double-Dialogue-Strategy".[7] This policy aims at an approach between Belarus and the EU states which respects Russian interests and appreciates Belarus as an independent mediator between East and West. To make such an option (or development) come about, the 'Double-Dialogue' process must be led with the representatives of the current Belarusian regime on the one hand (instead of barely noticing them as EU institutions did before), and, on the other hand, the dialogue has to be continued and extended even with the increasing opposition parties and with the developing civil society in Belarus.

The role of the Socratic initiative can be assumed to lie in opening channels of communication and thereby strengthening civil society in Belarus, thus hopefully contributing to the "revolutionary process of co-operation",[8] which could help the Belarusian people to cast off the self-isolation imposed by Lukashenko in a peaceful way, and to reach a non-violent change of the political system in Belarus.

I believe that we should bring our competencies as Socratic educationalists to support the Belarusian people in their struggle towards their own 'true interest', whatever that becomes. In my opinion there are three relevant tasks:

- We should continue our Socratic work hoping to strengthen thereby the democratic structures in Belarus.
- We could strengthen the self-confidence of the Belarusian people by showing appreciation and visiting the country, which will help us to revise incomplete historical preconceptions. (But let us not

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6 See: Timmermann, H., *Die widersprüchlichen Beziehungen Rußland – Belarus im europäischen Kontext* (SWP-Studie), Berlin, 2002; Timmermann, H., *Tauziehen um ein nebelhaftes Staatsgebilde,* Frankfurter Rundschau, No. 46/24, 2003.

7 Timmermann, H., *Tauziehen um ein nebelhaftes Staatsgebilde, ibid.*

8 *ibid.*

reduce Belarus only to a passive receiver of humanitarian support – although aid became necessary, and of course still is, after the Chernobyl catastrophe).

- We may help Belarus (formerly 'White Russia') to be more respected in Western Europe by offering opportunities to Belarusian intellectuals to make their country better known. (Unfortunately Belarus is now very often regarded only as an appendix, as the 'white' part of Russia).

We should not see ourselves as only donors. We are also questioners who know that they are receivers, too. It is a Socratic principle to learn from *each other*. Let us listen to the Belarusian people, above all to their historians, and find out what interesting neighbours we have.

Aneta Karageorgieva

Environmental Ethics And Dialogue With Children In Bulgaria

The Philosophy for Children Project

In 1991 between 30 and 40 Bulgarian school and university teachers received training in the American programme and methodology known as Philosophy for Children (P4C). After several years of further training, including attendance at workshops in the USA, and experimental practice in school, they formed a group of philosophy teachers, primary school teachers, university professors and students, most of them Bulgarians and one of Roma origin, which established an Association for the Advancement of Philosophy with Children (AAPC). This group has since implemented a number of successful projects in Bulgaria supported by national and international organizations.

The principal goals of the AAPC are:

- education in the values of democracy and civil society and development of autonomous and critical thinking;
- fostering personal fulfilment, interpersonal, ethnic and cultural tolerance;
- raising children's self-consciousness and self-esteem;
- developing the theory of philosophizing with children.

The P4C Project in Bulgaria

The latest project called 'Environmental Philosophy with Children: Summer School in Dobrevtsi' reconfirmed philosophy's potential for performing socially relevant tasks. The region of Dobrevtsi (a small village with about 900 inhabitants) is economically and socially very

deprived, with children missing classes in winter because of the lack of suitable clothing and shoes. The village is also isolated in respect of information and transportation, with high rates of unemployment (about 50%). Both quantitative and qualitative analyses (self-esteem tests, motivation tests, interviews with the participants, and the like) showed that the P4C project outcome there was very good. The target group included about 100 children of Roma (86%) and Bulgarian (14%) origin, age 6 to 16, eight local primary-school teachers, four local authority representatives and 12 volunteers from the AAPC.

Objectives and Outcomes of the P4C Project in Bulgaria

To introduce environmental issues at school, a book *Eco-Philosophy with Children* with a teacher's manual was written by members of the AAPC, and published with 50 copies presented to the school.[1] To the same end, two intensive training courses – one with the local school teachers and representatives of the authorities, and another one with the volunteers from AAPC (most of them students) – were carried out. The courses were designed so as to introduce the key concepts of democratic, pluralistic and tolerant dialogue, characteristic of P4C methodology, and to help the participants to learn by experience what it is like to philosophize, especially about nature, and what kind of thinking skills and enquiry techniques are being utilized in practical philosophy, specifically:

- *to develop and foster ethical attitudes towards nature in the target group*: P4C classes were held; children's work (advertisements, puzzles, etc.) was published in the book;
- *to raise civic/civil consciousness, dialogue with the local authorities, and participation in community life:* participation of the local authorities in the project included financial support; involvement of parents, grandparents, etc. in the activities during the summer school;
- *to foster ethnic, cultural and interpersonal tolerance between children:* friendships and partnerships established between children; documentation of shared experiences (in tourism, cleaning, painting the school fence, etc.) which was published in the book.

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1 *Eco-Philosophy with Children,* Texts and Teacher's Manual, Sofia, Omophor Publishing House, 2001.

Key Concepts of the P4C Project

With reference to the leading principles and key concepts of P4C methodology, the following shows how philosophical dialogue and discussion works. Principles and key concepts of P4C are:

- no institutional hierarchy is allowed among teachers/facilitators and children;
- no technical jargon is allowed;
- a community of enquiry is built;
- critical thinking skills are developed/encouraged;
- creative thinking skills are developed;
- valuation thinking or 'caring' thinking skills are encouraged (i.e. developing intense empathy, deep sincerity, and a strong sense of justice, focusing on what one can do in the circumstances and on having a vision of how things should or could be done – along with knowing the reality).

The practical approach taken is as follows:

- teachers and children sit in a circle, which is quite unusual in Bulgarian schools, and everyone is regarded as a valuable source of information, knowledge, experience and behaviour models;
- the texts that children read in class are fairy tales (Bulgarian, Indian) and small parts of children's world literature (The Little Prince, Pippi Longstocking, etc.);
- the children enquire together and unravel problems and questions posed by themselves; each person is given a strong invitation to speak several times (by reading in turns, by asking questions and by answering them); there are no taboo questions, each is taken into consideration, although the discussion focuses on one or two questions most relevant to the general topic – nature, human beings and their responsibility to it, caring about nature;
- making distinctions, finding similarities, using criteria, judging, developing context sensitivity, giving examples and counter-examples, tracing implications, testing the truth of statements, revealing assumptions are encouraged;
- story-telling, creating new interpretations and new context, harmonising diverse experiences in a new perspective, are encouraged;

- taking an active stance, considering practical steps to change things or behaviour, planning small concrete projects and trying to implement them, are encouraged.

Conclusion

By these means philosophical dialogues with children aim to present, discuss, evaluate and help children to internalize various models of thinking, attitude and acting, of good judgement and good reasoning, so that each child is given the practical opportunity to broaden her repertoire of such skills and models. The dialogue also fosters the habit of seeking understanding by using not only discursive, but also non-discursive ways, such as drawing, singing and playing together, and so on.

At present, the contact between the 'big world' outside and the village people is being maintained by visits to the school by the authorities on different occasions (the beginning of the school year, national holidays, and the like). Two new projects are in the process of elaboration, aiming at the improvement of conditions for sustainable development of the local community. One of them concerns the possibility of turning the second building owned by the school into a 'green school' camp base for children from neighbouring towns, which will provide some additional income for the village. The other one is to find and secure opportunities for selling the crop from the school's plum garden for a better price, as an ecologically pure product, instead of offering it to the local brandy factory for a few pennies. The future does not seem too optimistic, however, especially regarding the speed of expected changes, but these small steps could nevertheless be estimated as worthwhile.

Karin Murris

Socratic Dialogue in Mainstream Education for Citizenship in British Schools

Introduction: The Aims of the UK National Schools Curriculum

> Children learn responsibility best and gain a sense of moral values by discussing with good guidance from the earliest age, real and controversial issues ... Simple and immediate issues get discussed at first, of course – home and neighbourhood, attitudes to stealing etc, but then more complex social issues, with reasons and evidence for opinions being demanded at every stage.[1]

Philosophy sits comfortably with two major aims of the UK National Curriculum. The first states that the curriculum should "build on pupils' strengths, interests and experiences ... and promote an enquiring mind and a capacity to think rationally".[2] Enabling children to think creatively and critically is mentioned explicitly. The second major aim of the curriculum is concerned with children's spiritual, moral, social and cultural development and with preparation for the responsibilities and experiences of adult life. Pupils are to be taught ways of distinguishing between right and wrong and about a range of beliefs. The school curriculum should "pass on enduring values, develop pupils' integrity and autonomy and help them to be responsible and caring citizens capable of contributing to the development of a just society."[3] Likewise, the introduction to the National Curriculum contains a section on learning *across* the curriculum. This section includes spiritual, moral,

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1 *Education for Citizenship and the Teaching of Democracy in Schools*, Final Report, Qualifications and Curriculum Authority, 1998, p.64.

2 From the UK National Curriculum Handbook, Key Stages 1 and 2, p.10.

3 *ibid.*

social and cultural development, cross-curricular skills, Personal Social and Health Education (PSHE), and Citizenship, all of which can be said to have a philosophical dimension.

The Link between Citizenship and Thinking Skills

There is an important link between citizenship and the teaching of thinking skills. Such a link was also put forward at the 2002 'Philosophy with Children' conference when DialogueWorks Associate, Will Ord, argued in his keynote talk that government documents[4] show the importance of critical, creative and reflective thinking for students to be able to perform well in:

- discussion and debate;
- research and enquiry;
- participation and responsible action in civil life;
- communication and negotiation.

Ord emphasized that a thoughtful citizen must be a person able to:

- think and act reasonably;
- understand issues;
- communicate clearly;
- consider others;
- evaluate relevant aspects of their social environment.

As a result, citizenship education requires the development of:

- knowledge and understanding (e.g. of laws and rules, but also of certain philosophical concepts, such as justice, fairness, freedom, rights);
- skills of enquiry and communication in communal thinking; participation and responsible action.

4 See Citizenship Programmes of Study www.citfou.org.uk, www.standards.dfes.gov.uk or www.qca.org.uk

Philosophy can teach thinking skills through dialogue which offers opportunities for children to participate meaningfully in matters that affect them. Much of our thinking as individuals is like an inner dialogue. When involved regularly in philosophical dialogues with others the variety of voices in a community of thinkers will lead to a richer, more varied inner dialogue, and hopefully lead to more reasonable judgements. Within inner dialogue, self-correction takes place by reflecting upon one's beliefs, one's actions, the connection between the two and consequently one's responsibilities. In addition, in the Socratic Dialogue process individuals learn not so much in a group, but *as* a group.

Obstacles to the Introduction of Philosophy in Schools

Despite the encouraging links made by Will Ord between citizenship education and the teaching of reflective thinking, I suspect that there are still many obstacles to the introduction of philosophy in most British schools. Teaching philosophy requires reflection on pedagogy and may even require training, whereas, in most schools, citizenship will be taught by subject teachers who lack this training and have only a few hours to spare. Moreover, if we want to encourage Citizenship teachers to use the specific philosophical method of Socratic Dialogue (SD), then the obstacles may be increased even further.

I want to start a dialogue about the possibility of using the Socratic method in mainstream education with *whole* classes because my political commitment includes making Socratic education available to all. Most importantly, any method that excludes a whole-class approach is unlikely to survive in the practicalities of everyday teaching. To date, using the Socratic method with small groups of children has never been much of a problem but whole class teaching will create SD problems.[5]

One of the obstacles for teaching Socratically in schools is *adults' low expectation of children as critical thinkers.* This is in part due to the extent developmental psychology has influenced the way we expect children to develop cognitively, as is reflected in the design of Britain's school

[5] Inspired by the corporate work done by Dutch colleagues Jac Rongen and Hans Bolten, we have organized 'Mind and Muscle' courses with groups of excluded children from Bristol and London combining outdoor activities with philosophical reflection. These opportunities for out-of-school learning are also popular with gifted and talented children, but in principle they are open to all children from the age of about eight.

curriculum (still very much based on the ideas of psychologist Jean Piaget). Much recent research (inspired in particular by Margaret Donaldson's work) now confirms that when experiments with young children are constructed in such a way that they make sense to them, young children can carry out tasks that demand quite complex cognitive processes.

For example, some research carried out by a cognitive psychologist in a UK primary school[6] suggests that when children between the ages of five and eight are taught philosophy they significantly out-perform children receiving standard teaching, i.e., they are much more able to:

- generate alternative post-event attributions and alternative explanations for a range of hypothetical situations;
- recognise different emotions;
- make links between thoughts and feelings in different hypothetical situations.

Despite the deprived social circumstances of the school in question the children were capable of cognitive abilities that, according to Piaget, are normally reserved for children from the age of 12. This applies in particular to the ability to 'decentre' (to imagine thinking from viewpoints or perspectives other than one's own) and think hypothetically. Of course, the ability to decentre in the imagination is central to being a moral agent; it is a necessary condition for empathy.[7]

Another problem for teaching Socratically in schools is how an approach to teaching that has no fixed content or learning objectives can be included in a subject-driven curriculum. Typically, teachers' justification for lesson planning revolves around the specific learning outcomes attached to clearly described subjects. But a prime characteristic of philosophical enquiry is lack of control over the content of the dialogue. Moreover, teachers feel insecure and lack the necessary training to create an intellectual and emotional space for children's questions and contributions or to operate as highly skilled and attentive listeners, observers and facilitators of children's dialogue. On the whole,

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6 This research was carried out in Tuckswood First School in Norwich. See: www.creative-corner.co.uk/schools/tuckswood

7 It is unfortunate that not only are recently developed thinking programmes such as Anne Robinson's *Let's Think* based on controversial Piagetian assumptions, but also the Citizenship Foundation still subscribes to Kohlberg's stage-theory of children's moral development. See Rowe, D., *Introducing Citizenship: A Handbook for Primary Schools*, London, A&C Black, 2001, pp.16–17.

knowledge and central concepts were not presented as problematic in their own education. Knowledge was taught as a set of answers. The questions preceding these answers may have been forgotten. Statements of facts (that is, accepted fragments of knowledge) are the outcomes of previous enquiries. Socratic approaches to education on the other hand recognise that pupils need to relive and experience the entire enquiry process to be able to examine the truth of these statements of facts.

When pupils have a genuine opportunity to generate and explore their own philosophical questions, not only will they remember them better, but what they learn will also be more meaningful for them. They set the agenda themselves and shape and reshape the concepts through which they understand themselves, others and the world about them. This connectedness is essential to keep children interested and intrinsically motivated without needing to resort to 'external' motivation such as punishments or pleasing the teacher or other rewards. Focusing on children's own questioning, rather than their giving the 'right' answers, will encourage them to become independent and creative thinkers.

This kind of teaching makes great demands, not only on our cognitive processes, but also on our emotional capacities, because of the emotional unease which intellectual perplexity stemming from open dialogue can bring about. However, educating people to think for themselves has become urgent as they become increasingly distrustful of their own judgements and turn to 'experts' for answers in many areas. This coincides with a reluctance to take moral responsibility for one's own decisions and actions. Philosophy helps 'unlearn' habits of thought and encourages us to take responsibility for our thoughts and actions.

The Structure of a Socratic Dialogue

Questions that we might want to ask here are: is it possible to fit SD into the existing educational structures and climate without damaging its identity or integrity? Is there an *essence* to a Socratic Dialogue in the Nelsonian tradition? How much can the structure of an SD be changed while still enabling us legitimately to call it a Socratic Dialogue?

Traditionally the structure of a Socratic Dialogue in the Nelsonian tradition is something like this:[8]

[8] See Kessels, J., *Socrates op de Markt*, Meppel/Amsterdam, Boom, 1997.

- **First step**: the *motivation* for a Socratic Dialogue and its starting point is the search for a definition involving an *abstract concept* (e.g. what is freedom, or death, friendship, anger, knowledge), though more recently questions have become more specific, especially in business (e.g. how much flexibility can be expected from an employee?).
- **Second step**: the main philosophical question is analysed with the help of a concrete example drawn from participants' own experiences. Examples are written down on a flipchart and questioned. One example is chosen and described in full in such a way that all participants can put themselves into the shoes of the example-giver.
- **Third step**: the identification and formulation of the core-statement is worked on, i.e. the connection between the example and the main question. This poses no educational problems. Firstly, in small groups participants explore the relevance of the example in relation to the main question. This can be an action, a judgement, statement or both. It's not an answer to the main question. The example-giver knows intuitively that it is 'true', without knowing exactly why it is true. The core-statement is the conclusion of an argument, though the premises are not clear (yet).
- **Fourth step**: 'regressive abstraction' takes place, that is, a reasoning back to the more general assumptions that have to be true if the core-statement is true. For example, from 'what is a good teacher?' we might develop the core statement 'x was a good teacher because she made me curious', which might lead us, through a process of abstraction, to conclude that arousing curiosity is essential to teaching.

There are educational implications. It is not suitable for mainstream education involving whole classes; it excludes many with its reliance on the written word; the focus on one example-giver will discourage many from being involved.

Given the nature and method of Socratic Dialogue, the following might be the obstacles to introducing this method more widely in schools:

- group size (the Socratic Dialogue places limitations on the size of the group);

- time (choosing the example can take many hours);
- workload (a Socratic Dialogue relies on lengthy written work by the facilitator);
- ability (as it involves a description of a past experience the method relies on a good memory for its accuracy);
- character (the need to empathise may be a problem for some children or adults).

Overcoming the Obstacles to introducing Philosophy in Schools

There are a number of ways in which we might solve some of the problems considered above. Firstly, we could adapt existing philosophy methods, such as *adapting Socratic Dialogue* to take account of the situation in schools. For instance, we could shorten the example-giving time. The group could also be encouraged to focus on one aspect of the experience which would bypass the need for one person to describe the example at great length. Of course, adapting the method in this way might involve problems for the purist as it deviates from the usual structure.

Another way would be to *develop new methods* of teaching philosophy and thinking skills in schools. For example, I am developing a new resource with a colleague from Fair Play, a Scottish charity that introduces many old-fashioned games and activities into schools and playgrounds. The resource is called *Thinking Moves.* Although activities are often based on well-known games, the ones we have chosen, adapted or invented are particularly useful for philosophical enquiry. They help to develop the sort of skills or awareness necessary for Socratic enquiries (e.g. attentive listening or awareness of the needs of others) or sometimes offer opportunities to introduce certain lines of argument.

One such resource is 'State Your Position', a philosophical game for children. In the warm-up version of this game, 'Fruit Bowl', children are divided up into 'pears', 'bananas' and 'apples'. When shouting out, for example, 'bananas', all 'bananas' have to swap places. Players have to find an empty place, and the person without a seat chooses the next fruit to be called out. After a few minutes the game moves onto things you can *see* (e.g. 'anyone wearing a ring') to things you want to *know* (e.g. 'anyone who has told lies', 'anyone who believes there is life after death') and so on.

This game is fantastic for getting assumptions 'on the table' without the written word, and is used in philosophical enquiries with children. Children can swap places when, for example, they cannot follow the enquiry anymore or when they do not agree with someone. Sitting in one's opponent's place may help to think about the issue from another point of view, which is a powerful educational strategy. Also, a physical break often helps overcome a thinking impasse or 'energy dip' in an enquiry. Children soon take the initiative to insert such breaks in their classroom enquiries.

The game is then followed by 'thinking time': silent moments for reflection on the experience. Participants are then asked to write down some very concrete statements about what happened or how they felt during the game. Then, in small groups, they compare notes and choose one statement, which is written down on a flipchart and also given to the teacher to be put in a hat. The idea is to start with the concrete statement that is going to be picked out of the hat. After reading out the statements the teacher invites comments.

By contrast, adults find this kind of game very difficult. Adults' knowledge, experience and socialisation may be a hindrance rather than an asset in Socratic teaching. As we grow older we increasingly lose ourselves in abstractions and generalisations, often missing the uniqueness and complexities embedded in the concrete, the situational, the personal. Unlike most education and common belief about the nature of knowledge, Socratic Dialogue – with its focus on *phronesis* (practical wisdom) – acknowledges the importance of linking the abstract with the concrete. Children have the advantage of having less theoretical 'baggage' than adults – thinking aloud with others constitutes less of a threat to them.

The game itself raises many questions that need to be explored further when considering the kinds of philosophical methods that we can use in schools. Should we allow children to play competitive games? Games in which we can hurt others or games in which we can display selfish behaviour? Games that exclude physically less-able people? These questions can be raised and addressed by participants themselves, and, as such, provide valuable opportunities for participants to be listened to and to be taken seriously. A philosophical open-ended dimension adds to a more psycho-sociological approach to citizenship education. So often decisions are taken on behalf of others (especially children) by well-meaning adults. Philosophy is very inclusive in the way in which it

almost *demands* participation. Responsibility for content and procedure is placed not just with the teacher, but uniquely with the learner as well.

Conclusion

I actively seek or create situations in which people (independent of age) are encouraged to critically examine and evaluate their own assumptions and value systems (often through their actions), resulting sometimes in moral principles that are freely chosen rather than externally imposed. Such practice is necessary to protect democratic values such as human rights, individual freedom and equality. The notion that citizens must be self-regulating and participate actively in decision-making processes is also embodied in the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child.[9] I wonder to what extent the decisions we often make *on behalf of* children about citizenship education (e.g. censoring certain books or games at school) violate this UN Convention.[10]

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9 In accordance with Articles 12 and 13 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989).

10 Karin is a member of DialogueWorks. See: www.dialogueworks.co.uk, or contact the author at karin@dialogueworks.co.uk.

Toshiro Terada

How can Socratic Dialogue work in Japanese Civil Society?

The Need for Socratic Dialogue in Japan as Enquiry and Discipline

Our experience or experiment in Socratic-oriented dialogues and philosophical cafés in Japan shows that there is a demand for, and interest in, philosophical thinking through dialogue in our society.[1] My expectation is that Socratic Dialogue can work as a good tool for philosophical enquiry; philosophical enquiry not only within schools but also among citizens from different fields and professions: from nursing, social work, education, and so on. But what attracts Japanese participants is not always SD as philosophical enquiry. They are attracted more by the autonomous and collaborative procedure, thrilled by the analysis of a concrete example, and fascinated by the colourful aspects of inter-subjective understanding.[2] The importance for our society to develop a dialogical attitude cannot be over-emphasized. For example, a Japanese philosopher, Yoshimichi Nakajima, writes that Japanese society is a society that lacks dialogue, where ignoring differences and avoiding conflicts takes priority over recognizing differences and dealing with conflicts, with the result that the voices of minorities are silently

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1 I facilitated Socratic-oriented dialogues in my introductory philosophy course in 2001 at Meiji Gakuin University, Tokyo/Yokohama. The general theme for the semester was 'Self and Others'; the specific questions chosen by the students were "what is it to understand others?" and "what is the uniqueness of a person?"

2 A student wrote in his report at the end of the semester: "this course made me face things that I had believed without much care before, and it was very hard as well as enjoyable to formulate my ideas in the form of statements." Another student wrote: "this course itself was the opportunity to practise understanding others. I realized that understanding others is more difficult than I had thought." Some other reports of Socratic Dialogues in Japan are found in *Metier of the Clinical Philosophy,* Vol.9, Osaka University, 2001.

oppressed.[3] This observation is quite right, but SD can contribute to changing this uncomfortable situation by building up a dialogical attitude.

This is not to say that the Japanese art of verbal communication has been poor. On the contrary, it has been rich and colourful. My point is that, as far as recognizing differences and dealing with conflicts are concerned, the Japanese art of communication may work in a negative way, presumably together with the traditional virtues of harmony and conformity, which are not bad at all in themselves. At the same time, I have no intention to commit myself to the too simple view that the Japanese traditional virtues are simply something to be overcome by Western civil traditions. In the same way, it is wrong to suggest that some features of Japanese communication, such as the omission of subjects, high dependence on contexts, preference for non-verbal communication and so on, which are serious considerations in practising Socratic Dialogue in Japanese society, indicate immaturity or deficiency in ability to communicate.

Many teachers involved in elementary and middle education, as well as those in higher education, feel the need to develop skills for communication and decision-making in the public sphere, which are essential skills for members of a civil society. Thus debating is getting more popular in Japanese classrooms, but a debating intellect without a dialogical attitude is inadequate, even harmful. For example, a journalist, Eiji Ohtsuka observes that among Japanese citizens the pro-war discourses are more eloquent than anti-war discourses, and he attributes this fact to the elevation of what he calls 'the language of debate', which I understand to be the argumentative or debate-oriented use of language. According to Ohtsuka, people seem to be at a loss over how to express feelings like 'I don't like war' or 'war cannot be justified.'[4] Debate is different from dialogue in that debate aims to decide the winner, consists in persuasion, and allows people to take either side regardless of their personal beliefs. These qualities, of course, can be counted as merits, especially in classrooms, but alone they fail to catch the overall picture of

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3 Nakajima, Y., *Taiwano Nai Shakai (A Society Lacking Dialogue)*, PHP, 1997.

4 Ohtsuka, E., 'Sengo Minshushugi no Rihabiritehshon', ('Rehabilitation of the Postwar Democracy'), in: *9.11 Go wo Ikiru Tame no Nyu-tekisuto (Our New Texts for Living the Days after 9.11)*, Kadokawashoten, 2001.

sound communication among persons. The art of dialogue is essential to a sound civil society.[5]

The Difficulties facing SD in Japan: The Status of Consensus

The difficulties facing SD in Japan are: firstly, the rules and procedures, which are very rigid as well as time-consuming; secondly, the attitude of Japanese participants themselves who are inclined to avoid argument. Both difficulties have something to do with the status of *consensus* in the Dialogue. Achieving consensus at every step makes the Dialogue rigid and time-consuming. Many participants often wonder why and complain that the Dialogue gets stuck from time to time by making sure that everybody agrees. Ironically, the Japanese participants' inclination to avoid argument often helps the Dialogue proceed smoothly. But it does not mean that consensus is easily reached: rather it means that *real* or *genuine* consensus is never achieved, as avoiding argument results in leaving differences and conflicts vague or implicit. Putting too much emphasis on consensus plays a negative role: it may function as a kind of pressure on the participants and they may become even more silent, for fear that they may cause trouble in the group.

I find two separate reasons for the Japanese inclination to avoid argument, one negative and one positive. The negative reason is cultural: the traditional virtues of harmony and conformity as mentioned above. It is often the case with us Japanese that whatever contributes to the harmony and conformity of the group takes priority. On the other hand,

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5 It is worth considering whether the Japanese have a 'civil society'. It is only a century and half ago that the Japanese learned the English word 'society' or its counterparts in other European languages, for which the ingenious intellectuals of those days thought out a corresponding Japanese word after a process of trial and error. Even today some people argue that in Japan there is no 'civil society', much less 'civic society' in the strict sense: we still live in an old closed community inherited from the feudal era. Over the past 100 years or so not a few thinkers have struggled with the gap between civil society in the European sense and pseudo-civil society in Japan. In fact, I do not understand the concept of 'civic society' in contrast with that of 'civil society'. I know that the history of these concepts goes back to medieval Europe, or even to ancient Greece, and has been refined through the ages of Enlightenment and civil revolution, yet still I am afraid that somehow I do not understand something at the very core of these concepts.

the positive reason is a very sound kind of hypothetical attitude: 'let's wait and see what consequence this line of thought will have?'

Consensus in Enquiry and in Decision-making

Clarifying differences and conflicts is the starting point of a dialogue, which I have argued is lacking in Japanese society. The inclination to avoid argument, which conceals differences and conflicts among participants, turning an SD into a mere conversation, should somehow be removed. But once differences and conflicts are clear or explicit, it does not follow that differences and conflicts ought to be overcome; that consensus ought to be reached. A dialogue can go on, with differences and conflicts retained. In the course of the Dialogue each participant may experience her prejudices revealed and her views and opinions changed, including her own self-understanding. It is this *process*, not consensus, that is essential to philosophical enquiry.

This does not mean that argumentation is not essential to philosophical enquiry, nor that relativism is an appropriate response, as will be shown below. I believe that dialogue is a search for the *truth*. On this basis, one might assume that consensus is still essential to philosophical enquiry because as long as we are to presuppose the existence of the truth we can and we should presuppose the existence of consensus, that is, if we all know something is true, we can all agree about that matter. This is true, but only in the sense that in a formal dialogue, unlike in a conversation, we all aim to know the truth and thus to reach consensus, but this is not true in the sense that we in fact *do* know the truth or reach consensus. Our search for the truth does not guarantee that we will reach consensus. Also, if we should reach consensus there is no guarantee we will have reached the truth.

So I am not suggesting that striving for consensus is wrong. To strive for the truth entails striving for consensus, but that factual consensus never proves that our struggle for the truth is successful. The outcome of a factual consensus may turn out to be a mere prejudice which happened to be shared in the group. In SD it is very important to keep this subtle status of truth and consensus in mind.

Such subtle status of the truth and consensus in philosophical enquiry needs more reflection, which will be developed a little further below. But for the time being, let me put it this way. For a Dialogue to lead to

philosophical enquiry a certain higher-order consensus is necessary: a *meta-consensus*, as it were, that the Dialogue is nothing but *the search for the truth*, which factual consensus is never to guarantee. The meta-consensus need not be explicitly agreed or formulated verbally: it could be a sense of the truth shared by those who participate in the Dialogue, so to say, that which is always shared, however vaguely, by those who really mean to be engaged in a Dialogue.

A factual consensus is important, though, for autonomous and democratic group work. Autonomous group work entails the participants thinking, enquiring and learning themselves, without being led by the facilitator, not only about the content matter of the Dialogue but also about the way the Dialogue is to proceed. Together with many Socratics, I believe that this is part of the attraction of Socratic Dialogue. Such autonomy in collaborative thinking is essential to democracy. In this way SD may well be an opportunity for building up a democratic attitude or democratic culture, as many Socratics claim.

Consensus plays an essential part in the group deciding how to carry on the Dialogue. It follows that we should distinguish, first, the consensus *in enquiry* and that in *decision-making*, and secondly the *factual consensus* in enquiry or decision-making, and then the *meta-consensus* about the search for the truth. The consensus in decision-making may well be a form of compromise, while an enquiry is never to end up with a compromise. We need to flexibly structure and modify the way we carry on the Dialogue, keeping these three distinct forms or stages of consensus in mind.

Theoretical Reflection

The theoretical ground for the above can be sketched as follows. An individual person's interpretative schema or paradigm, as well as his knowledge, is partial by nature. Philosophical enquiry begins when a person feels his scheme or paradigm shaken in some way, thereby discovering the possibility of alternative schemes or paradigms. Critical thinking is nothing but intentionally and open-mindedly putting oneself into this unstable state and dialogue is nothing other than collaborative critical thinking with others.

A person has no choice but to start with her partial paradigm and limited knowledge. It is this awareness of partiality or limitation, I think,

that Socrates called "awareness of ignorance", which is closely connected with the dictum to "know thyself". Nevertheless, it is only with our partial paradigm and limited knowledge that we can start our enquiry. This awareness of inevitable partiality and limitation, of our 'ignorance', does lead to fallibilism and pluralism but not necessarily to mere scepticism or relativism. For the awareness of one's partiality or fallibility presupposes the existence of the truth: the idea of fallibility is meaningless without that of the truth, just as the idea of partiality is without that of impartiality. But, as we are not yet sure how we can tell that the truth exists, it is still questionable how we can develop the meta-consensus about the search for the truth.[6]

I admit that I don't have any convincing answers to this question yet. All I can say at this moment is that the meta-consensus about the search for the truth is, as I mentioned above, something that is always and already shared, however vaguely, when we are seriously engaged in any kind of dialogue. The important fact is, I believe, that the sense of such meta-consensus grows in the course of dialogical experience.[7]

As an individual person's judgement is partial and fallible, so every consensus made by a group of persons is also partial and fallible. So both of the following inferences are simply wrong: that factual consensus must be possible because the truth exists and that the truth must exist because factual consensus is possible. Consensus is neither *the ground for recognition* (*ratio cognoscendi*) nor *the ground for existence* (*ratio essendi*) of the truth.[8] Consequently, factual consensus is not the ultimate goal of

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6 Inoue, T., 'Gohi wo Utagau' ('Doubting The Consensus'), in: *Kaosu Jidaino Gouigaku (Conflict and Consensus in The Age of Chaos)*, Sobunsha, 1994. Inoue argues, critically examining Nicolas Rescher's idea, that the meta-consensus, which leads us to pluralism instead of relativism or scepticism, is the consensus about the richness of beings and the limitations of factual consensus. This consensus leads us to the awareness of the narrowness of one's paradigm, the recognition of different paradigms, and the will to understand other beings through inter-paradigmatic dialogue. He calls this position 'being-oriented pluralism'. cf. Rescher, N., *Pluralism: Against the Demand of Consensus*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1993.

7 Inoue *op.cit.* says that the meta-consensus may be regarded as a kind of faith. Perhaps "the a priori of communicative community" (Apel) might be an answer; the view that the theoretical ground of Socratic Dialogue can be identified in the theory of 'discourse ethics' and Socratic Dialogue identified as a practical form of discourse ethics is interesting. See Gronke, H., 'Die Grundlagen der Diskursethik und ihre Anwendung im Sokratischen Gespraech' and Raehme, B., 'Der Konsens in Theorie und Praxis des Socratic Dialogues Sokratischen Gespraech', in: Krohn, D., Neisser, B. and. Walter, N. (eds.), *Diskurstheorie und Sokratisches Gespraech*, Frankfurt-am-Main, Dipa-Verlag, 1996.

8 Inoue, *op.cit.*

philosophical enquiry, though we may well say that what we are doing in philosophical enquiry is seeking for the truth and therefore for consensus.[9]

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[9] Leonard Nelson, the founder of Socratic Dialogue, is right in starting philosophical enquiry at a concrete judgement, but wrong in believing that we can reach the truth by regressively revealing the grounding judgements of the initial consented judgement. While this method of Nelson's, which is called 'regressive abstraction', follows Kant's transcendental method (specifically speaking, 'metaphysische Deduktion' or 'Grundlegung'), Nelson seems to have failed to grasp from Kant an important lesson in the first and second Critique: a regressive method is just a part of creative philosophical enquiry. That is why Kant could not but undertake the analysis of 'reflecting judgement' (reflectierende Urteilskraft) in the third Critique, not totally satisfied with his analysis of 'determining judgement (bestimmende Urteilskraft)' in the first and second Critiques. The relevance and significance of the idea of 'reflective judgement' in the third Critique cannot be exaggerated for the philosophy of dialogue. Nelson has obviously thought of the Dialogue only in terms of 'determining judgement' in Kant's first and second Critique. But to be fair to Nelson, we have to admit the fact that many aspects of the third Critique have been neglected for a long time and it was not until the last half of the last century that interpretation of the third Critique developed in relation to other writings of Kant's. (Nelson, L., 'Die Kritische Methode und das Verhaeltnis der Psychologie zur Philosophy', in: Gesammelte Schriften in neue Baenden, Band 1, Hamburg, Felix Meiner, 1970).

Kopfwerk Berlin
(Jens Peter Brune, Ulrike Gromadecki, Horst Gronke, Bärbel Jänicke, Beate Littig, Volker Rendez, Sabir Yücesoy)

The Methodology of Socratic Dialogue

Creating Socratic Questions and the Importance of being Specific

1. Introduction

Socratic Dialogue (SD) may serve the purpose of changing our practices by uncovering and examining the knowledge underlying our practical judgements. For this reason, SD is characterized by a very specialized form of argument.

Facilitating such a Dialogue properly requires, at the very least, a clear understanding of its methodological course. From our point of view the best way to develop competence in facilitating a Dialogue group is to combine experience based know-how in conducting dialogues with methodological reflections on this experience.

In order to do this systematically, the Socratic team within the cultural-philosophical initiative Kopfwerk Berlin has developed various training modules which are based on our experience of facilitating SD under different conditions and with heterogeneous participants. In this essay we describe some of the exercises we have developed, which focus on the suitable formulation of opening Socratic questions, the choice of examples and the formation of concrete judgements. In section one we start with the task of finding an opening Socratic question that has both philosophical substance and relevance for our daily lives. Section two deals with the problematic aspects of the example phase, and, lastly, section three looks briefly at the phase of analysis and judgement.

2. The Opening Question in a Socratic Dialogue

Socratic questions must have a form which can *initiate* a process of common examination. They are especially suitable if they additionally possess an *operative* component, that is, if they already demonstrate a tendency which enables the process of argument to run productively. Sometimes you can see, just by looking at the form of a question that it "pays out a clue like Ariadne's thread",[1] and so shows the direction in which the solution of the problem is to be looked for.

How can one arrive at such an opening question, at a question which is oriented towards general validity, that possesses a *philosophical* character, and which is related to common experience, i.e. possesses a *lifeworld* character? This is the subject matter of our first methodological exercise. Proceeding from a concrete everyday situation, a Socratic question, which is related to the knowledge of the participants about life and world, should be developed. The second exercise includes, apart from the initialising dimension, the operative dimension of the Socratic question.

i. The philosophical function of the Socratic question

The topic or theme of a Socratic Dialogue is the first impression made upon people when they choose to take part. It can arouse interest and lead us to the given examples, which will determine the following course of the Dialogue. Socratic facilitators must therefore search for appealing and suitable Socratic topics or themes: *appealing* in the sense of being interesting and concerned with our daily lives, *suitable* in the sense of the logical level constituted by the formulation of the initial question.

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1 Nelson, L., 'The Socratic Method' in *Socratic Method and Critical Philosophy: Selected Essays by Leonard Nelson,* New Haven, Yale University Press, 1998, p.53. Republished by Dover Publications in 1965. Reprinted with an introduction by F. Leal in: Shipley, P. (ed.) *Occasional Working Papers in Ethics and the Critical Philosophy,* London, SFCP, Vol. 1, April 1998, p.42–62.

ii. The logical level of Socratic questions

In the process of searching for a Socratic question, we often rely on questions already posed in one way or another. Seldom do these questions fit. Not all questions dealing with problems regarding our public life meet the philosophical function of a Socratic Dialogue. Often they are too specific. They are *first order questions.*[2] Pragmatic questions like: 'should I help this person?', 'how do I manage this problem?', 'which means do I use to reach this aim?' These first order questions presuppose that general convictions underlying the practical problem and its solution are examined – convictions like: 'helping is demanded if ...', 'managing a problem means ...', 'a good aim is ...' etc.

The aim of a Socratic Dialogue consists in understanding the framework of validity of our decisions and acts, that is, the criteria, values and principles that form the basis of sensible judgements and decisions. Socratic investigation aims at deeper insights (through 'regressive abstraction').[3] Therefore only second or third order questions are suitable as Socratic themes.

Second order questions[4] are fundamental in the sense that they ask for the *presuppositions* which are basic to the solution of a specific type of problem. They contain 'if conditions' which define a range of validity. Hence the answers can take the following form: 'x should be done, if there is a situation of this or that kind'. Sometimes it is not possible to answer a second order question without clarifying fundamental principles, values and basic attitudes. By asking for this we set up *third order questions.* They do not refer to a specific type of situation but to a general solution, which hardly depends (if at all) on restricting conditions.[5] Concrete examples of the different orders of question are shown in Table 1 below.

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2 Kessels, J., *Socrates op de markt: Filosofie in bedrijf*, Meppel/Amsterdam, Boom, 1997 (published in German as: *Die Macht der Argumente*, trans. by B. Jänicke, Weinheim, Beltz, 2001).

3 Our ideas about the phase of abstraction in SD and some exercises are described in our essay 'The Methodology of Socratic Dialogue: Regressive abstraction – how to ask for and find philosophical knowledge', in Krohn, D. and Brune, J. P. (eds.), *Socratic Dialogue and Ethics*, Münster, LIT, 2004.

4 cf. Kessels, *op. cit.* p.28f.

5 Gronke, H. and Stary, J., "'Sapere aude!" Das Neosokratische Gespräch als Chance für die universitäre Kommunikationskultur', in: *Handbuch Hochschullehre: Informationen und Handreichungen aus der Praxis für die Hochschullehre*, Bonn, Loseblattsammlung, Raabe-Verlag, 1998, p.11.

Table 1 Examples of first, second and third order questions

		more concrete
First order question:	*How can I improve my consulting practice?*	
Second order question:	*Under which conditions is consulting appropriate?*	
Third order question:	*Which characteristics are significant for appropriate behaviour?*	
		more abstract

In order to make it easier to formulate suitable Socratic questions we have compiled some guidelines:[6]

- the problem does not primarily concern empirical facts;
- the question cannot be reduced to a specific or isolated problem;
- it cannot be solved by our superficial everyday way of thinking;
- it has a fundamental character and is connected with deeper attitudes and views;
- it aims at major, abstract and often unexpressed topics.

Exercise focusing on the logical level of a Socratic question

We constructed a workshop exercise to form questions which serve a philosophical function. We suggested to participants that they refer to a problem that concerns our life in civil society. Firstly, they had to formulate a first order question. In respect of this question participants had the task of formulating appropriate second or third order questions. We gave an example for a sequence of questions becoming more abstract at each level:

First order question:	*How much money should I claim for my voluntary work?*
Second order question:	*When is it acceptable to receive money for voluntary work?*
Third order question:	*What benefits is a voluntary worker allowed to receive?*

6 cf. Kessels, *op. cit.*, 2001, p.142f.

Table 2 Examples from workshop participants

Group 1	*Group 2*	*Group 3*
1st: Can I convince people to vote in September instead of not voting?	1st: How can I motivate young people to engage in civil society?	1st: Should I continue to be on the Ethics Committee?
2nd: Why is abstaining from voting irresponsible?	2nd: Why should we motivate young people to engage in civil society?	2nd: What should be the balance between professional and voluntary work?
3rd: What is the value of voting?	3rd: What obligations do we have in society?	3rd: What is responsibility?

iii. The initiating and operative functions of Socratic questions

Most of the time it is not enough to bring up questions for Socratic Dialogue simply through their logical appearance. Finding Socratic questions by the process of starting with our own concerns and developing them by formulating second and third order questions does not necessarily make those questions *appealing* to participants.

In this regard we have to consider two challenges. The first more general challenge concerns whether we are taking the participants seriously as dialogue *partners*. Do we really give credit for the participants' ability to discover their own insights or do we ask them questions that have an answer which is *known in advance*? In particular, questions of the form: 'why is X?' do not fulfil this demand. They are actually assertions and we ask only about the *reasons* for their validity. Although the 'why questions' characterize the whole process of Socratic debate, they are unsuited to form initial Socratic questions. This is also the case with questions such as: 'why is abstaining from voting irresponsible?' and 'why should we motivate young people to engage in civil society?' More suitable formulations could be: 'under which circumstances is abstaining from voting irresponsible?', 'should we motivate young people to engage in civil society?'

The second challenge refers to the specific *circumstances* of a Socratic Dialogue. A Socratic question must be suited to the participants' needs

and their time management. It must be able to initiate thinking processes and focus on the exciting aspects of a problem. Concerning a specific group, for example, students in a secondary school, the more 'academic' question 'what does it mean to be politically engaged?' is better changed into the more concrete and activating form: 'what does it mean to vote?' The reformulation seems to suit *their* political engagement in their world.

By trying to serve this initiative and operative function we have built up a strategy to adjust a Socratic question to the specific circumstances of a Socratic Dialogue. We have constructed different dimensions in order to make the Socratic question adjustable. However, we are aware that this project is not complete. It will just give us some idea of how to operate. Table 3 shows some of these variables as a concept map.

Table 3 Dimensions for initiating and operative Socratic questions



The *conditions* under which the Dialogue takes place can vary in many ways. Offering it in a public organization where employees are taking part under orders of their manager is different from offering the Dialogue to the same employees taking part voluntarily in different surroundings. The category of *conditions* asks us to imagine facilitating a

Socratic Dialogue either outside or inside an organization, department, etc.

The category *motivation* defines the expectations of the future participants, which have to be considered when formulating the Socratic question. Besides the fact that the participants can be motivated to take part because they are interested to train in the method itself, it can evoke the participants' interests by referring to a theme that is related to their life. A group of students studying social science have different interests from a group of economics experts.

The *time schedule* plays an important role as well. This category restricts the time of the offered Socratic Dialogue, for example, to four hours, two or six days, or a course of four sessions at two hours. A Socratic question containing too many aspects on the second or first order level is not really suitable for a short-term Socratic Dialogue because all of these aspects have to be cleared before the group can find any results or consensus. This can lead to frustration among participants.

Finally, the *group* has to be considered. The category of *composition* classifies the type of participants. Taking account of this dimension is essential for active participation in the Dialogue. The group of participants can consist of students, experts (for example: scientists, professors, etc.), or children, though even of nurses, teachers or prisoners. With regard to these different target groups, the question can be made attractive for participants in various ways. In particular, age, pre-existing knowledge, social, cognitive and emotional competence of the participants have to be taken into account. In regard to cognitive competence, for example, this means the question should not exceed the cognitive capability of the participants yet also should be difficult enough to arouse the participants' motivations and ambition to find an answer.

Exercise focusing on the initiating and operative function of Socratic questions

How do we put these theoretical insights into practice? We have developed an exercise to adjust the Socratic questions to the circumstances of a specific Socratic Dialogue. We ask participants in this exercise to work with the second order questions found in the first exercise to adjust their questions to the dimensions we considered earlier.

Each group must make a choice from the categories: conditions, motivation, time schedule and group assembly. After that it must try to

formulate questions more suitable for the conditions chosen. Table 4 shows some results of work with a group.

Table 4 Results of work within a group

First formulation	*Reformulation*
Why is abstaining from voting [in a parliamentary election] not responsible?	Can abstaining from voting be a responsible decision?
What should be the balance between your professional responsibility and voluntary work in the Ethics Committee?	How important for us is the work of this Ethics Committee?

The first original question is a formulation of the form: 'why is x good or bad?' As we said above, those kinds of questions are not unproblematic because they already imply the statement that 'x is good' or 'x is bad'. But also its reformulation: 'can abstaining from voting be a responsible decision?' is not fully suited to a Socratic Dialogue. It is a question with two definitive answers: yes or no. This question is a little bit more open than the totally closed 'why question', but it also strongly restricts the space of possible answers, that is, to yes or no. A more open formulation could be: 'under which conditions is abstaining from voting a responsible decision?'

The second question and its first reformulation illustrate that, in this case, looking at the specific time schedule and the actual life-related concerns of the participants are important criteria. For a short-term Socratic Dialogue it is appropriate to reformulate the original question so that it focuses more on one aspect and on the participants' own interests.

We think that exercises of this kind are useful to train people in the skill of finding questions that enable effective dialogues.

3. The Example Phase

What information do we need to make our choice in a reasonable way?
'Let's just carry out an experiment ...'
'Look at this model of a square.'
'In this painting I see ...'
'Two months ago I was involved in the following situation ...'

Socratic Dialogues are not speculative. In an SD the discussion refers to *concrete* experience. That means it focuses upon an example taken from the participants' lifeworld. The example can – especially in Dialogues on mathematical, epistemological and aesthetic themes – consist of a recent perception, e.g. a sketch, an experiment or a description of a picture. With themes of practical life, which refer to good and legitimate acting, it is taken from the biographical story of a participant and is described in the form of an actual lived experience. In this paper we concentrate on the last mentioned type of example.

Of course, in the abstraction phase of an SD, the discussion refers more or less indirectly to the concrete example. The applied terms must be able to be concretized during the whole process of the Dialogue. Nevertheless one can differentiate a temporarily limited example phase in a stricter sense. That is the beginning phase of an SD where the example is founded and written down. This phase is very important for the success of a Dialogue. For it establishes the central point of reference of the further investigation.

Characteristics of the example phase in an SD

We distinguish between the *purpose*, the *course* and the possible *results* of the example phase.

The *purpose* seems to be clear: we try to get 'material' for a productive discussion, to remember situations of personal experience which are relevant for the topic of the SD and suitable for the method of an SD. Without concrete material the characteristically 'elenctic' style of argumentation, which is oriented around the avoidance of inconsistencies, would not be possible. For in an SD it's about the discovery of a knowledge that is constitutive for practice.

We identify four aspects as the *result* of the example phase: (1) the Dialogue is based in concrete experience, (2) becomes more personal, (3) focuses on a definite problem, and (4) relates to common material. By way of their shared lifeworld experience, participants coming from different areas of professional practice and other activities can come to an understanding.

The most interesting part of a methodology workshop or a methodological training is the *course* of the example phase. In order to increase the awareness of this complex process we divide it into the three main steps:

(1) the *search* for examples;
(2) the *choice* of an example;
(3) the *description* of the chosen example.

These three steps include at least 11 sub-steps in all, as can be seen in Table 5.

Table 5 Steps and sub-steps in the example phase

1. Searching for examples	*2. Choice of example*	*3. Description of example*
1.1 methodological introduction	2.1 discussing the suitability of the examples	3.1 more exhaustive account
1.2 stimulation for remembering personal experiences	2.2 making a choice	3.2 asking for further information and deeper understanding
1.3 remembering past situations		3.3 writing down the relevant facts and details
1.4 short account of the situation		
1.5 asking for better understanding		
1.6 making notes		

Different competencies are required in order to cope with each of the main phases.

The first phase in particular requires in participants a certain level of *perception-competence.* We should be able to perceive (remember) a situation in our life that is of relevance to answering the general Socratic question. However intensive the Dialogue, where the fundamental Socratic questions are not connected or only tangentially connected with our experience of life, it will remain unfruitful.

The second phase requires *competence in well-considered decision-making.* The participants of an SD must try to make a decision about the most suitable example which does not depend on personal arbitrariness but is orientated towards proven and comprehensible criteria. It is most important to weigh the significance of the described experiences to the Socratic question.

The third phase requires *competence in articulation and structuring.* The remembered experience should be put into words and arranged according to an intelligible narrative sequence that can be a clear basis for the Socratic investigation.

The most important and also most challenging point is step two, the *choice* of a suitable example. We have developed concepts and exercises which are suitable for the training of corresponding competencies (see ii below). The step preparing us for the choice of example phase is the *understanding* of the described examples. Here it is about identifying the essential information about each told event (see i below). The step immediately before the beginning of the Socratic discussion process is the writing down of the chosen example. For this purpose we offer a category which helps the most important aspects to be recorded in structured form (see iii below).

i. Information questions

The first exercise concentrates on the steps *immediately preceding the choice of the example:* step 1.4 'short account of the situation' and step 1.5 'asking for better understanding'.

At this stage participants in an SD are confronted by a paradoxical problem: on the one hand there is usually not much time for participants to give convincing accounts of their lived experiences and, on the other side, in a relatively short time they have to reach a high quality decision

on how to achieve good starting conditions for the SD. So we ask: how do we get the decisive information?

The exercise starts with a prepared description of an example relating to a Socratic question, i.e. 'how much risk should I take?' The form of such an account given by one of the participants is usually short and incomplete but sometimes also filled in with some superfluous information. The main task for the participants is to concentrate on the most important information they need in order to get a good understanding of the example.

Which information question would you ask the example-giver in order to get a basis for the later decision? The exercise can start with each participant's writing down one or two questions which are most likely to get relevant information. After that the participants collect and analyse the reasons that motivated them to raise these questions. In this way we get a number of criteria for suitable but also for unsuitable information questions.

In our workshop experience the most important criterion for a suitable information question emerged as being reference to the example in the terms of the initial Socratic question. In any case you should ask how the essential term(s) of the Socratic question is/are concretized in the example (especially in which actions and which of their possible consequences).

As other important criteria come to light (the role of the example-giver in the example situation, persons involved and persons affected, place and time of the action) if there are any doubts about the memory or the openness of the example-giver you can ask a test question for detailed information, e.g. about his or her way of acting.

Besides these aspects we hope to gain from this exercise more awareness of unsuitable information questions. There are a lot of pitfalls. We point out three of them.

'What happened next?' questions

Unsuitable information questions are mostly those which don't refer to the time of the situation but to a time after it (e.g. 'What consequences did your decision have for your later life?', 'Do you have the same job today?', 'How do you feel now about your decision in the situation then?')

Insinuating questions

Questions that are particularly unsuitable are those that resemble information questions but in reality have different aims in mind. Many questions, the so-called open questions (what ...?, who ...?, which ...?, when ...?, where ...?, how ...? etc.) too, contain very strong insinuations in terms of content and sometimes also pejorative insinuations about the personality of the example-giver. In these cases the example-giver is almost unable to answer questions, and he or she feels the need to react by clarifications of the insinuations. The following sentences give you an idea what is happening in a Dialogue phase suffering from insinuation questions: 'Why did you treat him in that humiliating way? – I did not at all humiliate him! – OK, but how did he react to your criticism of him? Criticism of him? I did not criticize him! I intended to come to an agreement with him.' In such a Dialogue the exchange of information tends to change to a pros and cons debate.

Explanation questions

It is right that we should try to avoid overshooting the limitations of information questions. However, at the same time, we should avoid making these limitations too restrictive or narrow. Sometimes Socratic participants and facilitators claim that information questions should be restricted to the observable facts of the example situation. We do not agree with this restriction. For us, the example-giver's inner experience is part of the example situation: expectations, hopes, ideas, wishes, fears, etc. Therefore we think that although the answers are not always useful, in principle, people must be free to ask: 'how did you *feel* in the situation?', 'what did you *think* about?', 'what did you *fear*?' etc.

On the other hand there is very good reason for scepticism about questions on inner experiences. Sometimes the proposed questions are not really information questions. Instead of asking the example-giver for information the questioners ask for psychological or sociological *explanations* of his behaviour or his inner experience. Instead of asking: 'how did you feel in this situation?' or 'did you feel furious?', they ask: 'what do you think were the *reasons* for not being able to perceive your feelings in this situation?', 'what *motivated* you to get furious in this situation?' Generally, explanation questions should be avoided in an SD (especially in the example phase); they contribute to making the Dialogue hypothetical. Therefore in each case you should think seriously about

whether a question about the example-giver's inner experience really asks for information – and not for explanation.

ii. Criteria of choice

While the first exercise framework focuses on sufficient *understanding* of the example, the second framework focuses on the subject of its reasonable *choice*. Against the background of their experience of many SDs, the community of Socratic facilitators has developed a few criteria of choice. Through workshop activities and reflection we have developed 15 criteria of choice to date:

(1) relevant for the Dialogue topic;
(2) a concrete situation, not hypothetical;
(3) situation is in the past;
(4) comprehensible/accessible to everybody;
(5) derived from one's own experience;
(6) leading part played by the example-giver in the situation;
(7) the example-giver is no longer immersed in the experience;
(8) situation occurred in a clearly limited time;
(9) emotional maturity of the example-giver;
(10) cognitive competence of the example-giver;
(11) of interest to other participants;
(12) not too complicated;
(13) details of the situation can be remembered;
(14) examples for ..., not against ..., or borderline examples;
(15) challenging problem situations.

What do these criteria mean in reality? We have designed an exercise about this subject on the basis of the characteristic Socratic principle that we can only understand a concept (e.g. a criterion) if we can *apply* it to our experience. Therefore it is necessary to ask 'what is the concrete meaning of this criterion?' or 'under which conditions is this criterion fulfilled?' In our training process, we give participants the task of choosing one criterion out of the above list and, working in small groups, to make some proposals regarding *how to ask questions that test whether or not the criterion is fulfilled.* So we train the participants'

competence in applying abstract formulations of criteria to concrete experience.

The following are a few formulations to give an idea of the concrete results of this exercise:

relevant for the topic of dialogue:	Which examples do you feel are most attractive in relation to the topic? Are you convinced that the described situation is characteristic for x (main aspect of the topic)? Are different interpretations of the situation possible?
leading part of the example-giver:	Did the example-giver act/decide/judge? What was the degree of his influence on the situation?
the example-giver's immersion:	Do you (the example-giver) feel comfortable talking about this experience? About which aspects of the situation would you refuse to inform us?
comprehensible to everyone:	Can you imagine the circumstances of the example? Are you able to put yourself in the shoes of the example-giver?
not too complicated:	Does the example fit different but overlapping Socratic questions? How many people were involved in this situation?

As a rule it's too much for a Dialogue group to keep all 15 criteria in mind. As with all decisions, so we must reduce complexity in these cases. We suggest that only the first three criteria of the above list are set in advance for the participants to make their choice. It's really the facilitator's task to look at the other criteria. When there is a need to choose s/he can introduce one or two more criteria to make the procedure more reasonable or to indicate that there is still a problem. The facilitator must also keep watch that the participants don't play the criterion of personal interest off against other criteria. Sometimes the participants are very interested in particularly complex examples that are usually not suitable for an SD.

The example-giver's formation of a judgement on his or her way of acting in the situation can give rise to a special problem in that, even

before the exact formulation of the judgement, judgement can be recognised. But if the example-giver's judgement has changed over the years since the example situation ('then I thought that ... but today I would judge totally differently.') there is a danger of hypothetical discussion. If nobody from the Dialogue group, not even the example-giver, holds to the original interpretation of the example-giver (in the original situation), it could very easily happen that the discussion becomes one-sided and turns into a 'devil's advocate' type encounter.

iii. How to write down the example in a structured way? Model for a rough structuring of the example and hints for a more detailed structuring

The process of Socratic discussion, that is, of sharpening the concrete judgement(s) as well as regressive abstraction of the judgement(s) to fundamental convictions generally accepted by the participants, presupposes a sensible structuring of the 'material'. Depending on the time conditions of the Socratic Dialogue group and on the facilitator's exertion of influence, more rough or more fine guidelines could be given.

For a rough structuring of the description of examples we suggest a scheme of five parts, as in Table 6:

Table 6 Scheme for the description of examples

1	*scene and context of action*	e.g. organization, institution, field of work, area of life.
2	*situation before the action challenging an appropriate action*	e.g. conflict situations, emergency situations.
3	*problem of decision / alternatives of action as answers to the situation*	e.g. should I choose action A? or should I prefer action B?
4	*prevailing claim of validity / type of discourse (identical to the orientation of the initial Socratic question?)*	e.g. ethically legitimate? empirically true?
5	*decision / action*	e.g. deception, pushing through personal interests, help, renunciation.

On the basis of this scheme, the participants of a Socratic training seminar can practise the structuring of example descriptions. But often this scheme does not provide sufficient help. For example: sometimes it happens that during the phase of writing down the example a person who played an important part in the situation is totally ignored by the example-giver and so by other Dialogue participants. This can have a detrimental affect on the Socratic discussion. Because of this or a similar kind of 'blindness' we need some additional help for a more detailed structuring of the example. However, a detailed structuring cannot be predetermined in a strict sense. It depends mainly on the discussion context. In the following we give some hints for aspects of detailed structuring that are significant in most dialogues with practical and ethical topics:

- Who is involved in the decision-making process?
- Who is responsible?
- Who is acting?
- Who is affected by the action?
- Which needs and interests are involved?
- Which needs and interests are in conflict?
- Which obligations are in conflict with which interests?
- What foreseeable consequences were caused?
- How important are the consequences of the action?

The facilitators should keep these more detailed aspects in the background of the Dialogue. The reason for being reserved in this way is that these aspects already anticipate the common investigation of the judgement.

4. The Phase of Analysis and Judgement

Beginners in facilitating Socratic Dialogues often fear the phase after the example is chosen and written down. How do we start the discussion?

This is the phase of transition from the concretization of the initial question within the context of an example to the discussion about the decisions and judgements which have been taken in the situation described in the example. This is a difficult transition because of the danger that the investigation could become more controversial. If it goes

badly, the investigation can either lead to a clash of pro and contra arguments or, conversely, the discussion wears out completely because the participants are avoiding conflict. If this phase goes well, then the ideal conditions for the next course of the Dialogue are reached. For this reason, the facilitator feels more under pressure to ensure that the Dialogue process takes a fertile course.

Whereas the formulation of the initial question and the choice of the example are strongly influenced by the facilitator, her/his possibilities of managing the content of the Dialogue decrease in the discussion phase. At first, this gives rise to uncertainty. On the other hand, there are some procedures which can guide the facilitating activity.

We distinguish between three ways of introducing the analysis of the example or rather the process of discussion:

- the phenomenological approach;
- the essentialist approach;
- the 'collecting questions' approach.

Most popular is the *collecting questions approach.* Concerning the example chosen, the participants collect questions which they think could be helpful in answering the original Socratic question. Using a strategic dialogue, they choose from out of this collection the question with which they want to begin the discussion. The answer to this question leads – if it goes well – to a concrete judgement about the action or the decision (or else to a putative knowledge) concerning the situation in the example. During the following process of discussion the presuppositions of that judgement will be investigated.

The advantage of this procedure consists first of all in providing a smoother introduction into the discussion and getting a general idea about the possible avenues for discussion. The main disadvantages are that this procedure takes more time and that it cannot guarantee the investigation considers the most essential issue. To put it briefly: this is an open procedure and so in some cases it may be too open.

It is not unusual for the example-giver to have already formulated a judgement about her/his own way of acting. It is also possible that the facilitator will ask her/him to account for their way of acting using a concrete judgement. In this case, the group can argue with immediate reference to the judgement of the example-giver. The discussion then develops an *essentialist* character, because it deals directly with the central and essential aspect of the example.

It is this focusing which constitutes the main advantage of the essentialist procedure. Done this way, the discussion and process of obtaining knowledge are accelerated. However, the concentration on the core of the example can turn out to be disadvantageous if it forces the participants to develop a discussion too quickly. Such pressure can severely disturb the process of the Dialogue. Besides, the discussion could become extremely concentrated onto just one aspect. Finally, the success of this procedure mostly depends on how well or badly the judgement of the example-giver is formulated.

Lastly, one can proceed *phenomenologically*. This is especially preferable if there is a question to be dealt with either in the form of 'what is X?', that is a question aiming to clarify a concept, or a question concerning the meaning or value of an activity, e.g. 'what is solidarity?', 'what is the value of voluntary work?', 'what is the difference between truth and evidence?' To proceed phenomenologically means to look for concrete phenomena within the example which belong to the characteristics of the concept, for instance 'considering the whole of the example, where do you think solidarity was shown? Which aspects of voluntary work do you find in this example? At which point was the example-giver sure about the case? At which point was the truth evident?' After the most important phenomena have been collected one can try to determine that which all the phenomena share in common. In that way one could finally arrive at a general definition of the concept.

The advantage of this procedure is that the group very quickly gets a lot of relevant results. Thus, it arrives at an appropriate starting point for abstract argument. Besides, there are many participants who are used to such a procedure. It is not as demanding as the other two procedures. In that aspect there is a disadvantage as well. The discussion can easily remain superficial without really penetrating into the core of the subject matter. And the challenge to change something in one's opinions is weak because the phenomena are collected out of one's own limited perspective.

Exercise:

We have developed some exercises in order to practise the procedures mentioned above and to be aware of the strengths and weaknesses, advantages and disadvantages of them. For this exercise we give each workshop group a description of an example of about one page in length. We constitute several groups and each of them should work with one of the three procedures respectively.

(1) One of the groups proceeds *phenomenologically* and collects important aspects of the concept (e.g. tolerance) which were to be found in the example. In this way the ability to get a general idea about a case and think analytically will be improved.
(2) Another group considers the example and *collects questions* concerning the subject matter (no information questions and no explanatory questions), and thereafter it chooses one of these questions for further discussion. This task is a drill for improving the ability to formulate important questions referring to the subject matter and to get criteria concerning the suitability of the questions. It turned out to be an important criterion, for example, that it is favourable to formulate questions without presuppositions as far as it is possible. Otherwise the discussion slows down because of enquiring questions.
(3) Finally, in the third group participants think about how to continue if the example-giver has already formulated a judgement and the Dialogue group takes up this judgement directly for its discussion. It turns out to be probable that often other members of the Dialogue group raise objections against that judgement, but questions for a better understanding or clarifying of the judgement are to be expected as well.

It seems to be helpful, especially to improve one's competence as facilitator, to think through 'reflecting dialogue' about the means which a facilitator can use in order to influence the three procedures in such a way, that the respective advantages are reinforced and the disadvantages are reduced. In all of the three cases it is an important measure to motivate the participants to be concrete. This kind of influence can be very helpful for the process of the Dialogue in the case of both conceptual uncertainties and premature abstractions. Being concrete is an important prerequisite for a successful process of abstraction.

5. Conclusion

This methodological concept and this collection of methodological exercises are only a first step towards a more detailed and extensive theory of SD methodology. We think that the best means for developing the methodology of SD further is a dialogue between facilitators of Dialogues all over the world. For this reason the Dialogue group of Kopfwerk Berlin warmly invites you to take part in its ongoing work on the methodology of Socratic Dialogue.

Please consult us and send us your questions, suggestions, proposals, ideas: socratic-methodology@kopfwerk-berlin.de

Horst Gronke and Lily Sparnaay

Feelings in a Socratic Dialogue on Feelings

Introduction

Socratic Dialogues are about reasoning and arguments. Socratic Dialogues are a means to seek the truth as we all seem to know it, deep down. It is considered common knowledge that truth is known by reason, that feelings do not belong in a Socratic Dialogue. Or do they? Feelings are an essential part of the arguments and reasoning within the Socratic realm. Socratic Dialogues that did not allow emotional arguments or feelings to play a part would be a rather crippled means of exploring the themes they propose. In this paper we argue that feelings are not only essential to every Socratic Dialogue, but that Socratic Dialogues in which the themes concern feelings are among the best. However, and here's the snag, they are also the most difficult ones.

In this paper, we would like first to invite the reader on a small, historical trip to the roots of the importance of reason. In the second and third parts of the paper we put it to you that reason and feelings could go hand in hand – or even: *should* go hand in hand.

Plato and Kant on Reason and Feelings

It was as a part of his mythological theory of the soul that, in the fourth century BC, Plato developed his thoughts on the relationship between reason and feelings.[1] It is every man's job to develop himself in such a way that reason dominates all those powers of the soul which have less reason or no reason at all, and, once he has succeeded, the soul is in

1 Plato, *Politeia.*

harmony. Plato also called this a "state of rightness".[2] By this he meant situations where everything is OK, where everything is in its right place. We can apply the same principle to a state, for instance, or a city, a family – or a Dialogue group.

Western philosophy has since stuck more or less by this reason-feeling-urge hierarchy. In this tradition, in the 18th century, Immanuel Kant developed a moral philosophy in which reason is given centre stage. Every now and then Kant went so far as to overstate this hierarchical position in which reason comes first. In those instances he suggested that ethical reason does away with feelings completely, so that reason and feelings become opposites – like the feeling of affection. Friedrich Schiller, a follower of Kant, mocked Kant's fussing: "I am happy in rendering my friends a service, but unfortunately I do so with affection. So it pesters me that I am not virtuous."[3]

It seems even more plausible that we cannot act justly without feelings (just acts are always processed by reason). Reason and feelings should be allies. Merely tolerating feeling isn't enough; feelings *belong* with reason. Let's look at a discussion, for instance. What happens in a discussion? In order to understand one another, we have to try and put ourselves in the position of others. We have to imagine ourselves with other people's needs, interests or wishes, in short, someone else's feelings. Thus we can show others we really want to understand, and in their turn others may want to take us seriously.

Are Feelings Reasonable?

Feelings influence the way we think and the way we act, but do they always do so in the right way? We cannot always tell, so being aware of our feelings is important because it enables us to steer their influence rationally. Feelings differ from arguments in that not every feeling results in a valid argument – and an argument isn't the only thing that counts in a Socratic Dialogue anyway. There are also things like attitude, atmosphere, body language, doubt, etc. But whatever happens within a Socratic setting should be examined, so that it can be weighed – so that *in the end* everything against or in favour of a certain position has the shape of an argument.

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2 In Greek: '*dikaiosyné*'.

3 In Schiller, F., *Sämtliche Werke*, Band 1, München, Carl Hanser, 1973, p.299.

Feelings are personal, whereas arguments are not. Arguments we can agree or disagree on; arguing and reasoning belong together. Feelings, on the other hand, are an expression of our own personality. Expecting one person to love some particular other person on request, if the first person simply doesn't feel any love for the second one, may be complete and utter nonsense. We may, however, expect people to accept some particular view if it is supported by sound argument. Feelings as such cannot be arguments in a Socratic Dialogue (like 'I feel angry and that's why you're wrong!'), and whether a feeling is justified or not (like 'I am opposed to you being angry!') doesn't matter either. This would be an error in categories, rather like if one wanted to use a torch instead of a key to open a door. But it is possible to make a well-argued choice regarding whether it makes sense to take certain feelings into account when talking or acting.

All in all we can now discern three ways in which feelings, or how we go about them, could be fruitful in a Socratic Dialogue:

- as a signpost for finding truth;
- as a way of understanding the various perspectives of the participants;
- as a means of supporting mutual co-operation within a Dialogue.

They do have another side, however:

- when the signpost leads us astray;
- when there is only misunderstanding because other points of view are distorted;
- when co-operation breaks down.

Though they aren't valid arguments in themselves, feelings do offer a sense of direction in looking for truth and they can really inspire commitment. Every good Socratic Dialogue depends on the thinking of the participants – or rather, not merely thinking, but *creative* thinking and making these thoughts articulate. We call these 'acts of thinking'. Acts of thinking leave their mark on a Socratic Dialogue. They help to discover what is subsequently subject to critical examining: presuppositions that are the basis of our everyday opinions and of which we may not even be aware. When we examine these presuppositions in a Socratic Dialogue, we call them 'hypotheses'.

Some Socratic Dialogues just go smoothly, the participants have lots of ideas, they are focused and their process of thinking is intensive. In those cases the participants let themselves be guided by their 'eros', their sense of truth. In other Socratic Dialogues, however, nothing seems to work as the participants have drifted away from their sense of truth. There are several possible causes for this presence or, indeed absence, of 'eros'. They could have to do with the Socratic group: its make-up, the group dynamics, the way in which the theme is handled by the group (perhaps too challenging, too boring, too difficult, too fast), or the sheer challenge of talking about one's personal experiences. This sort of thing deserves attention, we feel, because we think 'eros', or the longing for knowledge has considerable influence on the participants. Because they want knowledge so badly, they are capable of putting aside any other influence that could interfere with obtaining this knowledge, like turning into sidetracks, playing around, or a certain dislike for one of the other participants.

The Position of Feelings in Socratic Dialogues on Ethics or Feelings

There are feelings, however, which lack any connection to reason and the quest for knowledge. What about them? Their influence on the course of a Dialogue can be considerable, both positive and negative. They can stimulate or obstruct mutual understanding and co-operation of the participants in the Dialogue. But they really become significant if the subject of a Dialogue is cause for putting feelings on the agenda. This is often the case when themes on feelings and ethical themes are discussed, e.g. 'under what conditions can we trust somebody?' or 'when should we help?' or 'what is a selfless act?' Trust, help and selflessness aren't just ethical notions, they also have a strong link with feelings; there are many people who base their trust on a 'gut-feeling'. Or take 'help'; when confronted with others in a sad or nasty situation, how often is our first emotion wanting to help? And who doesn't secretly gloat, when others call his or her actions selfless?

Themes on feelings are imaginative. Socratic Dialogues with themes on feelings and ethics are usually appealing to people's personal experience, more so than in those Dialogues with rather distant themes from epistemology or mathematics. They make people feel really

involved, which incites them to speak directly and sooner from their own experience rather than reason in hypotheses. That is exactly what every Socratic Dialogue needs. Experience and thinking, two essentials of Socratic Dialogues, are glued together by feelings. That's why we prefer themes with plenty of room for participants' personal feelings when facilitating a Socratic Dialogue, such as 'when do I accept a just decision?' rather than 'what is justice?' This involves a danger, however, when personal commitment becomes an emotional burden. It then interferes with the process of reasoning and understanding because speaking out becomes difficult and others don't feel free to keep asking the necessary questions.

Understanding and Co-operation

Now, how do we handle feelings in Socratic Dialogues, especially those on feelings, where their presence (i.e. feelings) is particularly strongly felt? This question is all the more interesting because virtually all Socratic groups are specially formed for the occasion and we know that newly formed groups in particular go through a development process, which goes, in its turn, hand in hand with the necessary feelings too.[4]

Now, knowing this, how do we handle feelings in a Socratic Dialogue? We first try to ensure a proper starting position, for which knowing and applying the Socratic *rules* isn't enough (like discussing an example, talking from one's own experience, no talking in general, no hypotheses, no quotations). Firstly, we can only hope to be successful in the long-run if participants manage to internalize Socratic *virtues* such as: arguing in a disciplined manner; self-criticism; respect and friendliness; attention and patience; critical tolerance. Secondly, we assume that feelings are never an *interference.* Feelings *always* have a meaning within the argumentative process. Thirdly, we create an environment in which people feel at ease, so that putting forward any feelings isn't a problem. During Socratic Dialogues we have a special session for this purpose; we call this a 'meta-dialogue'.

The meta-dialogue offers room for discussing the Dialogue session itself. People can ask about Socratic rules or comment on certain strategies on a more personal level or they can talk about what's

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4 Tuckmann, B.W. and Jensen, M.A.C, 'Developmental sequences in small groups', in *Psychological Bulletin*, 1965, No.63, p.384–399.

bothering them or perhaps what made them particularly happy. Keeping in mind three rules of thumb will help us in making the meta-dialogue more fruitful.

Our final purpose is understanding instead of arguing (indeed, we need arguments in order to examine and understand, but arguing is a means to reach a goal). Let's try not to be defensive when criticized, but try to listen and understand. When something is bothering you, just say it but don't start a good long monologue.

(1) Allow some space for other views, don't moralize, make clear you're speaking for yourself by using 'I' and 'me'.
(2) Don't mix argumentative strategy with strategy on a more personal level in a meta-dialogue; stay on the personal level in the meta-dialogue.

So called 'reflective talks' are yet another possibility to handle feelings. What happens is, one person says to another how s/he thinks they understood the second one and what tips they may have for him or her to be more effective in the Dialogue. The second person listens and informs the others if and how these are of use. But this only really works if criticism and comments are constructive.

So far, we have tried to draw a neat line between feeling and argument. In reality, however, this isn't always tenable and they get mixed. Now, it would be easiest to ban feelings from a Socratic Dialogue altogether, but the more difficult and confusing such Dialogues become, the greater the challenge to untangle them.

Truth in Socratic Dialogues?

When discussing ethical themes, what do we actually seek? Is it truth as a random Socratic group perceives it? This would be a fickle truth. We seek something with a broader meaning, like universal values, but nevertheless feelings play a part in this search and what is more they should play a part in this search contrary to what most people seem to think. The extreme view is that universal, 'high standard' truth is reached via *ratio*, whereas everyday 'low standard' (not really thought-through) truth is based on emotion and bigotry. We think this distinction is wrong. *Ratio* reflects life and depends on life as well; feelings are part of

life. The quest for truth in a Socratic Dialogue is teamwork between reason and feelings.

For a truth to persist, it should be questioned and criticized as much as possible and only then can we be satisfied it is *fully* examined. That is why feelings should also be taken account of; feelings that we subsequently question and examine. However, the systematic examining of the multiplicity of arguments sometimes takes its toll. It puts pressure on the participants; arguments seem to drift away in vague places. Attention, precise listening, self-confidence, all of them seem to disappear. How can we avoid this? We cannot, not completely, but we can try by switching our approach as facilitators.

We distinguish between a *phenomenological* and an *essentialist* approach. The difference in a nutshell is: a phenomenological approach is taken when we collect phenomena that could have relevance to our theme. An essentialist approach is taken when we try to evaluate what we have collected, and get to the bottom or the *essence* of things. At first participants are happily chatting away and collecting all sorts of things they think could possibly have something to do with their theme; there's no real evaluating and there's no real criticism yet. But when judging and evaluating gradually creeps in – which is absolutely necessary for a good quality Socratic Dialogue – things start to get more *essentialist.* Sometimes then people 'overdo' things; participants go stubborn, they stick to their guns and never give in. There's no more 'couldn't it be that...' or 'I think the case here is...' but only 'and *that*'s how things are!' All that's important now is having the last word, never mind if it is contrary to their own interests!

There's only one thing we can do now: switch to the *phenomenological* approach until matters have cooled down. The phenomenological approach is less demanding on the participants. It is a facilitator's job to find out which approach is fitting and when he (or she) thinks a switch is in order. He or she can only try and encourage participants to go along by asking the right questions, making the right suggestions and the odd remark and do so at the right moment. Switching approaches is a means to keep feelings on board and make them fruitful.

We see further possibilities in the 'four dimensions of communicative actions' that Paul Watzlawick or Friedeman Schulz von Thun each in their own right developed from the so-called 'organon model' by Karl Bühler. Our basic assumption is that everything that is said, or every *speech act*, has a *quadruple* meaning: content ('that is...'); request/demand ('do...'); self-expression ('I feel...'); and attitude ('I think ... about you!').

In a Socratic Dialogue *content* is the dominant dimension, like 'such-and-such is the case'. Nevertheless the other dimensions are always carried along: *request* or *demand*, when one participant appeals to another for a reaction, *self-expression*, when a participant wants to share something, and *attitude* when participants express a certain attitude towards one another, like: 'I like you' or 'I hate you' or 'I am curious as to what you want to say about this' or 'I don't care what you think'.

Socratic Dialogues are special in that *content* remarks do not refer to facts in objective reality but to views and feelings of the participants, especially those that refer to their own experience, particularly the example-giver. This is not always easy because it can cause feelings of sympathy or dislike towards other participants (*attitude*) to interfere with arguments on feelings (on a *content* level), so that it may seem that somebody is talking on a *content* level, when in fact he is talking on the level of *attitude*. We may have the impression, for instance, that one of the participants who asks about a million questions is trying to understand the feelings of some other participant because they could be relevant to the theme, when, in fact, his questions are in a subtle way a means to make the other participant look bad, so the others don't take him seriously anymore. This could be some devious strategy to disqualify somebody – but why would anybody do such a thing? Perhaps he simply doesn't like this other person, wants to get even, whatever. What matters is that the levels can get mixed, without us immediately noticing.

Feeling curbed or pressurized, misunderstood, criticized unjustly, reprimanded or advised without ever having requested advice – all of this spoils the atmosphere. People may react in one of the following ways: with defiance (refutation); by defending the criticized or rejecting any alternative; with indirect re-establishment of freedom; or even with direct aggression. This demonstrates a way in which feelings can be utterly unfruitful for any communication.

How do we persuade people to adopt a *dialogical attitude*? Of course we can just say 'don't make things personal, put yourself in his or her place, how would you feel if people said something like that to you, try and stay nice, remember we want to co-operate – in this way we have the correct attitude for a Dialogue'. But this is hardly inspiring.

We could proceed by focusing on people's listening abilities, because proper listening makes people feel understood and respected, their growing experience in the Dialogue will make them more confident in their role as participants. This will help them to develop a fitting attitude, especially if we add to that the assistance of the facilitator who can for

instance stimulate mutual enquiry, checking whether they understood other participants properly and so on.

All in all there seem to be five ways of active listening. We have arranged them here in such an order that in the first one the emphasis lies on the listening and in the last one, the emphasis seems to be more on the 'active'. The first is simplest: we merely confirm that we heard the other person and give some reaction, a comment or an answer perhaps. Secondly, when we nod, make eye-contact or murmur approvingly, we may, without actually speaking, underline that we have listened and make other participants feel they are taken seriously. Thirdly, repeating what the other person said in one's own words, without judging, is one step further. It makes people feel that others are really interested because they take trouble to find out what was meant and subsequently go more deeply into the matter.

But of course, this is all standard procedure in a Socratic Dialogue or whenever we are talking to other people. But what should we do when people feel unappreciated or offended on an emotional level? We could perhaps try putting our finger on things and naming them. This is our fourth possibility of active listening. It is, however, a difficult one, because how do we recognize such things as a secret attack, or a hidden message? There's no standard recipe; we just have to listen carefully, to tones of voice as well as the contents of what is said. For instance, one participants sneers to the other, 'yeah, yeah, I hear what you say...' and the facilitator reacts, 'don't I hear something else? Is something bothering you?' The facilitator has named it: a tone of voice that indicated something was wrong, and thus rendered it harmless, in that the participants can at least talk about it.

Of course, talking about it is in itself not a solution. How can we talk about it *effectively*? Using arguments? We fear this can only result in attack-and-defence mechanisms. We see more sense in changing the message from the negative into the positive, or at least the neutral. The facilitator could for instance change the wording of something one participant says to the other and use a phrase which essentially means the same but sounds more respectful. This is our fifth way of active listening. We think we can get people to get used to positive wording when, time after time they hear an unkind sentence changed into a sentence that shows respect. To sum up the five ways of active listening, for the sake of clarity:

- taking up ('Yes, I understand you. I would say that...');

- showing attention (a murmuring as if in consent, as indicating an active form of silent behaviour);
- paraphrasing ('so you said...');
- picking up the silent, emotional message ('you feel...');
- reformulating the message in a better way.

Thus, we think, feelings appear as a supporter, a companion and as subject to the 'logos' in a Socratic Dialogue.

Conclusion

If we put it that feelings have to be examined before they can count as arguments, aren't we talking about *rationalized* feelings, and do not *rationalized* feelings have their origin in the *ratio*? Do we contradict ourselves? We think not. Feelings that support arguments stem from the heart and they are processed by instruments of the head (analysis, logic), as are arguments that stem from the head. In short: all arguments that play a part in a Socratic Dialogue are examined with the aid of the *ratio*, whatever their origin. All have to be applicable, they have to be concrete, they have to be lived through. When feelings or emotions pop up in a Socratic Dialogue they have to be taken into account. But what is vital is what we *do* with them. Hate, sorrow, love, rage, they all play their part, but not as such, not unprocessed – and not up to a degree that make participants run away in tears or anger because they feel attacked. But when such strong feelings do occur we can be certain that they are meaningful to us – or to the 'logos'.

Robert Hamilton and Keith Hammond

Civic Adult Education and the University

> Dozens of studies confirmed that education was by far the best predictor of engagement in civic life... Education seemed the key to both greater tolerance and greater social involvement.
>
> Robert Putnam[1]

For ten years the University of Glasgow has delivered a project known as the 'Pre-Access' in geographical areas characterized by multiple indicators of deprivation. One of the areas in which it has worked consistently is the area of Govan, which has experienced rapid decline in the last decade, due in no small part to the demise of heavy industry associated with shipbuilding. In Govan as elsewhere, the Pre-Access has established itself within a lifelong learning agenda as a distinctive initiative designed for adults in the community where the focus is not on vocational training.

Rather differently, it provides a broad 'liberal' curriculum associated more with the aims of an old university such as Glasgow. It seeks to contribute to the development of an active citizenry and also to help students in moving on to more formal education in colleges and universities if desired. The two aims of the project are quite compatible in that they seek to further the development of individuals and their community not by breaking completely with the Scottish tradition, but rather by seeking a balance between change and tradition. Failing to achieve such a balance in the education of adults runs the risk of providing learning opportunities that become arid and formal, with all the social and economic evils that follow. Losing a grip on tradition may mean losing a grip on the more meaningful aspects of culture altogether with the consequence that what continues embraces none of the

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1 Putnam, R., *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community*, New York, Simon & Schuster, 2000, p.18.

enduring standards of communal value.[2] The result of such a loss would be development that was superficial, rootless and void of meaningful value in a real sense.

The Scottish Tradition

The tradition that the Pre-Access follows has a long pedigree in Glasgow and it is one where dialogue figures centrally. Since the Enlightenment, the University of Glasgow has had at its centre an engagement with the problem of meaningful development in the lives of ordinary people outside the institution. The early practice of this tradition sought to make higher education accessible to the community at large. Francis Hutcheson first introduced classes to the general public in both Moral and Natural Philosophy in the mid-eighteenth century, whilst he held the Chair in Moral Philosophy from 1729 to 1746. Hutcheson helped form an ethos that endures to this day. This tradition extended access to higher learning beyond students who were formally matriculated. Even in the case of matriculated students, compared with Oxford and Cambridge, Glasgow placed few barriers to admission. At Oxford, for example, articles of adherence were regulations governing admission which were laid down by the Church of England, which meant in effect that Catholics amongst other groups were excluded.

In the early years of the 19th century a somewhat different approach was taken north of the border by Enlightenment figures like George Jardine who urged more educational work amongst the ordinary working people of Glasgow. At the same time on mainland Europe Kant was urging the ordinary man of the Enlightenment to think for himself. During this period also John Anderson provided courses for the public at Glasgow on experimental physics which proved to be increasingly popular with the emergence of industrialisation. Jardine provided classes around a more liberal focus so that it might have a humanising affect on the new industrial workforce. In the case of both Anderson and Jardine, particular audiences were targeted within the general public. Anderson, for instance, requested that the educational needs of women not be overlooked. In this vein, in 1845 a single programme for women in Glasgow was offered by Professor Hutton Balfour who had to argue that

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[2] According to James, E., *An Essay on the Content of Education*, London, Harrap and Co., 1949, p.11

such a programme "would bring no harm to the women concerned".[3] Much remained to be achieved; further significant progress was not made in women's education until the 1860s when the movement seeking female emancipation forced the issue of equal educational opportunities onto the broad public agenda. However the seeds were sewn by Anderson and his colleagues. Women's education also received a boost through the introduction of University Extension, which involved delivering courses to groups and communities outside the university. By the 1880s and 1890s Extension lectures were being provided by the University of Glasgow in 16 venues. Large industrial areas around the East End of the city were easily accessible to these lecturers. Political awareness spread amongst the city's population, many of whom were keen to attend classes in the sciences, economics, politics and history. Jepson argues that Extension sought to perpetuate the tradition of liberal education associated with older universities.[4] As in the present context with the Pre-Access, it was fundamentally concerned with providing access to high quality curricula.

Hutcheson et al

The Pre-Access is clearly the heir to this tradition which first emerged with Hutcheson and others. It is also heir to the tradition, outlined by Davie, that connects Scottish Enlightenment 'psychologism'[5] with the 'anti-psychologism' of more recent continental thought. Scottish 'common sense' philosophy was in large part a response to scepticism. According to Richard Gunn, it hurls "thunderbolts against the prevalent modernist and postmodernist conception according to which philosophy amounts to sceptical reflection upon itself of a single and solitary and monologically isolated soul."[6]

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3 Jones, H. and Muirhead, J.H., *The Life and Philosophy of Edward Caird*, Glasgow: Maclehose, Jackson and Co., 1921.

4 Jepson, N.A., *The Beginnings of English University Adult Education*, London, Michael Joseph., 1973, p.215–216.

5 Psychologism is the theory that psychology is the basis of philosophy, so that, the validity of laws, like those of logic, is based upon the nature of the human mind or psychology. It may also involve the view that the mind itself resembles a 'machine'.

6 Gunn, R., 'Introduction' to Davie, G., *The Scottish Enlightenment and Other Essays*, Edinburgh, Polygon, 1994, p.xii.

The Scottish tradition recognises conversation as something quite different to Descartes, who Gunn notes to have preferred sitting at his stove alone clarifying his every philosophical thought as nothing but thought, rather than meeting and arguing with his friends.[7] Davie reports just this when he says, in the essay on Victor Cousin,[8] that "I can't be aware of matter or body as an object to myself, without also thinking of it as an object to other selves".[9] The point being made is that conversational interaction is not without its 'epistemological charge' just as only "an epistemologically competent subject is able to sustain an interaction of a conversational sort".[10] Gunn claims that "this sense of importance of to-and-fro interaction with others is central to the Scottish philosophical tradition".[11]

But what is the essence of this type of philosophy and educational practice to which the Pre-Access falls heir? It is one that acknowledges the Scottish 'passion for ideas' coming out in conversation. MacDonald comments that "conversation is not merely extensive but intensive". It has philosophical discussion deepening into "social theory (and vice versa) in the same movement as philosophers and non-philosophers – often the same people – play out different roles". A "conversational approach to philosophy tackles first – and higher-order – theoretical and meta-theoretical, social and epistemological – points at the same time."[12]

Within this conversational approach there is an informed citizenry, imaginatively embracing ideas as the foundation of a healthy democracy. It is one that has the liberal curricula working towards that end in provision that is not the same as the more atomised arrangements of schools, colleges and universities in that it pursues this conversational, rather than adversarial approach to teaching and learning – most recently promoted in the work of Hans-Georg Gadamer who was greatly influenced by both Aristotle and Hegel. However, before Gadamer there was, again in the University of Glasgow, the work of individuals like Edward Caird, Professor of Moral Philosophy for 27 years. Caird lived and worked between 1866 and 1927. He sought to broaden educational opportunities for working class adults as the first move towards building a more thoughtful society, a society that was not shaped around hard divisions of class that echoed the division of labour separating those

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7 *ibid.* p.xiii.

8 *ibid*, p.70–109.

9 Quoted in Gunn's introduction *op. cit.*, p.xiii.

10 *ibid.*

11 *ibid.*

12 *ibid.*

doing the thoughtful 'academic' work and those doing the more physical 'useful' work in society. Caird and his three successors to the Chair in Moral Philosophy all sought a more 'organic' society and they did so through the promotion of adult liberal education.

For these early thinkers, even in the most mundane of lives there is ordinary experience uniting the two worlds of thought and practical activity. Ordinary life experiences are constantly being brought out in the teaching and learning of the Pre-Access. In conversation reason does not just have warrant when it is employed in pure *a priori* forms. Reason that emerges in conversation comes about in the narrative forms that describe life. This is to say that conversation on the Pre-Access is not the same as conversing with a professional who, as Kant states, may often reason on behalf of the individual they converse with as a spiritual advisor, or as a doctor outlining the diet of someone, and so on.[13]

Conversation in the Pre-Access class is usually about a piece of reading but it is also about the experience encountered in the reading. Human experience is about interpretation, and just as there is no avoidance of this in human experience so there is no avoidance of interpretation in formal study. With a good piece of reading, there are moments of strong interpretation being encouraged and as with good conversation, this is always conducive to the social engagement of others in making sense of the same reading. There is no sitting back and letting the book do all the work for the reader. There is, in good reading and good class discussion of reading, the creation of situations where people have to think for themselves and share their thoughts. Thus, in the Pre-Access class learning is always social as students work together.

Gadamer's Conversational Approach to Teaching and Learning

With conversation then there is a reciprocal interpretation of different experiences, involving a rich and deep process that makes sense of endless aspects of the lifeworld and not just the text or reading that is at issue. This approach to teaching and learning on the Pre-Access has evolved almost intuitively amongst students and teachers, but it is

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[13] Kant, I., 'An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?' in *Kant's Political Writing*, trans. H.B. Nisbet, ed. H. Reiss, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1970, p.54–60.

expressed most fully in Gadamer's *Truth and Method.*[14] From cradle to grave, education, according to Gadamer, is about "being at home in the world" as the person and culture develop in *Bildung.*

Societal progress, be it about development from pre-industrial to industrial or from industrial to post-industrial, cannot take place in a one-sided way. Societal progress is meaningless without ordinary people being at home in the world in just the way that Gadamer describes. Hume expresses a similar idea. Hume found the cause of economic growth based on low-wage strategies unacceptable because it meant the nation's progress was purchased in just such a one-sided way at the expense of the "happiness of so many millions of its own labourers".[15]

For Enlightenment figures like Smith and Hume, the division of labour had warrant in an effective community of producers, but if those that laboured were to be generally happy with their life then they required something more of society, something more that balanced efficient productivity making society a more human collective. More often than not, this led to a focus on the general conditions of life, in which education was seen as a central feature. Of importance here were the Scottish Hegelians who read Hume as a primer to Kant and then went on to look at the idea of societal development through Hegel himself.

Friendship

For Hume and Smith modernity involved new social formations. They imagined a new sort of friendship to emerge with modernity that involved the breakdown of the extended family. After a while, relations lose contact and "in a few generations, not only lose all care about one another, but all remembrance of their common origin".[16] Change in family forms is very much in evidence on the Pre-Access and it makes friendships all the more important. Many of the students are single mothers. This makes the crèche facilities that are provided alongside of

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[14] Gadamer, H-G, *Truth and Method*, trans. G Barden and J. Cumming, London, Sheed and Ward, 1975.

[15] Ignatieff, M., *The Needs of Strangers*, London, Hogarth Press, 1984.

[16] Hill, L. and McCarthy, P., 'Hume, Smith and Ferguson: Friendship in Commercial Society' in King, P., and Devere, H., *The Challenge to Friendship in Modernity*, London, Frank Cass, 2000, p.35.

the classes extremely important, as are the friendships formed around providing mutual support amongst one another in their studies and child-minding chores.

Smith referred to contemporary friendship in terms of their being a "necessity of the situation" arising from "a new type of civil society" characterized by candour, openness, and proliferation of "clubs and societies" which reflect the breakdown of social categories. Conversation plays an increasingly important role in these new relationships. It is not incidental therefore that the teaching and learning on the Pre-Access is conversational rather than adversarial.

Gadamer has outlined this approach, which is guided by the play and interplay of experience and not the traditional epistemological quest for truth. Conversational approaches work outside of the relativist/objectivist rubric. Conversation works within traditions that are acknowledged not as "the dead or oppressive hand of the past, nor as anything monolithic, but as the active (often intractable) context of understandings, beliefs, commitments, which overlies the self-understanding of each human being".[17] For Gadamer, as for the Pre-Access students, "tradition emerges not in acts of acquiescence but through acts of progressively more informed questioning of all that seeks to address and influence human understanding".

Concluding Remarks: Adult Education as Civic Education

Milner makes the point that "adult education is civic education; that is, it is education aimed at citizens, qua citizens." He says that "citizens by definition are capable of choice, including the choice of shunning adult education programmes and informing themselves in other ways – or not at all."[18] The Pre-Access project now functions in areas of multiple deprivation around the city of Glasgow. On this project human choice is always subject to the respect that Milner places at the centre of adult

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17 Cleary, J. and Hogan P., 'The Reciprocal Character of Self-Education: Introductory Comments on Hans-Georg Gadamers's Address 'Education is Self-Education', *Journal of Philosophy of Education,* Vol. 35, No.4, Nov 2001, p.520.

18 Milner, H., *Civic Literacy: How Citizens Make Democracy Work*, New England, University Press of New England, 2002, p.117.

education. This is a feature that shapes the Scottish tradition at every level.

In particular, the Scottish tradition influences the way that philosophy is practised with a focus upon dialogue in a conversational form that takes place in non-institutional settings. The subjects taught along with the philosophy, are those associated with any pre-Reformation liberal curriculum. In trying to encourage quality study, the tutors also try to facilitate good, mutually-supportive friendships, an integrated aspect of the project that is considered every bit as important as the central focus of more formal study. To date the project has seen many students going on to university degrees and/or taking up a whole range of important positions in their local communities and the world of work.

Contemporary thought in higher education tends to emphasize the need for an increase in student numbers. It sees a more enlightened society in simple numerical terms. We question the wisdom of this narrow approach by questioning the quality of the education that is on offer to more and more people. But as reflected in the Pre-Access project, quality liberal education in the Scottish tradition has a key role to play in the creation of an educated public. Reichenbach makes the point that much of modernity is about 'self-improvement' but modernity cannot be exclusively defined in these terms because since Greek antiquity the thirst for knowledge "has been part of a characteristic trait in Western culture that has come to the fore again and again".[19] Yet this thirst for knowledge and understanding is a feature of humans that is often overlooked in marginalized areas of the modern city. We urge that far more consideration be given to the very best that is on offer in community based adult education as a means of building a civil society.

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[19] Reichenbach, R., *Journal Of Philosophy of Education,* Special Issue: 'Educating Humanity: Bildung in Postmodernity', Vol. 36, Issue 3, Oxford, Blackwell Publishing, 2002, p.415.

Dorothy Moir

Third Sector Organizations in a Changing UK Environment

> Voluntary and community organizations make a major and literally incalculable contribution to the development of society, and to the social, cultural, economic and political life of the nation.
>
> UK Home Office, 1998[1]

UK Government Intervention

Despite the apparently sophisticated economic approaches of the latter part of the 20th and the early years of the 21st centuries, in planning for effective social and welfare provision governments in the UK have encouraged the blurring of the boundaries between that which government can reasonably be expected to provide, and that which can – and perhaps should – be left to the 'philanthropist' and the ordinary volunteer.[2] This shift seems to have taken place however without due consideration of the longer term results of funding the implementation of such policies from the centre, both in socio-economic terms and more particularly in the effects it may have on the volunteer movement.

The Home Secretary has even recently announced that the over 50s are to be "invited" to share their skills with their communities. Concerned that there is a shrinking pool of volunteers, this age group is considered to have the life experience needed to energise and mobilise many of the government initiatives. The Department for Social

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1 *Compact between the Government and the Voluntary Sector*, UK Home Office, 1998.

2 Unless otherwise indicated, all references are to the situation prevailing currently in the UK where the third sector may also be referred to as the nonprofit or not-for-profit sector.

Development is establishing a task force for this specific purpose – The Experience Corps Initiative – in which it will consider how far the voluntary sector can continue to make a substantial contribution to the achievement of government objectives and to the well-being of civil society. This initiative parallels similar projects which have focused on the young, such as Connexions, in which students in school and community settings are encouraged to innovate and take part in activities which enhance the environment in which they live and work.

In the 1980s and 90s public statements of government policy have consistently shown that our politicians and civil servants had begun more consciously to recognise the significant contribution made by voluntary organizations to the economy and society. They noted the resources accumulated by these bodies, in funding sources, plant and property, expertise, cost effectiveness and efficient management. For example, the following charities are nationally and internationally recognised as efficient and effective in what they do:

- Barnardo's and the NSPCC, are seen as leaders in the care of needy children;
- MacMillan Nurses and The Hospice Movement supplement hospital services in the care of the terminally ill;
- Shelter and Crisis at Christmas support the homeless.

The contribution made voluntarily by groups and individuals to communities is vast and has only recently, in the UK, been counted as part of the Gross National Product (GNP). The National Council for Voluntary Organisations (NCVO) estimated in the year 2000 that the UK voluntary sector economy was worth £13.4 billion to the national economy, employing 485,000 paid workers and benefiting from the voluntary effort of more than three million individuals. In the North East of England, for example, a mainly urban district of high unemployment comprising Gateshead, Redcar, Cleveland, Tees Valley and Wear Valley, the voluntary and community sector contribution to the local economy was calculated as 3.8% of the regional GDP. An important source of employment, it provides 23,200 full-time equivalent posts, 4.4% of the region's workforce (2.2% nationally). This considerable financial benefit to the local and national economy could be replicated in many regions of the UK.

An Historical Perspective

History shows that there have always been those willing to invest in their community with or without the prior approval, encouragement or consent of government, and not primarily prima facie in the pursuit of self-interest. In the United Kingdom, the third or 'voluntary' sector came into prominence in Victorian times when a few citizens who had made fortunes in trade and industry claimed they were trying to put back something into the community.

Commercial empires were built and philanthropic ventures thrived, some of which may have been based on social and political conviction and religious principles. There were those who wanted to make their way in political life and others who saw philanthropy as a means of living the tenets of their faith which might help them achieve salvation. For others there was a desire to buy a kind of respectability permitting access to a society which despised 'new' money and which revolved around aristocratic heritage and 'old', inherited money. The motives may have been genuinely altruistic in a secular sense for some who were moved by a benign interest in their fellow men.

Whatever the reasons for investment in non-profit-making activity, many schools, libraries, hospitals, orphanages, alms houses and missionary societies were endowed. Whole communities, such as Saltaire in West Yorkshire, were set up, offering 'cradle to grave' provision for employees. Similarly, the Cadbury and Rowntree foundations provided good quality housing, education and social conditions for workers in the confectionery factories which were run by families who belonged to the Quaker Society of Friends, Quaker beliefs having barred them from active political life.

The grim and graphic descriptions of life in Victorian schools, orphanages and factories, as portrayed in the novels of Charles Dickens, are testimony to circumstances where the 'philanthropy' of the founder was not necessarily matched by his espoused ethical principles and practices. No doubt, the employees of genuine philanthropists were likely to have been treated fairly and ethically. There is no disputing the fact, however, that such philanthropy was often extremely good for business, encouraging productivity and so higher profits.

Many women, from the 'Lady of the Manor' to the 'Good Neighbour', were involved in voluntary work in the 19th century. Otherwise excluded from the public life of politics, industry and commerce, they nevertheless found an outlet in the care of some of the

more vulnerable members of society. This tradition was harnessed by government in 1938 with the setting up of the Women's Royal Voluntary Service to take account of civilian care as part of the war effort. Today the work of the WRVS in the community continues, in hospitals, in family support, in the Armed Services, and in emergency and disaster situations. It still receives part of its funding from government grants, the remainder coming from payments for the services it provides, and from fundraising, donations and legacies.

The UK Commercial Sector Today

Commercial organizations in the UK may now take advantage of the tax-deductible benefits of corporate donation. Their employees may make tax-deductible donations at source to preferred charities through payroll-giving, and by government recommendation may also have sanctioned time off work to act as school governors, trustees of charities and in other third sector roles. Third sector projects may be included in commercial trainee and apprentice programmes. These policies are less an informal arrangement and more a formal company policy statement, possibly favourably affecting its reputation in the stockmarket, and attracting a particular kind of investor. A fairly typical 'Corporate and social responsibility report' states:

> In recognising its wider corporate and social responsibilities, The Board [of X] introduced a number of important changes to the way it identifies, assesses and manages those social, environmental and ethical matters that influence the success of the Group's businesses. ... Further donations (are made) through advertising, sponsorship, products for prizes and volunteers or other in-kind support. ... [B]usinesses also run a whole range of initiatives for the benefit of local communities. These include allowing employees time off to participate in community activities and other charitable support.[3]

The sums of money involved can be considerable. In 2002, the staff of Centrica raised £475,000.00 for The Cystic Fibrosis Trust and over £150,000.00 for The Meningitis Trust. Help the Aged received support of £5.4 million over a period of several years, and the Company planned

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[3] Tomkins plc, *Annual Report and Accounts*, 2002, p.29. Registered Office: East Putney House, 84 Upper Richmond Road, London, SW15 2ST, UK.

in 2003 to donate to The Samaritans 1p for every call made to the latter's new directory enquiry service. Companies may or may not wish to be associated with charities or other organizations in receipt of government funding, however.

Whatever the altruistic and philanthropic inclinations of the board, such commitment of human and financial resources to the third sector makes good business sense and is often closely related to the company's financial interests. Those who take part, as employees or shareholders, in corporate involvement in the third sector may or may not share the company's philosophy, but may find it expedient to 'tow the party line'. At an individual level, conflict with conscience can be difficult to resolve. Charities nominated by companies may not be happy to accept such largesse, however. There are circumstances in which the philosophy and ethical stance of a charity or community may well be at variance with those of the company wishing to endow it.

Third Sector Organizations and Government: Costs and Consequences

Realising more fully the potential for relieving pressure on national resources, government has given substantial funding to such third sector organizations, together with explicit expectations of service delivery. Thus the relationship between government agency and voluntary organization becomes more formal, resembling partnership, with standards set by the grant-giver for future performance. But there are two problems. In exchange for money received, voluntary organizations have relinquished substantial freedom to set their own goals and targets. This was recognised by Stuart Etherington, Chief Executive, NCVO, who wrote:

> the sector may be courted more for the services [we] provide than what we can really bring to the party – independence and a fresh approach to old problems ...[and] has been sucked too far into service delivery.[4]

Secondly, no matter how much money or corporate skill is invested in third sector organizations by industry and commerce, the outcomes are dependent on the individuals who direct them and work in them. The increasingly demanding government requirements are set at levels often

4 Etherington, S., *Public Management Journal*, 7th July, 1999.

beyond the immediate competence of the organization. In a perfect world such standards and targets might be desirable, but meeting them can place unrealistic expectations on services already delivering to a 'good enough' level with which the receivers were content. A particular example is in the Standards for Care Homes for the Elderly. Faced with increased regulation, many charity-funded homes providing places taken up by social services have simply closed down. This has created a severe shortage of places for the elderly and infirm requiring residential care, and a critical problem, self-created, for government to solve.

Harnessed to supplement statutory provision, these resources can accrue definite social, financial and political benefits for government. The organizations' altruistic and ethical principles may not, however, have been properly recognised, and their intrinsic value misunderstood. The impact of government policies may be changing the face and culture of many third sector organizations, the nature of the people who work in them, and, more significantly, the elusive 'added value' which makes them so attractive and successful.

As social provision has become increasingly formalised and bureaucratic, so have many voluntary organizations. Subject to rigorous scrutiny of their finances and activities, controls are exercised over them by powerful bodies such as The Charity Commission and Companies' House. The question arises as to whether it is possible for voluntary services to accept government funding of this kind and whether they should, and can, maintain any significant degree of independence from government policy and stricture.

They risk being stifled by regulation. Although there are few who feel that the demands of regulation have enhanced the ability of third sector organizations to fulfil their mission, many have reservations about its efficacy.

Again, to quote Stuart Etherington:

> a prescriptive approach has crept into our partnerships with government ... contracts are driven by the aims of the centre. ... What they do not need is the output-oriented, tick-box approach to service delivery which has prevailed in recent years.[5]

[5] *ibid.*

The Individual in the Third Sector

The majority of UK charities are run by unpaid trustees or committee members, sometimes with help from other volunteers; such voluntary effort considered to be the grassroots of charity. Until recently many third sector organizations relied on just a few paid or salaried workers to carry out essential statutory administrative tasks. Such employees provided highly professional services, often for less than the commercial rate. In the new climate, accountants and other accredited personnel may be increasingly employed, in part due to the increasing regulation but also to protect the public and the organization from maladministration and bad practice as the charity grows in size and function.

Volunteers, moreover, might benefit from training at the organization's expense and be reimbursed for reasonable expenses incurred in their work for the organization. Some specialist training, such as computer skills, is now also provided directly by government-funded schemes to help third sector groups meet the new regulations.

Typically, volunteers, and paid workers in the third sector are strongly motivated to further the values of their organization and find a whole range of rewards in their work. Both paid and unpaid charity worker are likely to count job satisfaction as a key factor in their working conditions, together with more specific rewards such as intellectual stimulation, the exercising of autonomy and the utilisation of skills not employed in other areas of life. The imposition of complex external requirements for such activities as 'managing performance' has, therefore, altered the face and the nature of many charitable bodies, changing not only the ways in which services are managed and delivered, but possibly also the culture of the organization and the kind of volunteer and paid worker who might be attracted to it.

There are those who contribute to charities their money, time, skill (professional skills, such as accountancy or general skills in organization, for example), or facilities and support in-kind. People volunteer for a number of reasons; there could be a mix of motives for any one individual. These might include a wish for social company in order to avoid loneliness (a form of therapy), or to be part of a particular social circle of like-minded people with whom they can do the things they enjoy, or to continue professional involvement after retirement. For some people their involvement is quite simply a matter of conscience or altruism. They may feel that they have been fortunate in their lives and wish to 'pay back' something to others they see as less fortunate.

Rewards and Remuneration of Third Sector Involvement

For many, paid or not, money is not the sole or prime consideration when they commit themselves to involvement in the third sector. But there will, of course, be those for whom there is some expectation of gain such as for personal development (an opportunity to gain new skills, to improve employment prospects, to find a stepping stone to a future career through training, education and employment opportunities supported by the charity), or for status or kudos in the community, or even the possibility of community or society recognition (the award, for example, of a state 'honour'). There are benefits, too, which relate to self-esteem, to feeling valued and needed and having a sense of purpose. There is also always the possibility that the volunteer may transform not only the lives of others but her/his own also, often in unexpected and beneficial ways.

Most voluntary workers would agree that their 'rewards' are very real, if intangible. Altruism would rarely be claimed nor would any deny the pleasure and satisfaction gained both from the work and the appreciation of fellow workers and the community. Lights may be hidden under bushels but a feeling of personal contentment is often the hallmark of the charity worker.

Dilemmas to be Addressed

The combination of funding and government regulation has implications, moral, ethical, financial and social, for all those involved. There are unintended consequences. The issue of accepting money from government sources has a political dimension, the significance of which may not yet have been fully realized. This is paralleled by the increasing concern about the levels of donation to political parties by companies and leaders of industry and commerce.

A consequence of government funding and the refocusing of economic values in third sector organizations could be a major shift in perception of those organizations' primary objectives. Vision and mission can become secondary to the quest for funding. There are issues of conscience which may trouble the traditional volunteer, and paid charity worker alike. Some will find the level of government and external funding and target-setting intrusive, and unacceptable to the core beliefs

and values which have previously sustained the mission of the organization and their commitment to it.

They may ask:

- Is it acceptable to be involved with an organization in receipt of government funding and so to be, in effect, promoting government policies and values with which one may not agree?
- Can one work in an organization which has, for example, received National Lottery funding as an essential component of its functional budget if one has ethical objections to gambling?
- If the government is setting targets for a third sector organization as a condition of funding, how can success or failure be measured by the tool of economics if the funding is provided by different agencies whose principles and objectives may not match those of the organization?

Third sector organizations which feel they must adapt to prevailing economic conditions have to examine very carefully the ways in which they consider making changes. For example, organizations which could once depend wholly on the unpaid volunteer may need to consider the consequences of paying many of their staff. The culture of the organization may change. There may be differences in the way people are treated when working in the third sector in paid roles and in unpaid roles with a potential for discord where paid employees and unpaid volunteers work together, sometimes on similar tasks. Questions related to payment to individuals may take the form:

- If the voluntary worker is offered payment, in cash (for example, in expenses reimbursement) or other kind, are his/her principles as a volunteer compromised?
- Are some forms of payment more acceptable than others in the voluntary code, e.g. the repayment of travelling expenses or subsidised meals?
- Is it unethical to refuse payment, perhaps in the form of travel and out-of pocket expenses, when to do so would cause misrepresentation of the true costs of running the organization, and perhaps make it more difficult for others, who need such support, to participate?

- Is it possible that some of the non-financial intrinsic rewards to volunteers of 'pay back' or 'feel good' are less ethical than others?

There may be differences in the way in which the paid and unpaid are regarded by the organization and by individuals within it or by those outside, including beneficiaries. Feelings of superiority and inferiority may emerge. Less attractive roles may be allocated to paid workers or to the volunteers; volunteers may be expected to fulfil duties more properly in the domain of the paid employee and vice versa.

The Way Ahead

It is clear that the government has a fundamental difficulty in understanding the true nature of the volunteer and the third sector. It is precisely the lack of commercial or official involvement, the scope for personal freedom of choice and the wellspring of shared goodwill, which have enabled many individuals though the voluntary sector to enter a vibrant and successful lifestyle, separate from, yet connected to their professional and family lives. By its very involvement, not to say interference, the government risks destroying the very thing that it purports to admire and support. To go deeper, might it be that volunteers who continue to work in the third sector may wish to protect their rights within what appears to be an employment situation, and establish or become affiliated to a professional association or trade union?

As society develops, new ways of adapting to the rapidly changing political and social environment of the 21st century, those who find unacceptable to their philosophy and principles the evolution of the third sector into a 'Sector for Partnership with Government and other Agencies' may seek to find another outlet for their values, their altruism and philanthropy.

Will the formalisation of opportunities to contribute to one's community deter many who might previously have volunteered? Will government initiatives targeting the young and the over-50 age groups be regarded by some as a form of conscription, with a consequent political backlash? Can it be possible that this century will see the emergence of a fourth sector, comprised of those disenfranchised from the third sector,

who will work independently of external funding and whose principles will not be compromised by political expediency?

Closer to Home

Trustees of charities have to consider very carefully how best to fulfil their goals in the modern world. Many smaller organizations, such as the SFCP and PPA, are financially independent and have so far not needed to be concerned with the ethics of accepting outside funds. They are in the older tradition of the voluntary sector in this particular sense, so to say, and in that they depend heavily on voluntary effort to help them fulfil their Deed of Trust. The vast voluntary effort put into the UK's third sector nationwide is quite simply a fact of life here.[6]

The SFCP has also already undertaken paid help. Good stewardship of a charity dictates the need for financial controls and other rational ways of making best use of resources. This will also fundamentally entail

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6 In Germany, similar questions are being asked in the context of a debate over whether or not payment for Socratic Dialogue facilitators should be introduced. Consider the following by Gisela Raupach-Strey: "Socratic Dialogue, as practised by the members of the PPA, has always been an activity dependent on the voluntary efforts of its adherents. The tradition of facilitating Socratic Dialogue in Germany without payment is very honourable. This tradition is naïve from the point of view of society because being respected in present-day society depends in many cases on what one earns. The principle seems to be: the higher the fee, the better the work, and the greater the respect. These principles of society are problematical (and could be a subject for Socratic Dialogue). Even if one does not agree with these principles, one nevertheless cannot avoid being confronted with them. If confronted with them and one doesn't know what to do, there is a dilemma: one can give in to society and accept payment, but then deny a conviction held. If payment is rejected, one may not be regarded with the same respect as those who accept money and perhaps then one cannot do the work which one may be convinced it is important to do. If one tries to find compromises, one can never be content with oneself. One may take less money – then be regarded as less valuable – or take no money saying: 'I don't want to enter into those aspects of society where a high sum of money is the instrument of being respected.' But then there are members of society one never can reach, even if it is substantially the intention (or should be the intention). One can take as much money as is reasonable and 'normal' in one's personal domain, but then be unable to know whether one will compromise or destroy personal principles. There is a danger for organizations in this difficult area of development, to see things clearly, without a necessary internal and external debate." Raupach-Strey discusses these issues further in *Sokratische Didaktik: Die didaktische Bedeutung der Sokratischen Methode in der Tradition von Leonard Nelson und Gustav Heckmann,* Lit Verlag, Münster, 2002.

the wise management of a judicious mix of personnel (paid workers and unpaid volunteers, for example) to deliver the service, and the harmonising of the roles of these workers and their just and fair treatment (their ethical treatment). Not all paid workers are instrumental and solely motivated by money, just as the motives of volunteers are not always pure. More often, what unites them (paid worker and volunteer) is their shared value-system (their personal ethics) and their wish to help further the goals of the particular organization whose mission they espouse. Mutual understanding, tolerance and support is the way forward, therefore.

While the issue of payment can be contentious and will provoke strong feelings, an open debate about such issues is healthier than just 'sweeping them under the carpet' and formal dialogue can assist with such debates. Attitudes towards money and grants can be muddled and contradictory. Here is surely a role for rational and carefully facilitated Neo-Socratic Dialogue, which encourages self-criticism and should lead to greater understanding, and in principle to greater tolerance.

Gisela Raupach-Strey

The Contribution of Socratic Dialogue to Democratic Aims in Civil Society

Leonard Nelson formulated a sharp critique of democracy. This criticism rests solely on his understanding of the notion of 'democracy' as a principle of making decisions by majority. This was the general meaning given to 'democracy' at his time. The main point of Nelson's criticism was that a majority decision gives no guarantee of being in accord with the "ideal of right" (justice). In Nelson's eyes one could not adhere to both democracy and the "ideal of right". Therefore Nelson dropped the idea of democracy (as understood in his time) and asked how to establish justice. His idea was that those who govern should have the best insight into the idea of right (justice). Education is needed because many people don't have this insight or don't have enough of it. Nelson proclaimed and formed with his friends a 'party of right', and, like Plato, required that a group of wise men should govern the state and the wisest man should be the political leader.

Gustav Heckmann (1898–1996) worked as a teacher in the 'Walkemühle' (a progressive school founded by Nelson) and in 1932 as journalist in Berlin against National Socialism; and after 1945 he became a teacher at a college for the education and training of teachers. In 1973, he formulated his philosophical critique of Nelson's position (as presented above): we can never be certain that one man can combine in his person all forces of reasonable insight and clearness of will and character. This is not given to humans as an *a priori* precondition; they have to consult their experience. But the idea of political leadership and the ideal of reasonable government can be separated. Instead of political leadership Heckmann proposes the interaction of all available forces among human beings. In this way, perhaps not the ideally best decision but the realistically best decision can be reached. This idea of interaction ('Wechselwirkung') is realised during Socratic Dialogues.

The second point of Heckmann's critique is that Nelson did not uphold the basic interest of everybody to participate in political and social life. Heckmann postulates the ideal of active participation by

citizens and attaches a higher value to the type of state which allows not only critique but actually achieves participation in official decisions. Heckmann defines democracy in this more ambitious sense. This meaning of 'democracy' allows degrees of participation and overcomes 'black-or-white' thinking (e.g. the crowd versus the elite) concerning the capability of people participating in politics.

Nelson was very ardent to transform theory into practice. Because of the "ideal of right", the existence of which he constantly affirmed, he was very engaged in politics or, rather, in reforming the political and social structures. He was not only a professor at university, but also founded the progressive school, the Walkemühle (for children and adults), and the left-wing party 'ISK' (Internationaler Sozialistischer Kampfbund). The Walkemühle was directed by Minna Specht (1879–1961), who previously had been a teacher and educator in different places. Studying mathematics in Göttingen, 1914–1916, she came into contact with Nelson and increasingly became his collaborator in philosophy and in political activities. Later on she edited (together with Grete Henry-Hermann) Nelson's writings. The Socratic method was the main method she used in her pedagogical work. There were two main goals: developing clear thinking and argumentation, and strengthening character; within this the value of truthfulness was especially stressed.

In the education of adults there were Socratic Dialogues about the fundamentals of the state, and about right and justice. Their aim was the autonomy of every person who later on should take over tasks in the political organization. In reality, Nelson put much effort into establishing a group of people who would be able to take responsibility in society. At this time it was more the idea of education of an elite than of education for all. But the substantial ethical and political ideals, respect for all human beings and their interests (as well as the interests of animals) were basic ideals. It is interesting that in both these contexts Socratic Dialogues played a role, independently of Nelson's criticism of 'democracy', whereas in our present understanding Socratic Dialogues are an extremely democratic institution, not in a formal but in a qualified sense. The reason being that they allow everybody to think freely and speak freely, that they are carried by mutual respect and equal opportunity for everybody to participate in finding out what is right and influencing public opinion throughout the Dialogue.

The National Socialists closed the Walkemühle School at once. Gustav Heckmann and other teachers worked in Berlin on the daily newspaper *Der Funke* and tried to rally together the political forces on

the left. The friends of Nelson (he had died in 1927) recognised very early and very clearly (before 1932) the danger of National Socialism. They prepared themselves for working illegally in organized resistance and in this context Socratic Dialogues again played a big role. Grete Henry-Hermann (1901–1984) who took her doctorate with the mathematician Emmy Noether in Göttingen, worked together with Nelson on his philosophy lessons about the system of ethics and pedagogy. Before she herself had to emigrate, she travelled from one group to the other and helped them by facilitating Socratic Dialogues to reflect their political and personal situation. They confirmed their convictions in discussing the situation and in discussing the values which underpinned their resistance. It is astonishing how much strength these groups drew out of Socratic Dialogues, even in situations which were difficult in theory and practice. For example, they recognised that whereas lying is not acceptable normally, it is allowed in the situation of being cross-examined by the Nazis, in order to protect their friends. They realised, too, that not everybody who was educated in the spirit of Nelson's philosophy was able to participate in the illegal work.

After 1937, the work of resistance was no longer possible in their own country, and most of the followers of Nelson emigrated. They continued their work under new conditions, and Socratic Dialogues were facilitated in the refugee school in Denmark as well as in camps in England. Minna Specht and some of her friends interested in pedagogy developed a programme for 'German Educational Reconstruction'. Minna Specht stressed the idea of mutual respect, which is possible only when the child has itself the experience of being respected. She condemned sharply the education of the Nazis, which trained people to kill and was based on obedience to a minority of rulers, who were not legitimated. She pronounced as aims of education the development of consciousness and engagement for justice and mutual respect. Rights and obligations correspond to each other; they are not imposed, but recognised in people's own minds. Only in this way can we achieve the 'education of understanding', in which conflicts are solved through Socratic Dialogues, that means by talking to each other instead of resorting to violence. She calls such education 'democratic' embracing the principle of equality: justice counts for all people equally, it does not countenance privileges.

This was a programme, the basic ideas of which, after 1945, influenced pedagogical institutions like the progressive school, the 'Odenwaldschule' of which Minna Specht was the headmistress for some

years after the war. After this Minna Specht worked since 1951 in Unesco institutions and she was president of the PPA between 1949 and 1961.

After 1945 most of Nelson's friends were engaged in promoting social democracy in different countries and in different ways. They worked in groups and in organizations like trade unions. Others concentrated their activity in the pedagogical sector: Gustav Heckmann became professor of philosophy and pedagogy in the Pädagogische Hochschule in Hannover (a teacher training college that would later become part of Hannover University) and he collected a circle of facilitators for Socratic Dialogues even after his retirement. Grete Henry-Hermann became professor of philosophy and physics in the Pädagogische Hochschule (as above) in Bremen, where, like Gustav Heckmann, she worked in teacher education. She was engaged in politics of education and was president of the PPA from 1961 to 1978. Another former PPA President, Erna Blencke (1896–1990), who had been a pupil of Leonard Nelson and teacher in Gymnasium (grammar schools) in Frankfurt am Main and in Hannover, was also engaged in the resistance work and emigrated between 1938 and 1951, becoming Director of the Heimvolkshochschule for adult education (a Folk High School similar to the residential centres found in Denmark) in Springe near Hannover. I think the main idea of pedagogical work is expressed in the movement's formula of the 'Self-Confidence of reason' ('Selbstvertrauen der Vernunft'); that means autonomy, the effort of thinking for oneself, trying to think clearly and precisely, feeling responsible for what is going on in society and finding out solutions in the community of 'Selbst Denkenden' or Free Thinkers: those who don't follow any other authority than what they find out within their own thinking.

Some from the Nelson circle were engaged in the movement against atomic energy and the atomic bomb, in Amnesty International and later in the peace movement. For instance, Gustav Heckmann and his wife Charlotte were very politically aware and active throughout their lives. Gustav Heckmann gave good reasons for peace-making on a non-violent basis, following the model of Gandhi.

Today, in our circle, there are two lines of engagement: conferences about political questions , particularly about basic values and their actual importance and application, and the organization and carrying out of Socratic Dialogues in different contexts.

Why are Socratic Dialogues extremely democratic institutions? Socratic Dialogue is not only a method, it is a concentration of

democratic values and virtues. Socratic Dialogue is opposed to any form of dogmatic thinking, opposed to fundamentalism and to any use of violence – except the "forceless force of the better argument" (Habermas[1]). Socratic Dialogues are also not compatible with indifference concerning questions of social and individual life: everybody is concerned with these questions, but also everybody is obliged to give an answer to those questions in a reasonable way. Socratic Dialogues are based on the supposition that everybody has the ability to think – it is not a matter of IQ or of the status of being a professor at a university. Politics has to be regarded from a moral point of view, not only as a question of power or authoritative decision.

Socratic Dialogues reflect these democratic values on different levels:

(1) they give the opportunity to discuss with other people political subjects which are fundamental and/or actual;
(2) they realize democratic values in the way Socratic Dialogues are conducted: equality, respect for each other, liberty of opinion, tolerance etc.;
(3) following the rules of Socratic Dialogues the participants get the experience of these values in practice, especially discussing issues in a non-authoritarian and non-dogmatic way;
(4) the main methodological point of the Socratic method is the 'maieutic': the spiritual 'midwife' helps to bring out people's own thoughts, to put them into words and to test and validate them. This experience is well suited to encourage not only further reflection, but also participative activities in civil society.

Many of our Socratic facilitators endeavour to realize these very aims under the conditions of civil society today, in different sectors and institutions. It is very important to have a training in philosophizing, especially for young people in schools. For philosophizing is an aid to becoming a responsible member of society, the importance of which you cannot under-estimate. There are not many places and occasions in society where you are allowed to express your own thoughts without

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[1] Habermas, J., 'Vorbereitende Bemerkungen zu einer Theorie der kommunikativen Kompetenz', in: Habermas, J. and Luhmann, N., *Theorie der Gesellschaft oder Sozialtechnologie: Was leistet die Systemforschung?*, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1971, p.137.

negative consequences, to reflect and discuss your opinions free from pressure, with the aim of searching for truth and 'the right', and discovering your own judgements. So, Socratic Dialogues contribute to developing what we call in German the 'mündigen Bürger' and the 'mündige Bürgerin' – the model of the citizen of Socrates and Kant.

Paolo Dordoni and Stan van Hooft

Socratic Dialogue and Medical Ethics

A Brief Overview of the Field of Bioethics

Civil society embraces policy debate on a large range of issues that touch upon the deepest value commitments of citizens. One of these is bioethics. Most people understand bioethics to concern itself with questions that arise from advances in medical technology. Advances, such as artificial respiration machines, create new situations where decisions relating to life or death have to be made. The question of when a life support technology might be turned off did not arise when no such technologies existed. Again, the new technologies of stem cell research, xenotransplantation, and genetic engineering raise a host of questions. Moreover, there are perennial questions relating to abortion and to euthanasia. In all such cases the nature and value of human life is at issue. Also at issue is the need to develop public policy and law so that medical practitioners and other clinicians can have guidance in the context of these new difficulties. These issues require public and political debate, and it remains an open question as to how Socratic Dialogues involving clinicians would constitute mechanisms by which such issues could enter the arena of public debate and consensus-formation so as to shape a moral consensus within civil society.

However, there is another area of concern included in a broader conception of what bioethics might encompass, which is clearly amenable to development through Socratic Dialogue: namely, the definition and development of virtue in clinicians. The way in which clinicians approach their patients and the quality of clinician-patient interactions are matters which fall outside the scope of public policy (although minimal requirements defined as 'duty of care' are set in law) and which often fall outside the scope of clinical training programs. Methodical reflection of the kind encouraged by Socratic Dialogue may

be an effective means of developing more understanding of, and commitment to, the virtues that should mark the professional life of a clinician. This, in turn, may lead to patient satisfaction and general improvements in the health care sector, which would benefit civil society.

This thesis was illustrated in a workshop, which included a very brief Socratic Dialogue. This 'mini-Dialogue' was then followed by a brief methodological survey of approaches to bioethics leading to an attempt at defining the scope of the usefulness of Socratic Dialogue in the fields of bioethics and medical ethics.

Description of the Mini-Dialogue

The question for the workshop Dialogue was: "When is a clinical relationship successful?" In order not to lose time choosing an example, the following example had already been prepared by the example-giver:

Context of the example:

> "Some weeks ago I had an inflammation in my right eye. I was worried because I had to drive the following day for several hours. I had planned a working holiday. I decided to call an emergency number to find out where was the nearest available oculist. I had already fixed an appointment with my regular oculist, but it was for the following week."

Situation:

> "The oculist told me I that I didn't have anything serious, but only an inflammation and gave me some medicine. Moreover, he suggested that I take an optometric test. I often used to use glasses, but because I had been getting headaches, I didn't use them anymore. He found that my sight had grown worse and he told me to come another time with my old glasses so that he could prescribe new ones for me. The new glasses, he suggested, should not be very different from the old ones. During the visit he was very nice; he gave me time to understand his explanations and instructions. We talked also, briefly, of Italy and Spain."

Decision:

> "I decided to have new glasses"

This would seem to be a very simple example, not too emotional, without particular conflict or dilemma, in which it isn't difficult for participants to put themselves in the shoes of the example-giver (hereafter referred to as 'P'). At this stage of the Dialogue P didn't make explicit his own judgement of the situation in relation to the Dialogue question, though it may be presumed from the fact that the example was offered in relation to the Dialogue question, that P thought that this clinical relationship had been successful.

Considerations emerging during the clarification of the example:

- for some months P had also been having headaches as a complementary problem in his clinical history;
- P was successful in gaining an emergency appointment: he had a clinical problem and so had the possibility to have an appointment the same day;
- the oculist assured him the inflammation wasn't serious and gave him medicine;
- even though the visit was for an emergency (the inflammation), P also mentioned his problems with headaches;
- the oculist suggested that P should take an optometric test;
- thanks to this optometric test, P realized his sight had worsened;
- the oculist suggested new glasses;
- the oculist gave him good explanations and time to understand his advice. At the end of the visit they had a nice talk.

Once the example was clarified, the workshop group showed a certain scepticism about the success of this particular clinical relationship. Some participants, for instance, suggested that the cause of P's headaches could have been different from that of his problems with sight. It seemed that there wasn't any clinical evidence to connect headaches with the need for new glasses. Some surmised that the consultation of the oculist could have been simply an effort to achieve his own economic interests in selling more glasses. The kindness and niceness of the oculist was not sufficient to guarantee the validity of his diagnosis. Taking into account this peculiar consideration, we could have discussed, for instance, the role that medical criteria play in the success of a clinical relationship. Are the medical criteria the most important? If so, why?

The group also reflected on how this clinical relationship showed the disparity of knowledge and power between the actors involved in this

situation (a health care professional and a patient) as well as the trust that is often implied in such a relationship. There was no opportunity to discuss these suggestions more deeply and it would certainly have been interesting to have considered the peculiarities of the clinical relationship. A patient needs reasons in order to choose a course of action, but, at the same time, hasn't the clinical knowledge to judge the validity of these reasons. On the other hand, the clinician tends to justify his or her own diagnosis, prognosis, and treatment with certain reasons. What kinds of reasons are offered in a successful clinical relationship and how can they be successfully communicated and explained?

The example led the group to see the situation from the patient's point of view, taking into account the peculiar act of trust involved in the relationship. In this sense, what are the most important factors that enable a clinical relationship to be successful? What kind of ethical presuppositions are implicit in a successful clinical relationship, and what kinds of virtues and attitudes are evinced by the clinician? Here the role is played more by the *manner* of reasoning and discussing on the part of the clinician than by the objective reasons and arguments offered.

During the discussion, another participant suggested that the group focus its attention on the specificity of our question. If we are looking for 'when' a clinical relationship is successful, we have to discover the chronological point at which the relationship becomes successful. In the example, for instance, it could have been the moment when P decided to have new glasses. In response to this the facilitators clarified to the other participants that the expression "when" could be also utilised in a general way and, in this Dialogue, was intended as "under which circumstances". Nevertheless, the analysis of the moment of decision could have been fruitful to uncover all the presuppositions implicit in it.

As often occurs in a Socratic Dialogue, once the example was clarified, the group started immediately to discuss it, making explicit its ideas and presumptions, and not considering the judgement of P as its starting point. Nevertheless, thanks to the intervention of one participant, the group decided to ask P to make explicit his own judgements. Here is his judgement with some of his reasons:

This clinical relationship was successful for P because:

- I understood the advice;
- I had the impression that I was understood;
- I was not considered just as a pair of eyes;
- the oculist gave me time to understand his reasons.

For P it was clear that the reasons for the success of this clinical relationship were various. A central role is played by P's understanding both the advice and the reasons. Another is played by the time that P has been given to recognising the plausibility of the clinician's information. A further reason is the manner of the clinician's acting: "I wasn't considered just as a pair of eyes". In a full length Socratic Dialogue, the group might have been encouraged to choose one of these reasons in order to discuss it more deeply. Here the facilitators limited themselves to listing them because there were only two hours in which to work, and the objective was limited to giving a picture of the Socratic Dialogue's potential for encouraging clinical sensitivity.

Accordingly, once P's judgement in the example had been highlighted, the following question was posed: "where is the success in this relationship?" Here are the different points that the participants found relevant as answers to this question:

- availability of the appointment;
- P gained reassurance;
- P decided to get glasses;
- the oculist suggested further tests;
- the oculist gave P time to understand;
- P understood the oculist's explanation and trusted his advice;
- the oculist was nice.

Thanks to their particular points of view, the participants (some of whom were medical practitioners), were able to use these specific answers to the question of where the success of this clinical encounter lay. This enabled them to move on to the more general question of what such success consists in for clinical relationships more generally. So it was agreed that, on the basis of this example, such success is indicated by:

- the availability of the clinician;
- the reassurance of the patient's fears;
- the clinician's ability to promote the patient's own decision-making;
- the disposition of the clinician to go beyond the immediate needs of the patient;
- the time offered to the patient for explication and acting.

While much more time could have been given to a discussion of these suggestions with reference to the example, given the pressure of time the facilitators then suggested that the group move to a level of higher generality by asking the Dialogue question: "when is a clinical relationship successful?" The answers were the following:

A1 When the patient is cured.
A2 When the patient feels understood.
A3 When the patient feels informed.
A4 When both sides feel satisfied.

Not all these answers flow directly from the discussion of the example. A1 introduces an entirely new and more objective criterion. And it seems that the criteria of niceness and kindness highlighted earlier are not sufficient to establish a good clinical relationship. On the other hand, in points A2, 3, and 4, feelings do play an important role.

While the distinction between objective and subjective criteria might have been a matter that deserved more discussion, the time for the Socratic discussion was over quickly. However, this too brief discussion does demonstrate that in an apparently simple example like this one, there is a lot of content to analyse, content that bioethicists normally don't take into consideration, because, in bioethics as debated in civil society, attention is limited to dramatic cases which are peculiarly conflictual.

Socratic Dialogue and Bioethics Methodologies

This summary report of the mini-Dialogue already shows how many issues and questions can be generated by such a discussion. It is interesting to contrast, not only the differing topics that are amenable to the Socratic approach to discussing bioethical issues, but also the differing methodologies inherent in the Socratic approach on the one hand, and in the more usual and traditional approaches that professional ethicists use on the other.

In clinical bioethics there are many methodologies. For example, when discussing a clinical case one could focus on the principles involved in it. In bioethics these principles are usually four: beneficence, autonomy, non-maleficence, and justice. This approach is usually called

principlism and it is mainly used to provide a common framework for moral judgement and decision-making. Most clinicians and ethicists have interpreted this approach in a deductive way: they would deduce what should be done from the relevant principles. In relation to the Dialogue example, this would have led to such questions as: 'has the clinician acted beneficently?'; 'has she respected the autonomy of the patient?'; 'has she acted rightly and non-maleficently?'

Another methodology is the *casuistic* one. In this method, the clinician tries to align the case in question with some other similar paradigmatic cases that are in a certain degree analogous to this one, and then tries to see if the maxims of action exemplified in those other cases are applicable to the case in question. If we compare this approach with the deductive interpretation of principlism, here the ethicist or clinician is not considering principles as an *a priori* general framework in which to consider a clinical case but is looking for an *a posteriori* maxim of action drawn as a generalisation from actions or decisions in other cases. It will be seen that the Socratic Dialogue approach is consistent with casuistry so understood. What is offered is an example of a possible successful clinical encounter and then the criteria that made it successful are uncovered. These in turn can guide action for other cases. However, while casuistry will try to elicit maxims from a number of cases, Socratic Dialogue focuses on only one.

Another approach considers the specific way in which a *case history* is narrated. This approach takes seriously the case history of a person, as well as the meanings that this person attributes to the events of the case. Different agents, whether they be clinicians, patients, or the patients' families, narrate a case in different ways and sometimes conflicts of value arise from the differing ways in which the stories are told. Who tells the story and how? Who are the recipients of the stories? A narrative approach does not consider ethical problems presented in a clinical case impartially or in an abstract way, but considers them within the same context in which they have their origin and are developing. Here the similarities with Socratic Dialogue are evident because, in a Dialogue, the example is a narrative offered by the example-giver and developed further by the group.

Another approach is the *phenomenological* one. This approach takes into consideration the subjective ways of living the experience of illness, distinguishing that dimension of the self which relates to the experience of health. This approach does not look for ethical solutions so much as for new aspects which need to be considered in the story. Socratic

Dialogue often echoes this approach in the questions that participants ask of the example-giver.

A *virtue approach*, on the other hand, will centre attention on clinicians' ways of acting and on the role that attitudes and implicit knowledge play in their decisions and actions. A virtue approach centres attention on the promotion of excellence and on the role of education. It does not focus on the act, but on the agent, not on the consequences or on the duties, but on the character and moral quality of the agent. What considerations count as important in the deliberation of this clinician? When one deliberates on a clinical case, one considers it in a common discourse, and tries to enrich one's knowledge of it taking into account its complexities and the contribution of others, both from a factual point of view and from an ethical one. A virtuous clinician looks for prudential reasons to make decisions that are more responsible. Such a clinician is also sensitive to the needs of patients and to their suffering.

All of these bioethical methodologies are useful in a clinical context. They have offered us the language of principles and consequences, of virtue and vices, of values and facts, and, as such, they have defined the discourse of bioethics.

The question is then: what kind of perspective is offered to us in a Socratic Dialogue? In a Socratic Dialogue one can discuss principles, maxims, stories, virtues, and values, as well as the inner experiences of patients and of those who have to make difficult clinical decisions. But, most importantly, a Socratic Dialogue realizes a collective process of reasoning which allows for all of these approaches to be debated within the plurality and difference which is characteristic of a civil society. Is Socratic Dialogue then only a syncretistic methodology? No, it is more than this. It is an opportunity to consider not only our decisions in the context of the rationality and principles which should underlie them, but also to reflect on the influences that have, in fact, impacted upon them. Life is usually more complex than the theoretical constructions of formal ethics would allow. Socratic Dialogue uncovers the full complexity of ethical decision-making without confining itself to the partial visions that formal methodologies would impose. As such, the sustained reflection and discussion which it encourages are a singularly powerful means for developing in clinicians the sensitivities and insights which are required for them to make sound and ethical decisions in the clinical context. These insights, in turn, can be contributed to bioethical debates in civil society.

Beate Littig

Socratic Dialogue as a New Means of Participatory Technology Assessment?

The Case of Xenotransplantation

Introduction

Xenotransplantation (XTP), or animal-to-human transplantation, involves the transplantation of animal organs, tissues or cells into humans. Like many developments in modern medicine, science and technology, XTP brings enormous opportunities, but is also associated with new risks and major ethical problems.[1] Ethical questions of new technologies challenge our existing decision-making procedures. The questions in this context are not only: who is going to decide? And on what basis are we going to decide? But also in which way can we debate these complex issues? Who can legitimately discuss and resolve ethical problems of science and technology? Is it sufficient only to include professionals (including bioethics experts) or do we need a broader ethical debate, which also involves other actors in the field including the concerned public and/or civil society.[2] Furthermore, if a broad public discourse on the ethical problems of modern science and technology is both necessary and desirable, how can these questions be debated and resolved, and what decision-making procedures can be used to resolve ethical questions?

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1 See Bonss, W., *Vom Risiko, Unsicherheit und Ungewißheit in der Moderne*, Hamburg, Hamburger Edition, 1995.

2 See Joss, S., 'Public participation in science and technology policy – and decision making – ephemeral phenomenon or lasting change', *Science and Public Policy*, Vol.26, No.5, Oct 1999, pp.290–294.

This paper gives a description of an international research project, which introduces and evaluates a well-established method for resolving ethical issues – the Neo-Socratic Dialogue (NSD) – into debates on technological risks in modern societies.[3] The NSD can be traced back to the form of Socratic Dialogue developed by Leonard Nelson in the 1920s.[4] The issues under discussion in this project are ethical questions of XTP. Thus the project has a two-fold goal. On the one hand the project partners are interested in the many ethical questions of XTP. On the other hand, they are also interested in the problem of how to discuss these questions in democratic societies.

The following sections will give a short overview of these ethical problems and on NSD as a new means of Participatory Technology Assessment (PTA). Furthermore, the paper will present an outline of the above-mentioned research project and some preliminary results on NSDs already held.

Ethical Questions of Xenotransplantation

Xenotransplantation, like many developments in modern science and technology, is associated with new risks and raises a number of major ethical problems.[5] Whilst XTP could help solve the shortage of organs from human donors and save the lives of many patients waiting for transplantation,[6] there is a serious risk that viruses which cause animal diseases might cross the species barrier and spread through human populations.

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3 The project entitled 'Increasing Public Involvement in Debates on Ethical Questions of Xenotransplantation' is financed by the European Commission.

4 Nelson, L., 'The Socratic Method', in *Socratic Method and Critical Philosophy: Selected Essays by Leonard Nelson,* New York, Dover, 1965. Original: *Die sokratische Methode,* 1922, in: Nelson, L., *Gesammelte Schriften,* Vol. 1, Hamburg, Meiner, 1970, pp.269–316.

5 Melo, H., Brandao, C., Rego, G. and Nunes, R.., 'Ethical and legal Issues in Xenotransplantation', in *Bioethics,* Vol. 15, Nos.5–6, 2001, pp.427–442.

6 By the end of 1997, the waiting lists for transplantation in selected European countries amounted to: kidneys 30,392, heart 1,853, liver 1,755, lung 705, heart-lung 319, kidney and pancreas 267, pancreas 197. Figures include: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Luxembourg, Ireland, North-Italy, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain and UK (ETCO: 2000).

Ethical questions of XTP still to be resolved include:

- Is it in principle acceptable (for reasons of religious beliefs, cultural values and animal welfare) to use animals to provide organs and tissues for transplantation into human beings?
- Which animals could be used (primates or non-primates)?
- Is it acceptable to save the life of an individual whilst putting at risk health care professionals, relatives and the general population?
- Is it acceptable to restrict the individual freedom of xenograft recipients to protect public health?
- Is it acceptable to neglect alternative approaches to solving the donor organ shortage and to invest limited research resources into a technology, the success of which is highly insecure?

EU member states vary considerably in the public awareness and discussion of XTP. While some countries have already set up expert commissions to investigate the problems of XTP and have started to issue related guidelines – e.g. for the UK, for the Netherlands and for Germany – many other countries have yet to address XTP.

Apart from the lack of a well-developed public debate on the ethical issues raised by XTP, a basic and still unresolved problem in many modern societies is: who can legitimately discuss and resolve ethical problems of science and technology? Is it sufficient only to include professional bioethicists or do we need a broader ethical debate, which also involves other actors in the field including the concerned public? Furthermore, if a broad public discourse on the ethical problems of modern science and technology is both necessary and desirable, how can these questions be debated and resolved, and what decision-making procedures can legitimately be used to resolve ethical questions?

As an answer to the questions of participation in the decision on new biotechnologies so-called citizen panels or consensus conferences have been carried out in many countries worldwide.[7] These instruments usually do not focus on the ethics of new biotechnologies alone, but include social, economic, and other aspects as well. The conferences involve a small number of randomly chosen lay people, who are informed by experts on the above-mentioned aspects. The result of the citizens' panels or consensus conferences is a report/general statement of the lay people's forum on the technology at stake. The project XENO

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7 For example, Joss, S., Durant, J. (eds.), *Public Participation in Science: The Role of Consensus Conferences in Europe*, London, Science Museum, 1995.

differs in several aspects from the consensus conferences: firstly, it focuses on ethical problems alone; secondly, it does not include randomly selected lay-people but stakeholders of XTP, i.e. people who are by profession or personal involvement (patients and relatives) interested in XTP.

Representativeness of the general public is not a goal of XENO, however, interests of the general public are included via representatives of animal welfare groups, patient groups etc. The NSD aims to provide an ethical training for opinion leaders, decision makers and stakeholders on XTP, who are in most cases philosophical/ethical lay-people. With the NSD the participants in the Dialogue have the opportunity to develop systematically their own ethical standpoint on XTP on their own and together with others.

The Neo-Socratic Dialogue (NSD)

An NSD is an enquiry into ideas. It was originally meant to find consensus on some topic through a joint deliberation and weighing-up of arguments. The dialogue aims at visioning, explaining values and clarifying fundamental concepts. It implies a systematic investigation of our assumptions, reasons and viewpoints, and a co-operative testing of their validity. In the Dialogue, participants attempt to formulate legitimate principles and develop a shared and inspiring perspective.[8]

A second aim of the NSD is to learn to have a dialogue instead of a discussion. This requires adequate command of a number of dialogical roles, skills and attitudes, especially suspending judgements and keeping a balance between taking up a position and resigning it. Both aims are intimately connected to the development of strategy, organizational learning and knowledge management.

An NSD is focused on a single fundamental ethical question. An NSD is applied to a concrete experience of one of the participants, which is made accessible to all other participants. Systematic reflection upon this experience is accompanied by a search for shared judgements

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8 Heckmann, G., 'Erfahrungen in philosophischen Hochschulseminaren', *Herausgegeben von der Philosophisch-Politischen Akademie*, Frankfurt am Main, Dipa-Verlag, 1993; Kessels, J., *Socrates op de markt: Filosofie in bedrijf*, Meppel/Amsterdam, Boom, 1997; also published in German as *Die Macht der Argumente*, Weinheim, Beltz, 2001.

and underlying reasons for these. In the case of xenotransplantation these question can be the following:

- To what extent does individual benefit justify collective risk?
- Do animals have rights?
- Should animals' rights restrict the right of humans to live? To what extent?
- Does the purpose for which animals are used make a difference (in diet, in transplantation)?
- Are humans allowed to blur the boundaries between the species?
- Are measures which could become necessary to protect public health in accordance with human rights?

In the XENO project, at the time of writing, two NSDs per country are planned in Austria, Germany and Spain and moderated by an authorised facilitator. A group of experts/stakeholders will participate in the NSD. These experts/stakeholders are: researchers (e.g. active in stem cell research, psychologists, sociologists, economists), physicians and other health care workers, representatives of patients and their relatives as well as representatives of self-help groups, government, firms, religious, environmental and animal rights groups, statutory and private health insurance.

Due to time restrictions the NSDs will be held in a one day session with a preparatory meeting in the evening before the NSD. The facilitator will have little time and will need to use 'accelerating strategies' to speed up the NSD (such as limiting the numbers of examples, focusing on common views and less on dissent, allow leading speakers, etc.) It also must be assured that the results gained in the NSD will be applied to the field of xenotransplantation at the end of the one-day session.

The following table gives an overview of the different steps of the research work:

Table 1 Working blocks of the proposed project

Working block no.	Title
1	Baseline Evaluation (Analysis of the Debate on XTP in Each Participating Country)
2	Analysis and Monitoring of International Debate
3	NSD
4	Evaluation of NSD
5	Final Report and Policy Options
6	Dissemination of Results of NSD and Project Results

The project will last for two years. It will be carried out by several scientific institutes in Austria, Germany and Spain.[9]

Preliminary Results and Considerations

At the time of writing, two Austrian NSDs have taken place (with more being planned for Spain and Germany). Both dialogues were dedicated to the question: "Which risk may we take?" Based on the discourse analysis of XTP in the three project countries (working block one), this question turned out to be crucial for the ethics of XTP. The evaluation of the Dialogues is not finished yet, but some general remarks on the two Dialogues can be made now.

The second Austrian NSD was different from the first one. It was much more difficult to engage people in the NSD and in a discussion on ethical questions. Participants were (contrary to the first NSD) rather reluctant to evaluate the question of the Dialogue "Which risks may we take?" from their own personal experience and values. They stuck to their expertise and the ideal of 'objective' quantitative risk assessment and did not come up with a final statement to these questions stemming from the discussion of the everyday example. Therefore we were unable to introduce such a final statement into a debate of ethical questions of

[9] The Socratic facilitators are Paolo Dordoni (in Spain) Horst Gronke (in Germany) and Beate Littig (in Austria).

XTP at the end of the Dialogue. In the first Dialogue the participants agreed on a common statement of how to deal with collective risks and individual benefits, which could then be applied to the XTP field.

Although we would have wished that the second NSD worked as smoothly as the first one and was as clearly successful as the first, we nevertheless think it was a valuable experience which will help us to learn more about the use and preconditions of the methodology in our context.

It seems extremely important to include participants who are open-minded. This means that participants should be able and willing to question in a discussion with others their *own* standpoints and values. They should also be willing to rethink and evaluate their standpoints and values from their own personal experience and not from textbook theories. Such people should come not only from the XTP field in the narrow sense, but additionally people who work in the field of bioethics should be included. (We also had very good participation and contributions from a politician from the Green Party, whom we invited for the first NSD). In our view the participants of the first NSD were open-minded, especially the opinion leaders of the first Dialogue.

It is important to stress that the NSD on the ethics of XTP is not a discussion on risk assessment but a Dialogue on *ethical* questions and problems of XTP. Therefore, we think it necessary to give a short introduction at the beginning of the Dialogue on general ethical questions, e.g. what distinguishes ethical questions from knowledge-questions and what are the differences in approaching them? This information is necessary since the participants are not familiar with the NSD. In many cases they are not even familiar with the ethics of XTP, even though many of them work directly in the field of XTP.

The first Dialogue (and the responses of the participants) showed that the NSD can be a promising instrument for stakeholders to deal with the ethics of XTP. But as we learned from our second Dialogue certain preconditions have to be fulfilled so that the NSD works. Above all the participants have to be informed about the NSD properly. Professional experts especially need to know what is expected from them as participants, namely to express personal views, experiences and values and be willing to question them, which is totally different from their usual professional experience.

The further evaluation of the two Austrian NSDs (the analysis of 'before' and 'after' questionnaires and interviews of the participants and the transcription of the audio tapes of the Dialogues) will be compared

with the German and Spanish NSDs and will clarify the further preconditions of successful NSDs in this kind of setting. Additionally, the evaluation results will help us to think about a methodological mix (e.g. a consensus conference with an integrated NSD) to push ahead participatory methods of technology assessment.

For further information contact Dr Beate Littig, Institute for Advanced Studies, A-1060, Vienna, littig@ihs.ac.at

Gale Prawda and Peter Rickman

Philosophy for the Public: Dialogue and the Café Philo

Introduction

Far from being only an academic subject, philosophy is an integral part of being human. Because we naturally ask questions and make choices, we are all propelled into philosophy and only differ in the distance each of us goes towards the systematic reflection that is the aim of professional philosophy.

Philosophic questioning can take many forms, all of which supplement each other. There are informal discussions, guided debates (as in Café Philosophy and Socratic Dialogue), symposia with selected speakers, and what might be called the 'inquisitional approach' where someone's assertion is searchingly examined for its presumptions. There is, finally, the sustained monologue.

Café Philosophy

Café Philosophy, as a method of enquiry, was developed in France in 1992. The café setting is a public forum in which people gather together to share their thoughts on a particular topic over a friendly drink. During an enquiry, which is guided by a moderator, participants can examine their own assumptions along with those of others in a group. Using a

Socratic *maieutic* approach[1], ideas that were previously only latent or unquestioned in a person's mind are brought to the forefront of consciousness and explored.

Café Philo

Café Philos (otherwise known as Philosophy Cafés) have sprung up throughout the world in the past couple of years. The Café Philo originally started in 1992 with Marc Sautet and several friends who got together to discuss various issues of the day at the now famous Café des Phares at the Place de la Bastille in Paris. Since then every Sunday morning people would gather together to discuss various topics ranging from the classical to the absurd (for example: 'is hope a violent thing?', 'the Santa Claus myth', 'what is a fact?', and so on). The Cafés extended to others in Paris and throughout France (about 150 now), as well as internationally (about 150) in countries such as Japan, USA, England, South America, Germany and Belgium.

Why the Attraction to a Café Philo?

Its basic principle is to make philosophy accessible to all by trying to revive the spirit of the Socratic period in Athens when philosophers would dialogue publicly in the 'polis'. The café as a public forum is a friendly place where people gather together and discuss ideas collectively over a cup of coffee. You could consider it as a 'community salon'.

What is a Café Philo?

As an organized debate in a public place, a Café Philo aims at establishing a philosophical exchange, democratically distributing the right to speak amongst the participants. It strives to induce 'philosophic moments', to pass from simple opinion to critical thought, to analyse concepts communally and to decode the various meanings, in the form of a collective search on a particular subject.

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[1] The term *maieutic* (originally Greek for 'obstetric' but used figuratively by Socrates) refers to the Socratic method of 'midwifery', that is the practice of using Socratic method to bring ideas to the forefront of consciousness that were previously latent in the mind.

Basic rules for a Café Philo

- The subject arises from the participants' suggestions and is chosen by the moderator.
- There is no given *a priori*: only in the discussion of the subject can its philosophical character be determined.
- The moderator, attentive to listening, uses his or her knowledge to give guidance to the discussion/debate and enhances the development of the analysis with the participant.
- Each person listens while the other is speaking.
- Course-type, conference, or lecture renditions are discouraged, as is 'coffee hour small talk'.

Basic principles underlying Café Philo

- It is open to everyone.
- Freedom of thought is encouraged regardless of socio-economic background.
- It is a free public place where universal subjects can be discussed by the most diverse participants.
- It is a place beyond the limitations of money, power, and preaching (proselytizing).

Why a Café Philo?

Here is the real challenge to philosophy. By inducing debates in the public arena, can philosophy do what it sets out to do: can it break down people's prejudices based upon general beliefs by inducing them to thinking philosophically (critically)?

Café Philos are vital both socially and politically. They provide the free space for people to gather together to think things out, collectively as well as individually, away from dominating influences. They also allow people to develop their thinking skills and start questioning various aspects of life and how to change them.

Philos Magazine

This magazine was created as a unifying instrument for the various Café Philos. It reports on various café discussions and updates the lists of new Café Philos worldwide. It acts as a central register, serving as a directory of café Philos, as well as organizing international conventions. The Philos Association promotes the creation of Café Philos nationally as

well as internationally and contributes to this development by sending experienced moderators to help with starting up. For further information, see the websites www.philos.org and www.philodialogue.com

Critique: The Need for Sustained Reflection

It needs emphasizing that dialogue is only one step – often the first step – into serious philosophizing. A further step is some serious reading. The novice might start with some histories of philosophy, which provide an overview and point the reader to areas which might specially interest him. The next step – and it is of vital importance – is to tackle some great philosophic texts, to expose oneself, that is, to the thinking of a major philosopher. (This is not peculiar to philosophy. If, for example you really want to learn about tennis, it is not sufficient to pat a ball across the net in the local park. You want to see great players in action.) Such philosophical texts can be difficult and the student may need commentaries or the help of a tutor.

Serious philosophizing requires sustained thought, aiming at a systematic connection between ideas which crop up in debate or in the challenges of life. One needs to remember that Plato, in his maturity, turned from his Socratic dialogues which immortalized his master's methods – and which, incidentally, are not quite like the Dialogue form introduced by Nelson – to the Platonic monologue. Plato's *Symposium* presents a number of coherent speeches on one topic – love – and this gave the name to a form of procedure to this day. His other masterpiece *The Republic* starts with dialogue but even early contributions which challenge a positive concept of justice take the form of sustained argument and after that we get a massive, systematically argued, exposition of Plato's concept of justice which constitutes the bulk of the book.

To conclude: human beings naturally pose philosophic questions worrying about justice, the meaning of life and so on. Dialogue can bring to the surface and intensify these questions and whet the appetite for more, but serious philosophizing one must remember – is a job for a lifetime.

Postscript

> If *all* that Western civilization offers is freedom, then it is a civilization bent on its own destruction.
>
> Roger Scruton[1]

People have always been willing to volunteer for associations of various kinds. The Friendly Societies and the London Corresponding Society, founded in the early days of the Industrial Revolution of 18th century England, originated in the civil society of the day as a collective response to a pressing social need. There is reason for a revival of civil society in the 21st century if the lifeworld of ordinary people is in danger of colonisation by big business, if not the big state. The extent to which it is possible to unite in a common cause or purpose, to identify a set of deep values and norms that we can all share, is a moot point, however. We are warned in two aphorisms, on the other hand, that 'the price of freedom ever was eternal vigilance', and that 'once lost, precious freedoms are hard to regain'.

Civil society actions may take a political or non-political form. Alongside the mass political anti-globalization and campaigning protest movements there are plenty of examples of grassroots initiatives and local small-scale alternatives springing up everywhere these days which challenge big business, such as community co-operatives, farmers markets, local 'car-free days' and 'buy nothing days'.[2]

The 'third sector' is surely a misnomer. Civil society is the first, not the third sector, especially if we include in it the guardians and shapers of social norms, values and ethics in early life – our families and schools. The analogy of the balanced three-legged stool is an inappropriate and misleading analogy. Most would assume that the state was meant to exist for the benefit of society at large, rather than to be a burden on its

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1 Scruton, R., *The West and the Rest: Globalization and the Terrorist Threat*, London, Continuum Books, 2002, p.viii.

2 The civil society of Ithaca in the state of New York (population 28,000) has taken local matters into its own hands and transformed the life of the whole community. See www.ithacanews.org

citizens. Nor are states so impotent in the face of the globalization of economics. They still have sovereignty and can and do make economic choices affecting their own citizens and those in other countries offering cheap labour opportunities. By that same token, business which is embedded in society and dependent on it, on its goodwill, its trust, its moral and working energy, was meant to contribute to human flourishing and to furnish us with goods and services – to be our servant, not our master. It does not exist in a socio-political void. Contribution to the greater good, to human welfare, was originally meant to be an essential part of the deal.[3]

And further, never has a vibrant civil society, at both national and international levels, been so vital in today's high risk, conflict-ridden world. There has always been conflict and war but now weapons of mass destruction, suicide bombings and airliner hijackings are an ever-present threat. The year 2001 was the year of the September 11 Twin Tower terrorist attacks in New York. Ironically, 2001 was also the UN International Year of the Volunteer and the Year of Dialogue among Civilizations.

We think there will always be conflicts and competing views of the world – the 'clashes of civilizations', if you will. There is no fully coherent worldview of the common good. But it is not all conflict of interest. There is often a matter of pure misunderstanding through lack of the skills of articulation and communication, of regular opportunities for informal contact with the 'other'; not being fully appreciated oneself or not seeing the point of view of the other person or group. Formal and structured dialogue schemes may help with these problems.

Like democracy, formal dialogue is a tool, and not strictly an end in itself. It is one important means to achieving an active, ethically effective and vibrant civil society. Within limits it could help us to identify, define and realize our shared ends and values; help us decide what matters most to us, in what the ancients called 'the good life'.

Civil society has always been interdependent with institutions of the state, and the market. At the same time, the lifeblood of civil society (the oxygen of the voluntary sector), is its autonomy – its freedom and independence from interference. Civil society must also always strive to do its job responsibly with competence, integrity and conscientiousness, no-one would dispute. All sectors have their failings and there is always

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[3] The irony is that the limited liability company is a social and political privilege which exists only out of social and community agreement, out of a legal licence which was granted by the UK's 1862 Act.

the necessity for self-critique. Like the other sectors, civil society is also prone to its own failings. It harbours its own problems, inefficiencies and prejudices. By that same token, it also contains strengths.

The papers in this volume have pointed to the value of disciplined dialogue as a contribution to the development of a healthy civil society. But that is not all there is available to us. There is also the *written* word, solitary reading and quiet reflection. Self consciousness and self-critique by its proponents and facilitators is important in the practice of formal dialogue. SD has been a particular focus in the volume. Modern SD is itself always incomplete – in the struggle to close the gap between, for example, its ideals, such as the principle of equality among participants, and the imperfections of its practice.

Much needs to be done at all levels and in all sectors in the building and sustaining of a civilized society. There are no quick fixes. There are huge structural inequalities, as well as cultural blocks to full participation in society, preventing and discouraging many individuals and subgroups from contributing their views. Not everyone is willing and able to be party to the wider dialogue. Wider society is not a dialogue of equals; many, for example, are marginalized, excluded and discriminated against.

Structural inequality and social exclusion are a matter of concern for the sociologists Eva Gamarnikow and Anthony Green, in their critical essay on the statutory introduction of citizenship education into the school curriculum by the current UK government with its 'third way' politics.[4] For these authors government appears to "deflect responsibility" for social capital, for welfare problems and economic renewal, "delegating" their identification and solution to "the active citizenry".

Not all citizens have equal access to resources, including resources on offer in civil society. Many, such as the poor and the family carer, do not have the time and the energy, and access to the needed resources. Many lack the needed skills and confidence. To be publicly active citizens need supports. Many others do not have an interest in being so active.

Socrates tried to show his restless countrymen that to lose sight of the highest goal of the good life for all is fraught with moral peril. In the Athens of his day the pressing need, as he saw it, was for restraint. Socrates was anxious to avoid injustice in the conduct of his own life, the life over which he had some control. Volunteers in civil society are not saints, to be sure. For his biographer, Sampson, neither is Nelson

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[4] See their 'Citizenship, Education and Social Capital' in: Lawton, D., Cairns, J. and Gardner, R., *Education for Citizenship*, London, Continuum, 2000.

Mandela a saint. In his long years in prison, however, Mandela struggled with himself to become, as he often put it, "captain of his soul".[5]

Sometimes to fail to act at all is the worse moral outrage, as the parable of the Good Samaritan teaches us. We are reminded by Dana Villa[6] that the social and political detachment of Socrates was only a semi-detached alienation. If and when we ourselves are moved to act in civil society to lend a hand, to offer a service, we may be comforted, however, by Socrates' little demon perched on our shoulder warning us about the dire risks of intervention and the need for vigilance, the need to proceed cautiously if we are to avoid doing harm which we might later regret.

We muddle through and we are bound to keep getting it wrong, however good our intentions, because of our human frailty and because of the messiness and complexity of practice and action in an immensely difficult world, which often and painfully leads to undesired consequences. We think that is no reason for giving up trying. In this volume, we are trying to keep the debate open, the conversation going about ethics and dialogue. If we have managed that, then that is as much as we could have hoped for.

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5 Ranasinghe suggests that the story of Socrates has a particular interest for our own times. Socrates believed that "philosophical life is rooted in the polis" which is why, when facing the death penalty, he chose not to run away from Athens (Ranasinghe, N., *The Soul of Socrates,* Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2000, p.64). One can better understand the metaphor of the cave if we see Socrates as "passionately dedicated to elevating the polis from the subterranean state" (*ibid*, p.107).

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Contributors

Jens Peter Brune is a philosopher at the Freie Universität Berlin. He is a member of the GSP and PPA.

Hugh Busher is Senior Lecturer in the School of Education, University of Leicester, UK.

Paolo Dordoni is from Italy and is writing a doctoral thesis on Socratic Dialogue and clinical bioethics.

Ulrike Gromadecki studied physics and philosophy at the Freie and Humboldt Universities in Berlin, and is training to be a teacher.

Horst Gronke is from Berlin and founded the company 'pro argumentis', which specializes in consulting and Socratic Dialogue. He is a member of the board of the GSP.

Robert Hamilton is Senior Lecturer at the Department of Adult and Continuing Education, University of Glasgow.

Keith Hammond is a lecturer at the Department of Adult and Continuing Education, University of Glasgow. He is also a trustee of the SFCP.

Stan van Hooft is Associate Professor at Deakin University, Australia. He conducts Socratic Dialogues and organizes a monthly Philosophy Café in Melbourne.

Bärbel Jänicke works as a translator, mediator and Socratic facilitator in Berlin. She is a member of the consulting company 'pro argumentis' and also of the GSP.

Aneta Karageorgieva is a Professor of Epistemology at Sofia University in Bulgaria and a founder member of the Bulgarian Association for the Advancement of Philosophy with Children.

Dimitri Kletschko is Head of the Germanic Languages Department at Belarusian State University, consultant at the Belarusian Society of Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, and Belarusian co-ordinator of the German-Belarusian educational project.

Fernando Leal is Professor of Social Science at the University of Guadalajara, Mexico, and an Honorary Fellow of the SFCP. He is the founder of the Centre for the Study of Mexican Indigenous Languages and the Academy of Human Rights.

Beate Littig is a Senior Researcher at the Institute for Advanced Studies in Vienna, Austria, and lecturer in Sociology at the University of Vienna. She is a trained Socratic Facilitator.

Heidi Mason studied philosophy at the University of Essex, UK. She is a freelance writer and editor, working in philosophy, the social sciences, and international development.

Thomas Meyer is Professor of Political Science at the University of Dortmund, Germany. He is also Chair of the PPA.

Grazina Miniotaite is Senior Research Fellow at the Lithuanian Institute of Philosophy, Culture and Art.

Dorothy Moir is a trustee of the SFCP and an active member of BELMAS (British Educational Leadership, Management and Administration Society).

Karin Murris is a trained Socratic Dialogue facilitator and counsellor. She is a recognised philosophical trainer by the International Council for Philosophical Inquiry with Children (ICPIC).

Gale Prawda is a regular host of Café Philos and philosophical dinners in Paris and around the world. She also lectures in philosophy, business ethics, cross-cultural management and business strategy.

Gisela Raupach-Strey is a member of the PPA and GSP and works in teacher education at the Institute for Philosophy at the Martin Luther University, Halle-Wittenberg.

Volker Rendez is from Berlin and is a communication and team training coach engaged with the theory and practice of Socratic Dialogue.

Peter Rickman was formerly Visiting Professor of Philosophy at City University, London. He was a university teacher for 50 years.

Patricia Shipley trained as a psychologist after graduating in philosophy and theology. She is an Honorary Fellow of the SFCP and Emeritus Reader in Occupational Psychology at the University of London.

Ute Siebert works as a consultant in adult education in Germany and is a member of the PPA and GSP.

Lily Sparnaay is a freelance writer and editor in the Netherlands, and a member of the GSP.

Toshiro Terada is Associate Professor at Meiji Gakuin University in Japan, where he uses a form of Socratic-oriented dialogue.

Ugo Vlaisavljevic is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Sarajevo in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Director of the Studio for Philosophy, Social Sciences and Psychoanalysis.

Sabir Yücesoy is from Turkey and a member of the GSP.

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Die Lektion des Jahrhunderts
Ein philosophischer Dialog mit Riccardo Dottori
Gadamers Hermeneutik des suchenden Gesprächs ermöglicht vielen Disziplinen der Geistes- und Sozialwissenschaften, Wege des fachlichen Erkennens mit historischen Sichtweisen zu verknüpfen. Seit "Wahrheit und Methode" (1960) rühmt man die von ihm geleistete "Urbanisierung der Heideggerschen Provinz" (Habermas). Versteht Gadamer jede Aussage als Antwort auf eine Frage, so ist Leben als Dialog neu zu verstehen.
Bd. 2, 2. Aufl. 2003, 168 S., 15,90€, br., ISBN 3-8258-5049-8; 34,90€, gb., ISBN 3-8258-5768-9

Philosophie: Forschung und Wissenschaft

Hubertus Mynarek
Mystik und Vernunft
Das Buch ist in jedem seiner zahlreichen Kapitel der Beweis für die These, dass ohne Aufklärung, ohne Vernunft jede Mystik, jede Spiritualität und Religiosität blind und dumm wird, dass aber umgekehrt ohne Mystik und Spiritualität jede Aufklärung, jede Art von Vernunfterkenntnis flach, eng und schwachbrüstig, trocken und leblos, ja oft lebenszerstörend und menschenvernichtend wirkt. Deshalb stellt dieses Buch den großangelegten Versuch dar, die beiden für echtes menschliches Leben absolut notwendigen, scheinbar gegensätzlichen Pole – Mystik und Vernunft – einer tragfähigen und fruchtbaren Synthese zuzuführen. Der Autor – Philosoph, Theologe, Religionswissenschaftler – erarbeitet seine weit ausgreifenden, grenzüberschreitenden, den herkömmlichen Wissenschafts- und Vernunftbegriff erweiternden Perspektiven vor allem auf der Basis der Psycho- und Sozioanalyse, der Physik, der Technik und Technokratie sowie der Phänomenanalyse von Angst und Glauben. Mit diesem Werk werden die Türen für geistiges Neuland, für neue Ideen, für mentale Originalität und Kreativität weit aufgestoßen.
Bd. 1, 2. überarb. u. erw. Auflage 2001, 264 S., 20,90€, br., ISBN 3-8258-5312-8

Klaus Kornwachs
Logik der Zeit – Zeit der Logik
Eine Einführung in die Zeitphilosophie. Anhang mit Aufgaben/Lösungen
Der Versuch, Zeit zu verstehen, ist ein altes Problem der Philosophie. Zeiterfahrung und Zeitverständnis spielen sich auf mehreren unterschiedlichen Ebenen ab und man kann sich einem Zeitverständnis auf vielerlei Wegen zu nähern versuchen, nicht zuletzt durch genaue Beobachtung der eigenen Zeitwahrnehmung. Die – geistesgeschichtlich gesehen – jungen Naturwissenschaften haben viele neue Bausteine zu einem Zeitverständnis beigetragen und die Hilfsmittel hierfür sind immer abstrakter geworden. Eine Lösung der philosophischen Fragen nach Grund, Wesen und innerer Struktur der Zeit konnten auch sie noch nicht liefern.
Bd. 2, 2001, 424 S., 35,90€, br., ISBN 3-8258-4787-x

Norbert Kapferer
Die Nazifizierung der Philosophie an der Universität Breslau 1933 – 1945
Dem Schicksal der Philosophie an der Universität Breslau zwischen 1933 und 1945 widmet sich die auf Archivmaterial gestützte Arbeit Kapferers. Der Autor rekonstruiert den Verlauf der "Nazifizierung" und die damit einhergehende Zerschlagung einer durch jüdische Denker geprägten philosophischen Kultur. Ins Blickfeld geraten die Aktivitäten von NS-Organisationen und Hochschulinstitutionen wie die Initiativen von Rektoren, Dekanen, Direktoren und Professoren aus Breslau und anderen deutschen Universitätsstädten. Es begegnen sehr bekannte Namen wie Heidegger, Litt, Bollnow, Rothacker, Alfred Baeumler, Ernst Krieck etc. und längst in Vergessenheit geratene NS-Philosophen wie Karl Bornhausen (Redner bei der Bücherverbrennung) und August Faust (Sprachrohr des "Amtes

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Rosenberg" und Verfasser einer Philosophie des "totalen Krieges"). Deutlich wird, dass die nazifizierte Philosophie in Breslau unter der Führung von Faust eine nicht unbedeutende Rolle in der Universitätslandschaft des "III. Reiches" spielte. Eine exemplarische Studie zur "Machtergreifung".
Bd. 3, 2002, 272 S., 45,90 €, br.,
ISBN 3-8258-5451-5

Walter Schweidler
Das Unantastbare
Beiträge zur Philosophie der Menschenrechte
Würde und Rechte des Menschen: Mit diesen Begriffen bezeichnen wir das Verhältnis, aufgrund dessen sich die menschlichen von allen nichtmenschlichen Wesen unterscheiden. An der vernünftigen Verständigung über die Bedingungen der Aufrechterhaltung dieses Verhältnisses entscheiden sich die Konsistenz unserer Rechtssysteme, die interkulturelle Vermittelbarkeit unterschiedlicher Vorstellungen von Humanität und die Möglichkeiten des Brückenschlages zwischen Ethik und Politik.
Bd. 5, 2001, 264 S., 30,90 €, gb.,
ISBN 3-8258-5724-7

Harald Holz
Bewußtsein und Gehirn, eine philosophische Metareflexion
Erkenntnistheoretische und forschungslogische Erwägungen im Voraus zur einzelwissenschaftlichen Problemlage
In diesem Buch wird der Versuch unternommen, die hochkomplexe Problematik dessen, was heute unter dem Stichwort "Gehirn-Bewußtseins-Beziehung" behandelt wird, von einem neuen Denkansatz aus zu verstehen. Alle bisherigen Deutungen gingen entweder von einem monistischen oder aber von einem interaktionistischen Schema aus. Wird im ersten Fall der Begriff "Geist" auf materiale Bedingungen reduziert, so fristet im zweiten Fall dies "Geistige" eine merkwürdige Sonderexistenz von ähnlich gegenständlicher Natur wie das Materielle selbst, nur auf höherer Ebene. – Hier nun wird die Logik des "Entweder – Oder" aufgehoben zugunsten einer Sicht, die beide bisher als einander ausschließend gedachten Pole als Extremmomente eines in sich selber kontinuierlichen dynamischen Ganzen zu denken erlaubt. Das maßgebende Modell hierfür wurde vermittels einer entsprechenden philosophischen Analyse der Methode beim Aufbau der Funktionalstruktur des Infinitesimalkalküls gefunden. – Die so gewonnene Perspektive erlaubt, Gehirnaktivität und Reflexionsbewußtsein als Extreme eines Kontinuums, sofern man menschliche Wesenheit als solches auffaßt, zu deuten, zugleich aber dennoch dem Geist-Pol ein irreduzibles Eigengewicht zuzubilligen.
Bd. 6, 2001, 192 S., 20,90 €, br.,
ISBN 3-8258-5780-8

Theodor Leiber
Natur-Ethik, Verantwortung und Universalmoral
Es werden die Grundregeln einer universalisierbaren archekakopheugischen Minimalmoral formuliert, deren anthropozentrische Ausgangskonzeption in der Natur-Ethik systematisch auf die moralischen Probleme unseres Umgangs mit der (außermenschlichen) Natur ausgedehnt wird. Die entsprechenden anthropophysio-relationalen universalmoralischen Grundregeln bilden die Basis für einen modifizierten Grundrechtskatalog und dienen als Kriterien, um die in der zeitgenössischen Natur-Ethik vertretenen Naturschutzargumente auf ihre universal-moralische Verbindlichkeit hin zu überprüfen und daraus unterstützende Hinweise für eine Naturschutz-Pädagogik zu gewinnen.
Bd. 7, 2002, 296 S., 24,80 €, br.,
ISBN 3-8258-5368-3

Uwe Bernhardt; Friederike Denker; Hans Martin Dober (Hg.)
Rolf Denker: Hiob – oder die Schwere des Glücks
Ein philosophisches Lesebuch über Leben und Lebenlassen
In den hier versammelten Reden und Aufsätzen setzt sich ein Weisheits-Liebender mit der Bibel ebenso auseinander wie mit

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Kafka, ein Weisheits-Lehrer wagt sich an eine Deutung des Expressionismus ebenso wie an eine Interpretation der Träume Descartes'. Zwei Leitfragen ziehen sich wie Fäden durch das Gewebe dieser Texte. Die eine betrifft das erfahrene Leid. Deshalb ist auch dem Buch Hiob die Konstellation abzulesen, in der diese Beiträge ihren Zusammenhang finden. Die andere Frage betrifft das Verhältnis zum anderen Menschen. Eine mit Levinas radikal gefasste Ethik ist in diesem Band ebenso präsent wie der kulturtheoretische Anspruch der Psychoanalyse. Stets wird dabei die philosophische Anthropologie, wie Rolf Denker sie vertritt, auf die geschichtsphilosophische Signatur bezogen, in der die conditio humana ihre jeweilige Konkretion gewinnt.
Bd. 8, 2002, 152 S., 17,90 €, br.,
ISBN 3-8258-5990-8

Peter Gottwald
Zen im Westen – neue Lehrrede für eine alte Übung
Das Buch wendet sich an alle, die von der Zen-Lehre gehört haben, davon fasziniert sind und sich fragen, wie eine Integration dieser aus dem Buddhismus kommenden Tradition in die westliche wissenschaftlich-technische Welt möglich ist. Sein Schwerpunkt liegt in der Formulierung einer entsprechenden Lehrrede, seine Suche gilt darüber hinaus einer neuen Kultur. Das Buch zeigt Verbindungslinien auf zwischen der Zentradition und der Mystik, der Philosophie, der Psychologie, der Soziologie, der Psychiatrie, modernen erkenntnistheoretischen Versuchen und zum religiösen Bereich. Es geht um die gegenwärtige Möglichkeit, frei ein neues „Miteinander" zu üben.
Bd. 9, 2003, 224 S., 19,90 €, br.,
ISBN 3-8258-6734-x

Friedrich Rapp
Destruktive Freiheit
Ein Plädoyer gegen die Maßlosigkeit der modernen Welt
Charakteristisch für die moderne Welt ist der Wille zur Innovation. Auf dem Gebiet der Kultur ebenso wie in der Sphäre der Gesellschaft und der Technik wird die Aufhebung von Schranken und das Überschreiten von Grenzen als höchste Errungenschaft gefeiert. Doch dieses maßlose Freiheitsstreben stellt nicht nur eine Bereicherung und einen Fortschritt dar, es führt auch zum Verlust an Orientierung und Strukturierung und im Grenzfall zum Chaos. Im Sinne dieser These untersucht der Autor die theoretischen Prämissen, die zur gegenwärtigen Situation geführt haben, und diskutiert mögliche Anknüpfungspunkte für einen Wandel.
Bd. 10, 2004, 232 S., 17,90 €, br.,
ISBN 3-8258-7126-6

Christian Lavagno
Rekonstruktion der Moderne
Eine Studie zu Habermas und Foucault
Das Buch unternimmt den Versuch einer Rekonstruktion des philosophischen Diskurses der Moderne. Grundlage sind zwei bereits vorliegende (und konkurrierende) Entwürfe zu diesem Thema, der eine von Jürgen Habermas, der andere von Michel Foucault. Diese beiden Entwürfe werden sowohl für sich kritisch betrachtet als auch vergleichend gegenübergestellt. Am Ende des Vergleichs kristallisiert sich eine übergreifende Bestimmung der modernen Philosophie heraus, die – so der Anspruch des Buches – unabhängig von den verschiedenen Schulen den Kern modernen philosophischen Denkens freilegt.
Bd. 11, 2003, 272 S., 29,90 €, br.,
ISBN 3-8258-7173-8

H. Baum
Theorien sozialer Gerechtigkeit
Politische Philosophie für soziale Berufe
Soziale Gerechtigkeit – das erklärte Ziel sozialer Berufe – ist eines der am häufigsten zu hörenden Schlagwörter heutiger Politik. Zugleich ist Gerechtigkeit eines der frühesten und wichtigsten Themen der politischen Philosophie. Selbst die ältesten Beiträge zur Theorie sozialer Gerechtigkeit beinhalten dabei Informationen von bleibender Gültigkeit; ihre Kenntnis ist Voraussetzung für eine kritische Teilnahme an der gegenwärtigen Diskussion. Alle, auch die aktuellen

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Theorien sozialer Gerechtigkeit, weisen nachweislich eine formal-gleiche Argumentationsstruktur auf, die für ihr Verständnis Schlüsselbedeutung hat.
Bd. 15, 2004, 184 S., 17,90 €, br.,
ISBN 3-8258-7752-3

Sokratisches Philosophieren

Schriftenreihe der Philosophisch-Politischen Akademie (PPA) und der Gesellschaft für Sokratisches Philosophieren (GSP)
herausgegeben von Dieter Krohn, Barbara Neißer, Nora Walter †

Dieter Krohn; Barbara Neißer (Hg.)
Verständigung über Verständigung
Metagespräche über Sokratische Gespräche
Zur Methode des Sokratischen Gesprächs gehört als unverzichtbarer Bestandteil die Metakommunikation (Metagespräch.) Der Band enthält Beiträge zu unterschiedlichen Formen und Funktionen der Metakommunikation über das Sokratischen Gespräch. Verfahren und Bedeutung des teilnehmerorientierten Metagesprächs, des Analyse- und Strategiegespräches stehen im Zentrum der Darstellungen. Praxisberichte aus unterschiedlichen Anwendungsfeldern ergänzen den thematischen Schwerpunkt des Bands.
Bd. 8, 2004, 232 S., 19,90 €, br.,
ISBN 3-8258-6300-x

Gisela Raupach-Strey
Sokratische Didaktik
Die didaktische Bedeutung der Sokratischen Methode in der Tradition von Leonard Nelson und Gustav Heckmann
Sokratische Gespräche, wie sie seit den 20er Jahren in der Tradition von Leonard Nelson und Gustav Heckmann praktiziert werden, enthalten einen die antiken Sokrates-Dialoge nur partiell integrierenden Entwurf, den die Autorin als „Sokratisches Paradigma" in seinen konstitutiven Elementen darstellt, unter philosophischen, fach- und allgemeindidaktischen Aspekten näher untersucht und dessen Stärken für den Philosophie- und Ethik-Unterricht sowie diverse andere Lernkontexte sie aufzeigt. Erfahrungsbezogenes Philosophieren, Überwindung von Sprachlosigkeit und gedankliche Primärerfahrungen sind unter gegenwärtigen gesellschaftlichen Bedingungen von nicht zu unterschätzender Bedeutung. Die Focussierung auf das Gespräch, das im Kern auch andere Unterrichts- und Lernformen durchdringt, stärkt das Selbstvertrauen in vernünftige Denktätigkeit und die gegenseitige maieutische Denkhilfe in einer Lerngemeinschaft. Schließlich werden Reflexionen, Einblicke und Anregungen für die Praxis Sokratischer Gespräche gegeben, die vor allem in der Lehrerbildung ihr didaktisches Potential entfalten können.
Bd. 10, 2002, 656 S., 35,90 €, br.,
ISBN 3-8258-6322-0

Ästhetik und Kulturphilosophie

herausgegeben von Thomas Friedrich und Gerhard Schweppenhäuser

Gerhard Schweppenhäuser
Die Fluchtbahn des Subjekts
Beiträge zu Ästhetik und Kulturphilosophie
Kritische Philosophie kann heute nicht mehr mit dem starken Begriff des Subjekts arbeiten, aber sie muß *die Subjekte* in ihrem Konzept haben, verstanden als Handelnde (innerhalb systemischer Komplexe). Diese Überlegung ist ein gemeinsamer Nenner der Texte des Bandes. Die Themen sind vielgestaltig: Erinnerungskultur und politische Ästhetik, die Frage nach dem Subjekt in der Ästhetik der Natur, die regulative Idee der Menschheit als Subjekt im Strudel der Multikulturalismus-Diskussion, die Rekonstruktion des Geistes nach dem Modell der Maschine, die literarische Darstellung von Herausbildung und Zerfall individuell-gesellschaftlicher Subjektivität vor und in der Moderne, "klassische" und gegenwärtige Problemstellungen der Ästhetik des autonomen Kunstwerks und der Massenkultur sowie die Vermittlung von

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ethischen und ästhetischen Diskursen. Auf diesen Gebieten zeichnet sich ab, daß die Frage nach dem Subjekt ein unabgegoltenes Thema der Philosophie ist – entgegen allen "nachmetaphysischen" Grabreden.
Bd. 1, 2001, 240 S., 20,90 €, br.,
ISBN 3-8258-4974-0

Rodrigo Duarte; Oliver Fahle;
Gerhard Schweppenhäuser (Hg.)
Massenkultur
Kritische Theorien im interkulturellen Vergleich
Das vorliegende Buch versammelt gegenüberstellende, aber auch integrative Betrachtungen der Kritischen Theorie der „Kulturindustrie" mit Walter Benjamins politischer Medienästhetik, Marshall McLuhans universalistischer Medientheorie, Jean Baudrillards apokalyptischer Ästhetik der Simulation und des Hyperrealen, Vilém Flussers geschichtsphilosophischem digitalen Nihilismus der Medienkultur, Niklas Luhmanns funktionalistischer Systemtheorie der Massenmedien und Richard Shustermans neopragmatistischer Ästhetik der populären Kultur. Die Einleitung setzt sich mit Umberto Ecos einflussreicher Lesart von Max Horkheimer und Theodor W. Adorno sowie mit der medienphilosophischen Benjamin-Interpretation von Norbert Bolz auseinander und resümiert die neue Aneignung der Kulturindustrie-Theorie im GIobalisierungsdiskurs der gegenwärtigen Soziologie für die hier Scott Lash und Heinz Steinert als Repräsentanten ausgewählt wurden.
Bd. 2, 2003, 144 S., 19,90 €, br.,
ISBN 3-8258-6328-x

Roger Behrens
Krise und Illusion
Beiträge zur kritischen Theorie der Massenkultur
Das Schema von Krise und Illusion, das sich in der kulturellen Logik des Spätkapitalismus manifestiert, hat seinen Ausdruck in einem dynamischen Kraftfeld von Theorie und Praxis, welches sich die letzten einhundert Jahre strukturiert, vernetzt und immer weiter verdichtet hat. Hier finden sich Spuren, die weit in das vorletzte Jahrhundert zurück reichen: Die Entstehung der Massenkultur, die heute scheinbar ihr Endstadium erreicht hat, ist geschichtlich aus diesen Spuren im Sinne einer kritischen Theorie zu rekonstruieren.
Bd. 3, 2003, 256 S., 24,90 €, br.,
ISBN 3-8258-6423-5

Argumentaciones
Schriftenreihe der Deutsch-Chilenischen Gesellschaft für Philosophie/Escritos de la Sociedad Chileno-Alemana de Filosofía
herausgegeben von /Editores Hans Lenk, Mirko Skarica, Niels Öffenberger und Alejandro G. Vigo

Hans Lenk; Mirko Skarica;
Niels Öffenberger;
Alejandro G. Vigo (Hg.)
Urteil, Erkenntnis, Kultur
Akten der Tagung „Zur Geschichte der Urteilslehre", Santiago de Chile, Januar 2000
Der erste Band der Schriftenreihe der Chilenisch-Deutschen Gesellschaft für Philosophie dokumentiert die um das Thema Urteilslehre und Urteilsformen zentrierten Beiträge zu einem Kongress in Santiago und einem Workshop in Quitralco im Jahre 2000: Die Beiträge zur Geschichte der Urteilsformen und der Sprachanalyse reichen von Aristoteles' Urteilslehre und Logik bis zu Husserls Konzeption des prädikativen Urteils, berücksichtigen aber auch die geschichtliche Entwicklung von Begründungen der logischen Urteilsformen seit Kant sowie generell Fragen der sprachlichen und logischen Formen, der Bedeutung und Intentionalität sowie der Referenz theoretischer Begriffe und Fragen des Rationalismus, Empirismus und Idealismus. Logische und sprachliche Formen bilden die Grundlage von Erkenntnis und argumentativer Kultur, wie an den facettenreichen historischen und systematischen Beiträgen deutscher und südamerikanischer Philosophen deutlich wird.
Bd. 1, 2003, 256 S., 30,90 €, br.,
ISBN 3-8258-6067-1

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Philosophie im Kontext

herausgegeben von
Prof. Dr. Wilhelm Vossenkuhl
(Universität München)

Till Vierkant
Is the Self real?
An investigation into the philosophical concept of 'self' between cognitive science and social construction
This book attempts to give a convincing philosophical explanation for the strong persistence of our diverse folk psychological intuitions about the self. For this purpose it introduces, on the one hand, the distinction between subject and self model as proposed by Metzinger, on the other hand, the distinction between a social/normative and a cognitive/organic perspective on the self. The book argues that one needs to take into account both distinctions, if one wants to answer notoriously difficult questions like the one that gives the book its title: Is the self real?
Bd. 1, 2003, 184 S., 17,90 €, br.,
ISBN 3-8258-6518-5

Internet-Ethik

herausgegeben von Prof. Dr. Anton Kolb
(Graz)

Anton Kolb
Die Fluchtgesellschaft im Netz
Neuer Ethik-Kodex für das Internet
Die neuen Medien, die Informationsfreiheit, die Informations- und Kommunikationstechnologien sind in soziale Standards, in die Menschenrechte, in Humanität, Solidarität, Identität und Ethik einzubinden. Um dieses Ziel zu erreichen und Mißstände im Bereich von Multimedia zu reduzieren, bedarf es dringend der interdisziplinären Zusammenarbeit insbesondere von Wissenschaft, Politik, Wirtschaft, Gesellschaft, Kultur und Kirche. Im Buch werden konkrete, konstruktive Vorschläge gemacht, wird ein neuer und höchst aktueller Ethik-Kodex für das Internet formuliert. Anton Kolb ist Professor für Philosophie an der K.-F.-Universität Graz. Er hat 1979 die Rektorenkonferenz der Arge Alpen-Adria (dzt. 48 Universitäten) und 1991 die "Professorenkonferenz" (Standesvertretung der Professoren der 18 Universitäten Österreichs) gegründet.
Bd. 1, 2001, 280 S., 20,90 €, br.,
ISBN 3-8258-5148-6

argos-Schriften

hrsg. vom Institut für Gesellschaftswissenschaftliche Studien, Praktische Philosophie und Bildung argos e. V., Münster

Johann Ach; Matthias Kayß (Hg.)
"Stell Dir vor, Du stirbst ..." – Patientenverfügung und Vorsorgevollmacht in der Diskussion
Bd. 1, 1998, 160 S., 12,90 €, br.,
ISBN 3-8258-3754-8

Susanne Boshammer; Matthias Kayß (Hg.)
Halbe – Halbe?
Zur Gerechtigkeit der Frauenquote
Bd. 2, 2000, 176 S., 12,90 €, br.,
ISBN 3-8258-4491-9

Berliner Kolloquien zu Sozialethik und Ökonomischer Theorie

herausgegeben von André Habisch (Berlin) und Josef Wieland (Konstanz)

André Habisch; Michael Hartmann; Rolf Schuhmacher; Josef Wieland (Hg.)
Umweltethik und Entwicklungsprobleme: Die ökonomische Perspektive
Bd. 1, 1997, 216 S., 15,90 €, br.,
ISBN 3-8258-3274-0

André Habisch; Michael Hartmann; Susanna Schmidt; Josef Wieland (Hg.)
Globalisierung und Demokratie
Ethische Orientierung von Organisationen im Prozeß globaler Integration. Ein Gemeinschaftsprojekt der Katholischen Akademie in Berlin und der Evangelischen Akademie zu Berlin
Bd. 2, 2001, 192 S., 15,90 €, br.,
ISBN 3-8258-5032-3

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